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Abstract 
Although the “spatial” turn has generated significant advances in many areas of 
rhetorical theory and criticism, few scholars have considered how speakers (and 
specifically U.S. presidents) have drawn on the symbolic and physical elements of the 
speech setting as a material means of persuasion. The purpose of this study, therefore, is 
to demonstrate how U.S. presidents have invoked place as a rhetorical strategy. I contend 
that recent rhetorical approaches to space and place offer a fruitful theoretical and 
methodological perspective that enlarges and enriches our understanding of U.S. 
presidential public address as rhetoric designed for and delivered in situ, or in place. In 
this dissertation, I analyze three examples of Cold War presidential discourse: Harry S. 
Truman’s 1947 speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People at the Lincoln Memorial, John F. Kennedy’s 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” address 
at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and Ronald Reagan’s 1984 commemoration 
of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, France. I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan invoked 
place to (1) invest the speech setting with symbolic meaning; (2) harness always already 
present political and cultural symbols to build conceptual and literal commonplaces (topoi) 
for ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning embedded in that 
place; (3) constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the United States’ role in 
it; and (4) reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. This study also offers a 
theoretical and methodological framework—specifically, a rhetorical theory of deixis—for 
analyzing the persuasive power of rhetoric in situ. 
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Chapter One: The Significance of Place in U.S. Presidential Public Address 
 
 
On March 22, 2016, President Barack Obama spoke in Havana, Cuba, to an 
immediate audience of 1,100 (including Cuban president Raúl Castro) and to the 11 
million people living on the island via national television.1 As the first sitting U.S. 
president to visit the communist country in eighty-eight years, Obama frequently invoked 
his presidential presence in Cuba as a symbolic gesture of his determination to reconcile 
the U.S.-Cuban relationship. In his opening remarks, the president declared, “I have come 
here to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas. I have come here to 
extend the hand of friendship to the Cuban people.”2 Obama described his trip in literal 
and metaphorical terms, stating, “Havana is only 90 miles from Florida, but to get here 
we had to travel a great distance—over barriers of history and ideology; barriers of pain 
and separation.” This narrative recognized the tense history between the United States 
and Cuba, a history shaped by Cold War crises such as the 1961 Bay of Pigs incident and 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet despite the many years of strained diplomatic ties 
between the two countries, the president articulated his hopeful vision for the Cuban 
people even as he argued for the merits of democracy, equality, and human rights. 
Through his rhetoric in place, Obama declared it “a new day—es un nuevo día” for the 
two countries, one that represented an end of Cold War diplomatic tensions and the 
                                                
1 Ryan Teague Beckwith, “Read President Obama’s Speech to the Cuban People,” March 22, 2016, 
accessed March 22, 2016, http://time.com/4267933/barack-obama-cuba-speech-transcript-full-text/. 
2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016, accessed March 
22, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/22/remarks-president-obama-people-cuba. 
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beginning of “a better and brighter future for both the Cuban people and the American 
people.”3 
Obama’s recent visit to Cuba is just one example of the persuasive power of 
presidential rhetoric in place. Perhaps the most famous instance is Abraham Lincoln’s 
dedication of a bloodied battlefield in Pennsylvania on November 19, 1863. Garry Wills 
writes that “[t]he tragedy of the macerated bodies, the many bloody and ignoble aspects of 
this inconclusive encounter, are transfigured in Lincoln’s rhetoric. . . . The nightmare 
realities have been etherealized in the crucible of his language.”4 Lincoln’s brief address 
transformed Gettysburg from a bloodied battlefield to a place that represented (and still 
represents) the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Since 
1789, U.S. presidents have relied on the physical and material aspects of certain speech 
situations to persuade their audiences. In fact, because nineteenth-century presidents 
often embarked on presidential tours throughout the country to address the U.S. public 
personally, the presence of the president was a powerful rhetorical force prior to the 
mass-mediated images of the president visiting particular places or audiences.5 
                                                
3 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press 
Conference,” March 21, 2016, accessed March 24, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press. 
4 Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 1992), 37. 
5 For example, George Washington understood the significance of how the U.S. public saw or experienced 
presidential address. As Stephen E. Lucas observes, Washington was “[a] master of political ceremony . . . 
[and] staged the presentation of his speeches with great care. He also gave extraordinary attention to his 
self-presentation, cultivating a blend of regality and republicanism that, in combination with his magnetic 
physical presence and personal charisma, captivated those who saw and heard him.” Stephen E. Lucas, 
"Present at the Founding: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective," in Before the Rhetorical 
Presidency, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 39. For 
more on presidential travel and presidents speaking in place during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
see Richard Ellis, Presidential Travel: The Journey from George Washington to George W. Bush 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Lucas, "Present at the Founding: The Rhetorical 
Presidency in Historical Perspective; Amy R. Slagell, "The Challenges of Reunification: Rutherford B. 
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Throughout the 19th century, U.S. presidents used their presidential presence in place as a 
rhetorical gesture—even though their exposure was limited. For example, in 1877, 
Rutherford B. Hayes embarked on a speaking tour of the South in an attempt to reunify 
the nation. Hayes became a physical representative of the rhetorical goals he hoped to 
accomplish. Amy R. Slagell writes that Hayes used his trip to acknowledge the nation’s 
bitter divisions while “articulating both a vision of a united nation in the future as well as 
a list of the principles he asserted were held in agreement across sections, races, and 
parties. . . . But the master stroke of his plan to use rhetoric and symbolic action to reunite 
the nation was seen in the trips he took around the country.”6 In this instance, Hayes’ 
physical presence in place and the circulation of the presidential body7 throughout the 
country offered a physical display of the domestic policy goals he was trying to 
achieve—specifically, his desire to work towards reunification. However, in this and 
other instances of presidential presence in place, these situated rhetorical appeals had a 
limited audience; only those physically present could appreciate fully the symbolic 
aspects of the speech’s location. 
The visual optics of twentieth-century political speechmaking further amplified 
the persuasive impact of presidential presence in place. Because the U.S. public could 
physically see the president speaking in place, his location became a symbolic backdrop 
that the audience experienced alongside the spoken discourse. The rise of television only 
                                                                                                                                            
Hayes on the Close Race and the Racial Divide," in Before the Rhetorical Presidency, ed. Martin J. 
Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 243-266. 
6 Slagell, "The Challenges of Reunification: Rutherford B. Hayes on the Close Race and the Racial 
Divide," 254. 
7 For more on this concept of the circulation of the presidential body, see Zoë Hess Carney, “The 
Constitution of the President as Global Virtual Representative: Obama’s International Town Hall 
Meetings,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Communication Association, Las Vegas, 
NV, November 22, 2015. 
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increased the symbolic significance of place within U.S. presidential public address.8 As 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson notes, eloquence in the electronic age “is visual, not verbal,”9 
and the “television now transports the actual landscape to the nation’s living rooms. . . . 
the spoken word is attached to images almost like a caption.”10 These visual images of 
presidential presence in place—be it through print journalism, live news coverage, or the 
Internet—contribute to the overall persuasive impact of the rhetorical act.11 Bruce 
Gronbeck argues that presidents require not only “the right words, but [they need] to be 
well-positioned, well-timed, well-tuned, and well-framed visually.”12 “[W]ell-positioned” 
also suggests “well-placed,” for Gronbeck challenges rhetorical critics to expand our 
concept of political rhetoric beyond the merely verbal to the visual aspects of the 
rhetorical act. Similarly, Cara Finnegan and Jennifer L. Jones Barbour identify the 
                                                
8 In a fascinating study published in 1967, political scientist Bernard Rubin explained how television 
influenced political life in the United States. “First and perhaps foremost,” he wrote, “the medium can 
transmit sounds and sights from the locales where news events are unfolding. Consequently . . . interest in 
on-the-spot news reporting has grown tremendously. Before World War II, it was difficult for the average 
person to picture news events in real-life settings. Today, most Americans can visualize a civil rights 
demonstration, a political party convention, a Presidential address, or a rocket launching through television 
presentations.” For Rubin, the “where” (or the place) of a particular rhetorical act or news event was 
particularly important, and the visual images that act provided became a powerful form of public education 
and persuasion. Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 
1967), 1-2. For more on the relationship between television and politics, see, for example, Murray 
Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Erik 
Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); 
William C. Spragens, The Presidency and the Mass Media in the Age of Television (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1979); Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988); David E. Fisher and Marshall Jon Fisher, TUBE: The Invention of 
Television (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1996); Stephen Cushion and Justin Lewis, eds., The Rise of the 
24-Hour News Television: Global Perspectives  (New York: Peter Lang, 2010). 
9 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 44. 
10 Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age, 57. 
11 The claim that certain places, sites, or backdrops of political acts can have a persuasive impact is not 
new, however. Political scientist Murray Edelman criticized politicians who exploited political scene or 
setting for their own ideological ends, writing that political actors take “[g]reat pains . . . to call attention to 
settings and to present them conspicuously, as if the scene were expected either to call forth a response of 
its own or to heighten the response to the act it frames.” Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 95. 
12 Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Presidency in the Age of Secondary Orality," in Beyond the Rhetorical 
Presidency, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 42. 
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challenges and opportunities visual rhetoric provides and urge students of public address 
“[to adapt] our critical practices to the challenges of the visual” and analyze how 
“[t]echnologies of communication . . . enable or constrain the movement of rhetorical 
discourse.”13 For scholars of presidential rhetoric, the linkages between the verbal and the 
visual provide rich sites for rhetorical analysis, particularly in thinking about how U.S. 
presidents utilize and even exploit the images that accompany their rhetorical acts. 
Attending to what we can see of a rhetorical act—the place, the speech setting, the 
audience members, the objects located in the place—helps us understand how the visual 
and the verbal collide in U.S. presidential public address. Moreover, by considering how 
U.S. presidents point to or gesture towards these places, settings, people, and objects as 
evidence, rhetorical critics can uncover how orators use language to trigger rhetorical 
vision and memories of the past by directing their audiences to what is physically present 
before them. 
In this dissertation, I argue for the significance of place in analyzing U.S. 
presidential public address. Although the “spatial” turn has generated significant 
advances in many areas of rhetorical theory and criticism, few scholars have considered 
how speakers (and specifically U.S. presidents) have drawn on the symbolic and material 
elements of the speech setting as a means of persuasion. The purpose of this study, 
therefore, is to demonstrate how U.S. presidents have invoked place as a rhetorical 
strategy. I contend that recent rhetorical approaches to space and place offer a fruitful 
theoretical and methodological perspective that enlarges and enriches our understanding 
                                                
13 Cara A. Finnegan and Jennifer L. Jones Barbour, "Visualizing Public Address," Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 9, no. 3 (2006): 504; 503. 
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of presidential rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place. To do this, I analyze three 
examples of Cold War presidential rhetoric: Harry S. Truman’s 1947 speech to the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at the Lincoln Memorial, 
John F. Kennedy’s 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in 
West Berlin, and Ronald Reagan’s 1984 commemoration of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, 
France. I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan invoked place to (1) invest the location 
with symbolic meaning through speech; (2) harness always already present political and 
cultural symbols to build conceptual and literal commonplaces (topoi) for the ideological 
metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning embedded in that place; (3) 
constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the United States’ role in it; and (4) 
reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. This study extends beyond these three 
cases, however, in that it offers a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing 
the persuasive power of rhetoric in situ—or in place. 
In this introductory chapter, I situate the project within the relevant scholarly 
literature on U.S. presidential rhetoric and spatial theory and offer a preview of my three 
case studies. In what follows, I first consider how conceptualizing presidential presence as 
linked to and established in place reveals how chief executives amplify the persuasive 
potential of particular locations simply by being there physically. I then discuss how 
various scholarly works on the relationship between rhetoric, space and place, memory, 
visual rhetoric, and geopolitics inform this project. Finally, I discuss how the classical 
concept of topos (or the commonplace) offers a helpful framework for analyzing the 
Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy as Cold War commonplaces, 
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metaphorical and literal “places of return” from which and in which U.S. presidents 
activated their location as a material means of persuasion.14 To conclude, I outline the 
key methodological assumptions guiding this project and preview the remaining chapters 
of the dissertation. 
 
Presidential Ethos and Presence in Place 
Because the U.S. president speaks on behalf of and to the nation, his15 rhetorical 
authority is special and unique. When the president speaks, we listen. As Roderick P. 
Hart notes, “[p]residential speech is speech for the record, speech that cannot fade, 
speech whose echo will never cease. . . . In short, speech talks; presidential speech talks 
even louder.”16 But presidential speech does more than command the U.S. public’s 
attention. Presidents use rhetoric to interpret and even define who we are as a people. As 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson observe, “all presidents have the 
opportunity to persuade us to conceive of ourselves in ways compatible with their views 
of government and the world.”17 Indeed, according to Vanessa B. Beasley, U.S. 
presidents become “symbolic guardians of national unity in the United States” and use 
their bully pulpit “to promote the idea of an American people to the American people.”18 
Presidents also define political realities for, as David Zarefsky notes, the president’s 
                                                
14 Christa J. Olson, Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican 
Ecuador (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014), 5. 
15 I use the male pronoun here (and, when necessary, throughout this project) to reflect the current state of 
the institution. 
16 Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 6, 32. 
17 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done 
in Words (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 8. 
18 Vanessa B. Beasley, You, The People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 22. 
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“prominent political position and his access to the means of communication” enables him 
to “[define] a situation . . . [and] shape the context in which events or proposals are 
viewed by the public.”19 When U.S. presidents invoke place as a rhetorical strategy, they 
tap into the symbolic resonances of that location to demonstrate their innate 
understanding of U.S. political culture and public life and define the meaning of that 
place. Simply put, speaking in place offers chief executives the opportunity to display the 
material and symbolic resonances of that location to the nation and the world. 
This connection between presidential authority and place is captured in the 
etymology of the word ethos. Although commonly understood as the “character” or 
“good will” of the speaker, ethos actually describes a speaker’s ability “to manifest the 
virtues most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks.”20 S. Michael Halloran 
suggests that “[t]he most concrete meaning given for [ethos] in the Greek lexicon is ‘a 
habitual gathering place.’” This definition suggests an “image of people gathering 
together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas.”21 Michael J. Hyde extends this 
definition, arguing, 
one can understand the phrase “the ethos of rhetoric” to refer to the way discourse 
is used to transform space and time into “dwelling places” (ethos; pl. ethea) where 
people can deliberate about and “know together” (con-scientia) some matter of 
                                                
19 David Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, 
no. 3 (2004): 611. 
20 S. Michael Halloran, "Aristotle's Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else's," Rhetoric Review 1, 
no. 1 (1982): 60. 
21 Halloran, "Aristotle's Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else's," 60. 
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interest. Such dwelling places define the grounds, the abodes or habitats, where a 
person’s ethics and moral character take form and develop.22 
Ethos, then, is as much a reflection of the speaker’s ability to identify the shared values of 
the community, and where these values dwell, as it is a description of the speaker’s own 
character. This extended notion of ethos is significant for this project because it suggests 
that presidents can cultivate and even create metaphorical and literal “dwelling places” 
that represent U.S. ideals. I argue that U.S. presidents often demonstrate their inherent 
understanding of communal virtues by locating certain speeches in places that symbolize 
political, cultural, and social customs and shared values. As my analysis chapters will 
demonstrate, when presidents speak in place about these shared values, they also bolster 
their own rhetorical authority as a moral leader and head of state. 
Presidential rhetoric in place also works as a means of presence, a way to 
underscore or amplify the symbolic significance of a particular location for the U.S. 
public. Within rhetorical studies, the concept of presence usually refers to the ways in 
which rhetors make certain pieces of evidence particularly salient for the audience.23 
What is particularly interesting about the concept of presence, however, is the variety of 
meanings one can assign to it. Outside of this traditionally rhetorical interpretation, one 
                                                
22 Michael J. Hyde, "Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell," in The Ethos of Rhetoric, ed. Michael J. Hyde 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xiii. 
23 “Presence,” write Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, “acts directly on our sensibility.” Robert 
D. Tucker explains the concept of presence as “a property that a speaker gives to images, symbols, words, 
phrases and larger argumentative structures. This “property” can be best thought of as ‘standing-out-ness.” 
To make something present to the audience, whether through speech or direct experience, means that the 
rhetor uses language to direct his/her audience toward, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put it, “what he 
considers important to his argument or . . . to enhance the value of some of the elements of which one has 
actually been made conscious.” See Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A 
Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 116, 117; Robert E. 
Tucker, "Figure, Ground and Presence: A Phenomenology of Meaning in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 87, no. 4 (2001): 397. 
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of the most common understandings of presence is the embodiment of an individual or 
thing; the presence of someone or something denotes that they are there. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the term as the “fact or condition of being present; the state of 
being with or in the same place as a person or thing; attendance, company, society, or 
association.” A second definition is particularly useful for thinking about presidential 
presence: “The place or space in front of or around a person; the immediate vicinity of a 
person; the company or society of someone. Freq. with reference to ceremonial or formal 
attendance on a distinguished, esp. royal, person.”24 This type of presence—the physical 
proximity of a head of state, celebrity, or all-star athlete—often evokes heightened 
feelings and/or sensations from the audience such as excitement, nervousness, or even 
fear simply because that person is there. For the purposes of this project, I use the 
concept of presidential presence to suggest that when presidents travel to a particular 
location and speak in place, they lend their rhetorical authority and ethos to that place and 
mark it as significant in U.S. political culture. Even as U.S. presidents amplify a site’s 
importance in the public imaginary, they also bolster their own rhetorical authority and 
ethos by speaking in that place. Ultimately, I argue that presidential presence in place 
reveals a co-constitutive relationship between presidential authority and rhetoric in place, 
a back and forth exchange between  presidential authority as a function of ethos and the 
symbolism embodied in the history and memory of a place itself. 
To summarize, when U.S. presidents speak, they embody a certain type of ethos, 
one that reflects their understanding of the nation’s virtues and ideals even as they foster 
                                                
24 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “presence, n.,” accessed March 18, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/150669. 
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a shared communal ethos through their rhetoric. As my analyses of Truman, Kennedy, 
and Reagan will demonstrate, this ethos often manifests itself on the political stage as 
presidents respond to particular rhetorical exigencies and situational demands. In each of 
my case studies, the president situated his address in a location that was linked 
inextricably to his overarching rhetorical purpose. In this way, then, U.S. presidents 
utilize the physical elements of the speech setting—or the political stage—to reflect the 
communal values they wish to advance. Because presidents play multiple rhetorical roles, 
they have special powers to invest places with symbolic meaning. Moreover, when they 
harness the persuasive power of place through speech, their rhetorical acts linguistically 
bond the spoken word with the physical place, marrying the verbal with what is 
immediate to the senses. 
 
Place and the U.S. Presidency 
The recent “spatial” turn has pushed scholars within a variety of disciplines to 
examine how certain spaces and/or places gain political and cultural significance.25 A 
parallel conversation has been occurring within rhetorical studies, with critics examining 
                                                
25 Some of the most important works include Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday 
Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other 
Spaces," Diacritics 16, no. 1 (1986): 22-27; Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertation of 
Space in Critical Social Theory (New York, NY: Verso, 1989); Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 
trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991); Gearóid  Ó Tuathail and John 
Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," 
Political Geography 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204; Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: 
Rethinking the French Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Edward S. Casey, The Fate of 
Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Doreen Massey, For 
Space (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2005). 
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how space and/or place can work rhetorically.26 Although most of these studies within 
rhetoric analyze the persuasive capacity of the space or place itself, scholars have paid 
less attention to how speakers can invest certain spaces or places with shared values, 
cultural identities, and political ideologies through speech. In this dissertation, I build on 
these perspectives to argue that critics should consider how speakers employ the 
symbolic and material elements of the speech setting as a means of persuasion. This 
approach takes place seriously while also analyzing where and how orators use language 
to activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-
political context for their persuasive purposes. In this section, I discuss several important 
conceptual themes within the space and place literature and describe how I use these 
                                                
26 There are numerous studies that are important. See, for example: Ronald Walter Greene, "Another 
Materialist Rhetoric," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 15, no. 1 (1998): 21-40; Carole Blair, 
"Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric's Materiality," in Rhetorical Bodies, ed. Jack 
Selzer and Sharon Crowley (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 16-57; Carole Blair, 
"Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places," Western Journal of Communication 
65, no. 3 (2001): 271-294; Roxanne Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space," Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2001): 41-71; Ronald Walter Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: 
Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'," Quarterly Journal of Speech 
88, no. 4 (2002): 434-443; Roxanne Mountford, The Gendered Pulpit: Preaching in American Protestant 
Spaces (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003); Raka Shome, "Space Matters: The 
Power and Practice of Space," Communication Theory 13, no. 1 (2003): 39-56; Elizabethada A. Wright, 
"Rhetorical Spaces in Memorial Places: The Cemetery as a Rhetorical Memory Place/Space," Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2005): 51-81; Kenneth S. Zagacki and Victoria J. Gallagher, "Rhetoric and 
Materiality in the Museum Park at the North Carolina Museum of Art," Quarterly Journal of Speech 95, 
no. 2 (2009): 171-191; V. William Balthrop, Carole Blair, and Neil Michel, "The Presence of the Present: 
Hijacking ‘The Good War’?," Western Journal of Communication 74, no. 2 (2010): 170-207; Carole Blair, 
Greg Dickinson, and Brian L. Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," in Places of Public Memory: 
The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials, ed. Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott (Tuscaloosa, 
AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 1-54; Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, eds., Places 
of Public Memory  (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010); Ronald Walter Greene, "Spatial 
Materialism: Labor, Location, and Transnational Literacy," Critical Studies in Media Communication 27, 
no. 1 (2010): 105-110; Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of 
Place in Protest," Quarterly Journal of Speech 97, no. 3 (2011): 257-282; Christopher Reid, Imprison'd 
Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Robert J. Topinka, "Resisting the Fixity of Suburban Space: The Walker as Rhetorician," 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2012): 65-84. 
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perspectives in the project. I have limited my scope to authors, theories, and approaches 
that directly inform my study of how U.S. presidents invoke place as a rhetorical strategy. 
Rhetorical scholars generally approach place as a physical site or location that can 
be geographically identified and space as a fluid, unbounded, metaphorical description of 
some area, region, or shared ideological network. Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and 
Brian L. Ott observe that space and place are often used “to emphasize a difference in 
how physical situatedness is experienced. In such usages, a place that is bordered, 
specified, and locatable by being named is different from open, undifferentiated, 
undesignated space.”27 Similarly, Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook observe 
that “[p]lace refers to particular locations (e.g., a city, a particular shopping mall, or a 
park) that are semi-bounded, a combination of material and symbolic qualities, and 
embodied” whereas “[s]pace refers to a more general notion of how society and social 
practice are regulated (and sometimes disciplined) by spatial thinking (e.g., capitalist 
modes of production or gendered notions of private and public spaces).”28 For most 
rhetorical scholars, the concept of place suggests a physical site or location one can 
identify through definitive geographical and spatial boundaries. In this project, I define 
place as a physical location identified by certain material characteristics that often 
functions as a storehouse of political symbols and cultural memories—places like the 
Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy. I see space as a complex set of social 
and political relations that condition and even govern certain ways of being and acting in 
that place. I approach space and place as distinctive entities, yet also mutually 
                                                
27 Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," 23. 
28 Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," 259-260. 
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constitutive; that is, they are always informed by each other and subject to constant 
negotiation and renegotiation.29  
In this dissertation, I focus specifically on how U.S. presidents have invoked 
place—that is, a geographically definable and physically located site that is always 
imbued with symbolic meaning—as a rhetorical strategy. From the outset, however, it is 
essential to note that each of my case studies reveals how the mediation and circulation of 
presidential rhetoric in place quickly extends beyond its physical situatedness within 
spatial and geographical borders into the broader space of the Cold War global 
imaginary. In the chapters that follow, I consider the ways in which the president, the 
White House, the U.S. State Department, and other governmental agencies saw the place 
or location of the president’s address not merely as a means of invention, but as a 
physical symbol of U.S. democracy during the Cold War that the president could activate 
and amplify because of his physical presence in that place. In turn, the mediation and 
circulation of presidential rhetoric in situ—be it through photographs, radio broadcasts, 
newsreel footage, or live television—extended the local (or place) into the global (or 
space) as the U.S. president used his location to argue for a specific way of being and 
acting in the Cold War world. This perspective builds on Ronald Walter Greene and 
Kevin Douglas Kuswa’s argument for performing a rhetorical cartography of place in 
                                                
29 For example, the Lincoln Memorial is a place located within the District of Columbia on the south side 
of the National Mall. We can point to it on a map and give directions for how one can get there via car or 
Metro. Its physical location invites certain rhetorical action because of its placement on the National Mall, 
its proximity to political officials, and its status as an important symbol of the Civil Rights Movement. The 
monument’s material qualities—white marble, high columns, a statue of Abraham Lincoln—also render it 
as a place of national importance. To describe the Lincoln Memorial as a space, however, we must consider 
it as one point in a larger spatial network of symbols and ideologies “that is under constant construction, 
reconstruction, and sometimes subject to deconstruction.” In other words, places can work as physical sites 
where cultural, political, and ideological spatial structures can be negotiated, contested, and transformed. 
Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," 260. 
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protest. In their reading of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements, Greene 
and Kuswa consider “how a ‘place in protest’ . . . travels beyond its own location, pulling 
and pushing different places, people, and practices into ‘maps of power.’”30 Although my 
case studies do not address place in protest, they do offer another example of how the 
rhetorical invocation of place (and the symbols that always already present in that place) 
can constitute citizen-subjects and create geopolitical realities. Speaking in place, 
therefore, does not mean that rhetorical acts are bound to their location. Instead, it is the 
very placed-ness of these rhetorical encounters that makes them ripe for mediation, 
circulation, and extension over time and space.31 
                                                
30 Ronald Walter Greene and Kevin Douglas Kuswa, "'From the Arab Spring to Athens, From Occupy Wall 
Street to Moscow': Regional Accents and the Rhetorical Cartography of Power," Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2012): 273. For more on spatial materialism and critical/cultural rhetorical approaches 
to space and place, see Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertation of Space in Critical Social 
Theory; Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric; Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: 
Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'; Raka Shome and Radha 
Hegde, "Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Globalization," Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 19, no. 2 (2002): 172-189; Shome, "Space Matters: The Power and Practice of Space; 
James Hay, "Between Cultural Materialism and Spatial Materialism: James Carey's Writing About 
Communication," in Thinking with James Carey: Essays on Communications, Transportation, and History, 
ed. Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 29-55; Donovan Conley and Greg 
Dickinson, "Textural Democracy," Critical Studies in Media Communication 27, no. 1 (2010): 1-7; Greene, 
"Spatial Materialism: Labor, Location, and Transnational Literacy; Ronald Walter Greene, "Rhetorical 
Materialism: The Rhetorical Subject and the General Intellect," in Rhetoric, Materiality, & Politics, ed. 
Barbara A. Biesecker and John Lewis Lucaites (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2010), 43-65. 
31 For more on rhetorical circulation, see Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (Cambridge: Zone 
Books, 2002); Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: Circulating Subjects through Michael 
Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'; Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, "Cultures of Circulation: The 
Imaginations of Modernity," Public Culture 14, no. 1 (2002): 191-213; Lester C. Olson, "Pictorial 
Representations of British America Resisting Rape: Rhetorical Re-Circulation of a Print Series Portraying 
the Boston Port Bill of 1774," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12, no. 1 (2009): 1-35; Catherine Chaput, 
"Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective Energy," 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 43, no. 1 (2010): 1-25; Mary E. Stuckey, "On Rhetorical Circulation," Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs 15, no. 4 (2012): 609-612; Darrel Allan Wanzer, "Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting McGee's 
Fragmentation Thesis through Decolonality," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 15, no. 4 (2012): 647-657; Megan 
Foley, "Sound Bites: Rethinking the Circulation of Speech from Fragment to Fetish," Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 15, no. 4 (2012): 613-622; Stephen Heidt, "The Presidency as Pastiche: Atomization, Circulation, 
and Rhetorical Instability," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 15, no. 4 (2012): 623-633. 
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Much of the work connecting rhetoric and place focuses on the persuasive powers 
of certain physical sites or geographical locations—memorials, museums, public 
spaces—in and of themselves. Endres and Senda-Cook use the term “place-as-rhetoric” 
to define this approach, one that “refers to the material (physical and embodied) aspects 
of a place having meaning and consequence, be it through bodies, signage, buildings, 
fences, flags, and so on. . . . place-as-rhetoric assumes that place itself is rhetorical.”32 Put 
another way, “place-as-rhetoric” suggests that places have rhetorical significance—or the 
ability to persuade—apart from spoken discourse. Another perspective is that rhetoric 
constitutes and reconstitutes place even as place enables and constrains particular ways of 
being in the world. Kirt H. Wilson underscores this point in his work on the 
reconstruction desegregation debate, writing that in the Deep South, “[p]lace existed as a 
kind of condensation symbol; it signified a person’s identity and location within the 
organic communities of the South. Individual and communal, place determined the 
spaces that a person could occupy and how one could interact, privately or publicly, with 
others.”33 Both concepts—“place-as-rhetoric” and the enabling and/or constraining 
function of place—are important for this dissertation. I argue that when U.S. presidents 
(and rhetors more broadly) situate a speech act in a geographical location central to their 
argument, they activate the rhetorical resonances of that place, be it the argument that 
                                                
32 Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," 265. 
33 Kirt H. Wilson, The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of Equality and the Rhetoric of 
Place, 1870-1875 (Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 12. See also Kirt H. Wilson, "The 
Politics of Place and Presidential Rhetoric in the United States, 1875-1901," in Civil Rights Rhetoric and 
the American Presidency, ed. James Arnt Aune and Enrique D. Rigsby (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2005), 16-40. 
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place makes in and of itself or the symbolic associations and limitations that place 
provides. 
Another important aspect of rhetoric in place is how particular locations function 
as storehouses of public memory, places that trigger a community’s remembrance of a 
shared history.34 In fact, the very reason that a particular site or location can perform a 
“place-as-rhetoric” function is because it represents some trace of the past. French 
historian Pierre Nora’s seminal work on memory studies, Lieux de Mémoire, grounds 
many of these projects. In the introduction, Nora writes, “Lieux de mémoire are complex 
things. At once natural and artificial, simple and ambiguous, concrete and abstract, they 
are lieux—places, sites, causes—in three senses: material, symbolic, and functional. . . . 
These three aspects of embodied memory—the material, the symbolic, and the 
functional—always coexist.”35 It is precisely the physical, tangible, touchable nature of 
memory places that renders them a concrete manifestation of the past. These places 
                                                
34 See, for example, Edward Tabor Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields (Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991); John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, 
and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); John R. Gillis, 
ed. Commemorations  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Steven H. Browne, "Reading, 
Rhetoric, and the Texture of Public Memory," Quarterly Journal of Speech 81, no. 2 (1995): 237-265; 
Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past; Blair, "Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as 
Exemplars of Rhetoric's Materiality; Edward S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study 2nd ed. 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000); Blair, "Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables 
from Public Places; Edward S. Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time," in Framing Public Memory, ed. 
Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 17-44; Kendall R. Phillips, ed. 
Framing Public Memory  (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Benjamin Hufbauer, 
Presidential Temples: How Memorials and Libraries Shape Public Memory (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2005); Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven R. Goldzwig, "History, Collective Memory, and 
the Appropriation of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Reagan's Rhetorical Legacy," Presidential Studies Quarterly 
35, no. 4 (2005): 661-690; Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place; Balthrop, 
Blair, and Michel, "The Presence of the Present: Hijacking ‘The Good War’?; Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, 
Places of Public Memory; Bradford Vivian, Public Forgetting: The Rhetoric and Politics of Beginning 
Again (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Kendall R. Phillips and G. 
Mitchell Reyes, eds., Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a Transnational Age  
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2011). 
35 Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History," in Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, ed. 
Pierre Nora (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 14. 
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become sites “in which memory is crystalized, in which it finds refuge. . . . in which a 
residual sense of continuity remains.”36 Similarly, Edward S. Casey argues that place “is 
integral to public memory” because being in place facilitates the very act of remembering 
and, at times, even “embodies the memory itself.”37 For Casey, places provide an “active 
material inducement . . . drawing out the appropriate memories in that location.”38 Both 
Nora and Casey suggest that being in a particular location activates the memories we 
associate with that place. Thus, when U.S. presidents speak in situ, they harness the 
symbolic resonances of their speech setting while simultaneously contributing new 
memories to that place. In the chapters that follow, I consider how Truman, Kennedy, and 
Reagan used their rhetoric in situ to appropriate the material and symbolic elements of 
their location as a means of evidence. By speaking in place, these presidents harnessed 
the memories and ideologies associated with the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and 
Normandy as inducement for their specific proposals. 
Because places are “always already rhetorical” and “assume an identity precisely 
in being recognizable—as named, bordered, and invented in particular ways,” it is critical 
to recognize that U.S. presidents play a central role in constituting geopolitical realities 
and, in this instance, the dominant narrative of the Cold War.39 When presidents speak in 
or about place, they legitimize that place and give it credence on the world stage. Cultural 
geographers Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew argue that the simple act of describing 
“a foreign-policy problem is to engage in geopolitics, for one is implicitly and tacitly 
                                                
36 Nora, "Between Memory and History," 1. 
37 Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time," 32. 
38 Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time," 32. 
39 Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," 24. 
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normalizing a particular world. One could describe geopolitical reasoning as the creation 
of the backdrop or setting upon which ‘international politics’ takes place but such would 
be a simplistic view. The creating of such a setting is itself a part of world politics.”40 For 
rhetorical scholars this point is particularly important. Describing, characterizing, or 
naming a place does much more than create a backdrop for a speech act or even define 
the symbolic significance of the place itself. When U.S. presidents speak in situ and link 
their rhetorical act to the symbols that are always already present in place, they contribute 
to the “dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas” that are always already present in that 
particular location.41 
Although most studies focus on the rhetoricity of the place itself, several works 
highlight an under-theorized dimension of the relationship between rhetoric and place: 
how a speaker can rely on and even exploit various aspects of the speech setting such as 
the position of the speaker in relation to the audience, the physical construction of the 
stage, and other physical aspects of the geography or design that characterize the near 
environment of the delivery space. In a 2001 article published in Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly, Roxanne Mountford argued for a critical examination of what she termed 
“rhetorical space”: 
Rhetorical space is the geography of a communicative event and, like all 
landscapes, may include both the cultural and material arrangement, 
                                                
40 Ó Tuathail and Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American 
Foreign Policy," 194. 
41 Ó Tuathail and Agnew note that within “American geopolitics” specifically, the president is “the chief 
bricoleur of American political life, a combination of storyteller and tribal shaman” with “the power to 
describe, represent, interpret and appropriate.” Ó Tuathail and Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: 
Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," 194, 195-196. 
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whether intended or fortuitous, of space. The cultural is the grid across 
which we measure and interpret space, but also the nexus from which 
creative minds manipulate material space. The material—a dimension too 
little theorized by rhetoricians—often has unforeseen influence over a 
communicative event and cannot always be explained by cultural or 
creative intent.42 
Here Mountford emphasizes the rhetorical significance of the material arrangement of the 
speech setting, arguing that this “rhetorical space” reflects “a physical representation of 
relationships and ideas.”43 This approach is helpful because it suggests that orators can 
fuse verbal discourse with what is materially real by referring to physical objects, bodies, 
and spaces within the speaking environment—objects, bodies, and spaces that condition 
the invention and reception of public address. 
Speaking in place, however, involves more than being somewhere physically. 
Instead, it suggests that the place or location of a speech act becomes a scenic and 
symbolic backdrop that is both verbal and visual. This visual component of presidential 
rhetoric in place is crucially important for this project, for, as each of my case studies 
demonstrates, the visuals associated with rhetoric in situ are profoundly rhetorical. When 
the president speaks in a certain place or location, we see him. He performs on a stage, 
whether metaphorical or literal, before an audience that is either physically or virtually 
                                                
42 Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space," 42. 
43 Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space," 42. Another scholar who employs Mountford’s notion of 
rhetorical space, Christopher Reid, considers how the arrangement of podiums, gavels, desks, and bodies in 
the British House of Commons suggested certain hierarchical relationships between Members of 
Parliament (MPs). Reid extends Mountford’s work when he describes how MPs invoked cultural and 
political memories located in that space by gesturing towards or pointing to objects and bodies through 
their speech. See Reid, Imprison'd Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-
1800. 
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present.44 Throughout this dissertation, I approach my case studies as texts that are 
simultaneously verbal, visual, and material, rhetorical acts made up of what is spoken, 
seen, and immediate to the senses. In that vein, I find Cara Finnegan’s description of the 
visual rhetoric project particularly helpful in thinking about how to analyze the rhetorical 
act in its textual, visual, and material totality. She writes, 
The visual rhetoric project relies upon critiques of vision and visuality to 
illuminate the complex dynamics of power and knowledge at play in and around 
images. It embraces the complexities of the relationships between images and 
texts and argues that visual images should not be artificially separated from texts 
for analysis. And it seeks a “recovery” of the image that avoids the privileging of 
language over image, of verbal over visual. The goal of the visual rhetoric project, 
then, is to determine how visual images participate in public discourse—to 
understand in a historically specific, systematic fashion how images become 
inventional resources for public argument.45 
Here Finnegan stresses the complex and interwoven relationship between the verbal and 
the visual.46 As I will detail more fully in the next chapter and demonstrate through my 
                                                
44 Similarly, David Zarefsky observes that a text of presidential rhetoric “refers not only to the words the 
president speaks but to the entirety of the presidential performance. For example, the fact that a State of the 
Union address is delivered to a joint session of Congress, with the president appearing before a giant U.S. 
flag in the chamber of the House of Representatives, is as much a part of his speech as are the words he 
speaks.” Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 609. 
45 Cara A. Finnegan, "Documentary as Art in U.S. Camera," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2001): 
39-40. 
46 For more on this important relationship and visual rhetoric more broadly, see Paul Messaris, Visual 
"Literacy": Image, Mind, and Reality (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture 
Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994); Paul Messaris, Visual Persuasion: The Role of Images in Advertising (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1997); Keith V. Erickson, "Presidential Rhetoric's Visual Turn: Performance Fragments and 
the Politics of Illusionism," Communication Monographs 67, no. 2 (2000): 138-157; Cara A. Finnegan, 
Picturing Poverty: Print Culture and FSA Photographs (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2003); 
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three case studies, presidential rhetoric in place activates the material realities of the 
rhetorical situation as a means of evidence—including the visuals that accompany their 
body in place. When presidents speak in situ, the placement of their presidential body 
within a particular location triggers not only the symbolic dimensions of that place, but it 
also provides visual images to the immediate and extended audience of how and why that 
particular place is significant rhetorically. In turn, as images of the president speaking in 
place circulate in the United States and around the world via newspaper coverage, 
television, cable news, and the Internet, the president’s rhetorical act extends beyond 
spoken discourse. It becomes a text that is simultaneously verbal and visual, one that 
circulates in place while simultaneously moving through place to (re)constitute the 
rhetorical significance of that place for present and future action. 
Where many studies of visual rhetoric focus particularly on the rhetoricity of 
visual images themselves, this project analyzes how presidential presence in place works 
persuasively precisely because it is both verbal and visual. In the chapters that follow, I 
argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan used their physical placement at the Lincoln 
Memorial, the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and the beaches of Normandy to 
                                                                                                                                            
Cara A. Finnegan, "Review Essay: Visual Studies and Visual Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, 
no. 2 (2004): 234-256; Charles A. Hill and Marguerite Helmers, eds., Defining Visual Rhetorics  (Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004); Cara A. Finnegan, "Recognizing Lincoln: Image 
Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8, no. 1 (2005): 31-57; 
Finnegan and Barbour, "Visualizing Public Address; Cara A. Finnegan, "What Is This a Picture Of?: Some 
Thoughts on Images and Archives," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9, no. 1 (2006): 116-123; Robert Hariman 
and John Lewis Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal 
Democracy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); Davi Johnson, "Martin Luther King Jr.'s 
1963 Birmingham Campaign as Image Event," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10, no. 1 (2007): 1-26; Lester C. 
Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope, "Visual Rhetoric in Communication: Continuing Questions 
and Contemporary Issues," in Visual Rhetoric: A Reader in Communication and American Culture, ed. 
Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008); Paul Messaris, 
"Review Essay: What's Visual about 'Visual Rhetoric'?," Quarterly Journal of Speech 95, no. 2 (2009): 
210-223; Cara A. Finnegan, Making Photography Matter: A Viewer's History from the Civil War to the 
Great Depression (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015). 
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amplify the symbolic dimensions of these particular locations while constituting the 
United States’ presence on the world stage as a global leader. Presidential presence in 
place, therefore, is not only physical; it is inherently symbolic. Each of my three case 
studies is unique, not only because they deal with three different U.S. presidents and 
particular rhetorical exigencies, but because they also represent distinct moments in the 
transformation of mediated presidential discourse and in the Cold War struggle between 
U.S. democracy and Soviet communism. However, all three chapters provide important 
theoretical and methodological insights into the ways that critics must analyze how visual 
images address publics while also considering how publics visualize the various 
dimensions of presidential rhetoric in place. 
 
The Cold War Commonplace 
As U.S. presidents engaged in Cold War rhetoric in favor of U.S. democracy and 
against Soviet communism, they frequently used metaphorical and ideological 
interpretations of the world to motivate civic action and broad national support for U.S. 
policies at home and abroad.47 According to Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, 
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the Cold War was “a rhetorically constructed ideological reality that was first accepted 
within the ruling circles of government, then publicly conveyed through major speeches 
and writings to Americans who generally accepted it as the reality of both foreign and 
domestic politics.”48 Yet this “rhetorically constructed ideological reality” was reinforced 
by the metaphorical and the literal. As Martin J. Medhurst writes, 
Cold War, like its “hot” counterpart, is a contest. It is a contest between 
competing systems as represented, for example, by the Soviet Union and the 
United States. It is a contest involving such tangibles as geography, markets, 
spheres of influence, and military alliances, as well as such intangibles as public 
opinion, attitudes, images, expectations, and beliefs about whatever system is 
currently in ascendancy. The contest, in other words, is both material and 
psychological in nature. The currency of Cold War combat—the tokens used in 
the contest—is rhetorical discourse: discourse intentionally designed to achieve a 
particular goal with one or more specific audience. While the weapons of a hot 
                                                                                                                                            
Cold War," Western Journal of Communication 59, no. 3 (1995): 214-227; Ernest G. Bormann, John F. 
Cragan, and Donald C. Shields, "An Expansion of the Rhetorical Vision Component of the Symbolic 
Convergence Theory: The Cold War Paradigm Case," Communication Monographs 63, no. 1 (1996): 1-28; 
Martin J. Medhurst, "Afterword: Rhetorical Perspectives on the Cold War," in Critical Reflections on the 
Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station, TX: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Shawn J. Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and 
the Cold War, 1945-1955 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman 
Doctrine: A Cold War Call to Arms (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Timothy 
Barney, "Power Lines: The Rhetoric of Maps as Social Change in the Post–Cold War Landscape," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 95, no. 4 (2009): 412-434; Ned O'Gorman, "'The One Word the Kremlin 
Fears': C.D. Jackson, Cold War 'Liberation,' and American Political-Economic Adventurism," Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (2009): 389-427; Ned O'Gorman, Spirits of the Cold War: Contesting Worldviews 
in the Classical Age of American Security Strategy (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 
2011); Timothy Barney, "'Gulag'-Slavery, Inc.: The Power of Place and the Rhetorical Life of a Cold War 
Map," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 16, no. 2 (2013): 317-353; Timothy Barney, "Diagnosing the Third 
World: The 'Map Doctor' and the Spatialized Discourses of Disease and Development in the Cold War," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 100, no. 1 (2014): 1-30; Ned O'Gorman, The Iconoclastic Imagination: Image, 
Catastrophe, and Economy in America from the Kennedy Assassination to September 11 (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
48 Hinds and Windt, The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950, 5. 
  25 
war are guns, bombs, missiles, and the like, Cold War weapons are words, 
images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert 
means. For the most part, however, Cold War is a matter of symbolic action, 
action intended to forward the accomplishment of strategic goals—social, 
political, economic, military, or diplomatic.49 
Medhurst’s description of Cold War rhetorical discourse helpfully articulates the 
relationship between metaphorical representations of the U.S.-Soviet conflict and specific 
tangible instantiations of this clash. Because the Cold War was a war of words, images, 
and movements, I argue that presidential rhetoric in place functioned as a rhetorical move 
that was both material and symbolic.  
In this section, I discuss how classical and contemporary perspectives of the topos 
support a view of the commonplace that is both conceptual (a place one can go to find or 
discover the right argument for a specific situation) and physically real. This approach, I 
argue, extends not only our understanding of the topos in relation to the rhetoricity of 
place, but also reveals how U.S. presidents speak in place to build conceptual and literal 
storehouses for the ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning. In 
the analysis chapters that follow, I argue that Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and 
Ronald Reagan spoke at the Lincoln Memorial, the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, 
and the beaches of Normandy to activate the symbolism embedded in the rhetorical 
history of that place even as they (re)constituted that place as a metaphorical and literal 
instantiation of the United States’ place in the world at three distinct moments during the 
Cold War. Ultimately, I argue that these U.S. presidents used their speech to activate the 
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memories, symbols, and ideologies housed within these commonplaces as a material 
means of persuasion. 
Within classical rhetorical theory, the idea of a topic (Greek topos, which literally 
means “place” in Greek) or the commonplace (locis communis in Latin) referred to 
specific metaphorical place or “seat” where rhetors could find argumentative resources.50 
As Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee explain, “this graphic meaning of place was 
applied conceptually, to mean an intellectual source or region harboring a proof that 
could be inserted into any discourse where appropriate.”51 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle used 
the term to describe particular metaphorical locations where a speaker could look for 
arguments.52 George A. Kennedy explains that for Aristotle, topos suggested 
“metaphorically [the] location or space in an art (more literally perhaps the place in a 
handbook) where a speaker can look for ‘available means of persuasion,’” and also notes 
that prior to Aristotle, the term “may also already have been used in mnemonic theory of 
the physical setting against which an object or idea could be remembered.”53 For 
Aristotle, notes Ralph Citrón, the topics provided “a flexible set of mental procedures that 
could be applied to any issue at hand so as to generate a more rigorous dialectics and 
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better logic and, if possible, proof in different disciplines.”54 Notice here that Aristotle’s 
emphasis, at least as interpreted by Citrón, was on assembling stock arguments, an 
approach that left little room for rhetorical invention.55 
Later rhetoricians made similar criticisms of Aristotle’s topical system. Cicero 
was careful to emphasize that commonplaces were to be relatively abstract and thus 
applicable to a wide variety of rhetorical situations. As James M. May and Jakob Wisse 
observe, Cicero “repeatedly reject[ed] the practice of providing lists of standard 
arguments (‘commonplaces’ or ‘topics’)” and instead suggested “‘commonplaces’ of a 
different kind: abstract argument patterns, which help the orator to devise all his 
arguments himself.”56 This approach encouraged orators to draw on the commonplaces as 
an inventional resource, not a rigid set of rules for each and every occasion.57 Richard 
McKeon writes that Quintilian, like Cicero, 
complained that many orators made collections of sayings and arguments 
concerning subjects likely to recur in the practice of their art instead of fortifying 
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themselves with places by which to discover new arguments that had never 
occurred to them before. Commonplaces were memorized rather than used for 
invention, and they were recited when the occasion arose rather than used when 
the circumstances required.58 
For Quintilian, the topoi or commonplaces lost their persuasive value when orators 
simply deployed them without any thought to the particular needs of the rhetorical 
situation. 
More recent work in rhetorical scholarship reveals how commonplaces offer 
rhetors a creative means of rhetorical invention even as they reflect the doxa of a 
particular group or community. Christa J. Olson underscores this connection when she 
defines the topoi as “nodes of social value and common sense that provide places of 
return for convening arguments across changing circumstances.”59 Following Ralph 
Citrón’s discussion of topoi as “storehouses of social energy. . . . [that] organize our 
sentiments, beliefs, and actions in the lifeworld,”60 Olson writes: 
Those content-filled storehouses allow actors from a wide range of subject 
positions to bring a shared sense of the world “before the eyes” of the publics they 
convene. . . . [T]his understanding of the commonplace makes it particularly 
applicable to the material and symbolic constitutions of national life. The very 
idea of the nation relies on expansive, layered commonplaces that appear to 
preexist any given rhetorical moment but are also generated from each use in 
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context. Understanding the commonplaces of nationalism, then, requires seeking 
out those topics and topoi that, as Citrón suggests, “have sufficient umph to 
actualize the body politic.”61 
This view of the commonplace suggests that citizens identify with and return to certain 
metaphors, enthymemes, and, following Cicero, “seats” of arguments that describe and 
define who they are as a people. It is this shared understanding that makes the 
commonplace a metaphorical and physical place reflecting the sensus communis—the 
“common sense that is shared among members of a community” and easily recognized by 
the body politic.62 As Crowley and Hawhee observe, “[t]he distinguishing characteristic 
of a commonplace is that it is commonly believed by members of a community. These 
beliefs are ‘common’ not because they are cheap or trivial but because they are shared ‘in 
common’ by many people.”63 In this view, topoi not only reflect and even embody shared 
values, but they can also provide a space in which and from which the orator can uncover 
all the available means of persuasion the rhetorical situation requires, whether these exist 
within the mind of the speaker or within the material realities of the rhetorical situation—
a physical, locatable, definite place. 
Building on these discussions of topoi and commonplaces from classical and 
contemporary rhetorical theory, I argue that rhetorical scholars should conceptualize 
topoi not simply as metaphorical places where rhetors can find arguments, but as material 
locations that function as arguments in and of themselves. If we take seriously the idea 
                                                
61 Olson, Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican Ecuador, 
8. 
62 Crowley and Hawhee, Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, 128. 
63 Crowley and Hawhee, Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, 20-21. 
  30 
that “location matters” and that places offer a unique form of rhetorical action, than it 
makes perfect sense to conceptualize the topoi as “seats” of argument that are both 
metaphorical and physically real.64 If certain locales can activate and even embody 
communal memories, then certainly these places offer a conceptual and material schema 
from which rhetors can speak to, for, and about the broader community.65 Carolyn R. 
Miller conceptualizes the commonplace in this vein, describing the topos as “a space, or a 
located perspective, from which one searches,” a place that is “particularly rich in 
connectivity to other significant or highly connected points. . . . [points that] can serve as 
intellectual tools that yield new viewpoints.”66 For William L. Nothstine, topos “can 
suggest not simply location of objects separate and independent from the self, but rather 
the situation of the self within a world of things and possibilities. The ‘place’ metaphor 
may refer to a position affording a particular point of view, a perspective, from which 
one regards one’s world. This ontological metaphor places the individual at the center of 
a horizon, defined by a unique, but necessarily limited, viewpoint.”67 Both Miller and 
Nothstine emphasize the creative work a rhetor does to search within and speak from “a 
space,” “a located perspective,” of “the situation of the self within a world of things and 
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possibilities.” Positioning oneself within this conceptual space or physical place suggests 
that the orator has identified that location as particularly persuasive. Indeed, as Scott 
Consigny argues, topos functions “both as instrument and situation; the instrument with 
which the rhetor thinks and the realm in and about which he thinks.”68 And, I would add, 
from which the orator speaks, for speaking in place is a rhetorical choice in itself, a 
persuasive strategy rhetors adopt to amplify the symbolic dimensions of that place 
through speech while simultaneously contributing new meanings to that particular 
location. 
Throughout this project, I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan used their 
rhetoric in place to constitute the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy as 
metaphorical and literal commonplaces of U.S. democracy during the Cold War, 
locations that provided a physical instantiation of U.S. Cold War ideology. As the first 
section of this chapter discussed, the U.S. president is uniquely qualified to speak to and 
for the nation. “The President has become the nation’s chief storyteller,” writes Mary E. 
Stuckey, “its interpreter-in-chief. He tells us stories about ourselves, and in so doing he 
tells us what sort of people we are, how we are constituted as a community. We take from 
him not only our policies but our national self-identity.”69 As part of this interpretative, 
story-telling role, the president draws on lessons of the past to make sense of the present 
and future. By returning to the commonplace—understood both as a conceptual 
storehouse and a physical locale—the U.S. president “open[s] up the perception of new 
meanings and applications even in a familiar text [or place], which in turn uncovers 
                                                
68 Scott Consigny, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," Philosophy & Rhetoric 7, no. 3 (1974): 182. 
69 Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-In-Chief (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 
1991), 1. 
  32 
previously unperceived lines of arguments to unnoticed conclusions which were not there 
until they were made facts by discovery.”70 In each of my case studies, when the 
president spoke in place, he pointed his audience toward the familiar features of that 
location (and what that place had previously symbolized) while also introducing new 
“lines of argument” based upon the exigencies of the moment. Perhaps, then, studying 
U.S. presidential rhetoric in place at these distinct historical moments reveals the ways in 
which topoi are both metaphorical and literal seats of argument, places commonly shared 
and well-known and yet ripe for rhetorical (re)appropriation. 
 
Guiding Assumptions and Outline of Chapters 
In this introductory chapter, I have examined the rhetorical significance of 
presidential rhetoric in place. This discussion has focused on the unique ability U.S. 
presidents have to amplify the symbolic dimensions of a particular location, the rhetorical 
dimensions of places in and of themselves, the importance of visualizing presidential 
rhetoric in place, and the rhetorical salience of the Cold War commonplace. Before 
previewing my three case studies, I want to outline the motivating assumptions guiding this 
project. Although I engage these questions and assumptions more directly in the chapters 
that follow, it is important to articulate these claims as a starting points from which I build 
my argument. They are organized under six conceptual areas or schemas: place, the 
presidency, topoi or commonplaces, mediation and circulation, rhetoric in situ, and a 
rhetorical theory of deixis. 
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Presidential invocations of place build upon prior symbolic resonances even as 
they (re)appropriate such resonances for present and future purposes. To study 
presidential rhetoric in place requires critics to consider the rhetorical history of the place 
itself71 before attending to the traditional contextual elements of a rhetorical act (e.g., 
analyzing the rhetor’s persona and rhetorical goals, consulting archival materials related 
to the planning, writing, and delivery of the speech, and the specific historical exigencies 
to which the rhetor was responding). Critically analyzing how certain geographic 
locations (such as the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and the beaches of Normandy) 
have functioned persuasively throughout history reveals how places condition rhetorical 
acts even as rhetoric in place shapes, refashions, and even transforms the symbolic 
significance of that particular location. 
Presidential presence and oratorical performance in place amplify the 
rhetorical dimensions of that location even as the physical speech setting contributes to 
the president’s own authority and ethos. Presidential presence in place—as expressed in 
and through presidential ethos, rhetorical authority, and physical embodiment—works 
rhetorically and does not necessarily require spoken discourse to be persuasive. When we 
see the president in a particular location, the simple fact that he is there suggests that this 
particular occasion (and this place) is important enough to warrant his attention. Of 
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course, presidential rhetoric amplifies the importance of a chief executive’s physical 
presence. But even if a president never opens his mouth, the very fact that he is there says 
something (although inaudibly) about the merits of this event, audience, and moment in 
time. Moreover, because U.S. presidents speak to, for, and on behalf of the U.S. public, 
they are uniquely qualified to activate, constitute, and (re)define the memories, symbols, 
and ideologies located in place. As such, there is a co-constitutive relationship between 
presidential authority and the rhetorical potentialities of place. U.S. presidents speak in 
place to harness the symbolic power of that location as a material means of persuasion 
and to bolster their own rhetorical authority and ethos on the national and global stage. 
When U.S. presidents travel to and speak from a place, they constitute civic 
commonplaces that are physically real, using their presidential authority to transform 
what was once a symbolic conceptual resource into a literal storehouse of shared 
values, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. Understanding the commonplace (or 
topos) as both metaphorical and literal enables critics to uncover how physical places can 
function as “seats” of argument, sites that offer rhetors the opportunity to uncover 
networks of meaning that change over time and yet remain rooted in place.72 If the 
commonplace provides particular discursive resources when orators speak about shared 
values and ideals, putting the topoi in place requires a reexamination of the particular 
places—sites, memorials, geographic locations—that represent and re-present these 
shared values and ideals to the body politic. 
The mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric in place fuses spoken 
discourse with the physical and material elements of the speech setting. When 
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presidential rhetoric extends beyond the immediate geographic location and moment in 
time and is circulated through radio, newspaper, television, and/or the Internet, audiences 
literally “see” the speech setting as an irreducible element of the rhetorical act—whether 
or not the rhetorical act happened yesterday or fifty years ago. Although the specific 
features and functions of this circulation change based on the mediated technologies 
available at the time, a critical reading of presidential rhetoric in place must consider how 
these texts circulate in and through place, over time, and to various publics. 
Rhetoric in situ provides a conceptual storehouse—a commonplace—for 
organizing these separate but interrelated themes of place, presidential presence, and 
mediation and circulation.73 The phrase in situ comes from the Latin “situ,” a term that 
means “place, situated, present.” It also suggests an intentionality behind where a person, 
object, or thing is located or placed.74 To be in situ is to be in one’s own place; to put a 
thing or object in situ is to return it to its original place.75 Today, art historians use the 
phrase to describe a work of art designed for a specific location, a place that highlights 
the qualities or attributes the artist wishes to feature. As I use the phrase throughout this 
project, rhetoric in situ signals the importance of where a rhetorical act occurs and 
assumes that locating a speech act in a particular place is a rhetorical choice in itself—a 
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means of invention. It suggests that the rhetorical act defines and, in some cases is 
defined by, the cultural and political symbols and memories associated with that place. 
The phrase suggests that, just as rhetoric is placed and works rhetorically to transform a 
place, a rhetor can also draw on the physical and material elements of the speech setting 
to harness the power of place as a persuasive strategy. It communicates the idea that 
rhetorical acts respond to, negotiate with, (re)appropriate, and even transform the places 
in which rhetors speak. And finally, rhetoric in situ reminds the critic that all rhetorical 
acts are situated and performative—that is, they are emplaced. 
An analysis of rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place requires a 
theoretical and methodological intervention that accounts for the variety of ways 
speakers use language to activate the material realities of the rhetorical situation and 
link text with context. As I detail more fully in chapter two, a rhetorical theory of deixis 
draws on the principles of close textual criticism to analyze how the relational, spatial, 
and temporal coordinates of a speech act—both the symbolic coordinates within the text 
and the tangible bodies, locations, and times that comprise the physical speech 
situation—constitute a shared social world that is both linguistically constructed and also 
materially real. Identifying the deictic references within an orator’s speech act provides 
tangible evidence of the historical events, social relationships, symbolic places, shared 
communities, and dimensions of temporality the rhetor invokes through speech. This 
approach allows the critic to identify where and how the speakers use language to 
activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-political 
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context for their persuasive purposes while uncovering how oratorical texts activate, 
operate within, and speak through their contexts. 
A common thread connecting each of these assumptions is my interest in 
uncovering the variety of ways that U.S. presidents speak in place, exposing how 
immediate and extended audiences (both U.S. citizens and those in other countries around 
the world) interpret these in situ performances, and determining what exactly makes 
presidential rhetoric in place rhetorically persuasive. More broadly, however, these 
guiding principles offer important insights for close textual criticism, rhetorical theory, 
U.S. presidential rhetoric, and spatial theory in that they push the critic to reconsider the 
relationships between text, context, materiality, and place. In the chapters that follow, I 
build on these concepts to argue that presidential rhetoric in situ was a particularly 
effective weapon in the ideological struggle between U.S. democracy and Soviet 
communism. Chapter two outlines the theoretical and methodological approach I take in 
this project. Drawing on scholarship from classical rhetorical theory and linguistics, I argue 
toward a rhetorical theory of deixis, an approach that interrogates how speakers employ 
language to activate the scenic elements of the physical speech situation and linguistically 
bond text and context. This orientation provides a framework for identifying how orators 
“access . . . the context of speech at the moment of utterance” and thus invite their 
audiences to fuse the spoken text with its relational, spatial, and temporal contexts.76 
Ultimately, this perspective pushes scholars to consider the ways in which these elements 
of context—bodies, places, temporalities, objects, and sensations—provide a material 
                                                
76 William F. Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic Reference," in Rethinking Context: Language as an 
Interactive Phenomenon, ed. Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 61. 
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means of persuasion when activated in and through speech. I then turn my attention to my 
three case studies. 
In chapter three, I analyze Harry Truman’s June 29, 1947, speech to the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) at the closing session of their 
38th annual conference. Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, Truman stated 
that the United States had a moral duty to extend the full benefits of citizenship to all U.S. 
Americans, regardless of race, color, religion, or creed. But Truman’s speech was more than 
a domestic appeal. It was an argument for maintaining the United States’ leadership role in 
the Cold War struggle against totalitarianism. In my analysis, I explore how Truman’s 
references to speaker/audience, location, and time activated the contextual elements of the 
immediate speech situation as physical proof. This critical sensitivity to bodies, places, and 
temporalities reveals how Truman linked his presidential ethos to a particular location, the 
Lincoln Memorial, and interpreted this particular moment as a critical juncture in U.S. 
history, a time that was ripe for political action. This approach reveals how Truman’s 
rhetorical authority and ethos—as displayed through speech—activated, interacted with, and 
ultimately transformed the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial in U.S. political 
culture and the global imaginary. 
Chapter four examines the significance of John F. Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin and 
his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” Address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz on June 26, 1963. 
Perhaps more than any other geographical location during the Cold War, West Berlin 
provided a physical and metaphorical symbol of the ideological struggle between 
democracy and communism. In this chapter, I show how the Kennedy Administration 
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saw the president’s physical presence in West Berlin as a rhetorical act in itself, a 
symbolic move that demonstrated his commitment to West Berliners and reinforced his 
status as the leader of the Western Alliance. Through my analysis of the White House’s 
preparations for the president’s trip, the media coverage of Kennedy’s visit to West 
Berlin, and the chief executive’s speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, I argue that the 
persuasive aspects of presidential rhetoric in situ include and yet extend beyond spoken 
oratory to encompass the physical, material, and psychological dimensions of the 
president’s presence in place. This analysis also reveals the potential of these dimensions 
to work rhetorically on audiences and even speakers themselves. 
In chapter five, I analyze Ronald Reagan’s June 6, 1984, address at Normandy on 
the fortieth anniversary of D-Day as an exemplar of commemoration in place. I argue that 
Reagan used the place of his address—Pointe du Hoc—to anchor his audience in the 
present moment while also transporting them back to the events of D-Day forty years 
earlier and projecting a specific course for future action. Where Truman and Kennedy 
relied on physical but inanimate evidence for their argument, Reagan drew on a more 
emotionally potent rhetorical resource: sixty-two of the U.S. Army Rangers who had 
climbed the cliffs forty years earlier. In his speech, the president used active language, 
vivid imagery, and the physical presence of bodies in place to help his audience look 
back into the past and “see” the events of D-Day unfold before their eyes. These visual 
images and the physical composition of the speech setting amplified Reagan’s spoken 
text and made the story of D-Day literally come alive through a sensory accumulatio. The 
physical display of bodies in place also provided a living link between past and present 
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even as they offered the underlying value for continuing efforts to free Europe from 
Soviet communism in 1984. 
The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the guiding assumptions of this 
study and discusses how my analyses of Truman at the Lincoln Memorial, Kennedy in 
West Berlin, and Reagan at Pointe du Hoc offer new theoretical and methodological 
insights for studying presidential rhetoric in place. I conclude by outlining how this study 
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Chapter Two: Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis 
 
 
In recent years, the spatial, material, visual, affective, and sensory “turns” have 
pushed critics beyond the bounds of the speaker-audience model characterizing the public 
address tradition. These “turns,” and the scholarship resulting from them, have included 
studies that extend our understanding of the available means of persuasion at various 
times, in certain places, and on specific occasions.77 This burgeoning and important 
scholarly emphasis on bodies, objects, sensation, materiality, ethnography, and in situ 
criticism necessitates a discussion of how critics are to analyze oratorical texts within and 
as a product of their material, historical, and symbolic contexts. How are we to account 
for the material dimensions of a speech designed for and delivered in place? How do we 
define context, particularly in light of new methodological approaches such as rhetorical 
field methods, ethnography, autoethnography, and audience studies? And what is the 
critic’s job in “recovering” the materiality of historical texts—the bodies, sensations, 
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locations, and temporalities addressed and constituted through speech? I argue that a 
rhetorical theory of deixis offers a way to theorize how speakers employ language to 
activate the scenic elements of the physical speech situation and linguistically bond text 
and context. This approach offers the critic a theoretical and methodological tool for 
“[u]npacking a text, probing its dimensions and possibilities” to better understand how 
orators use language to activate “the richness of a very specific situation that already has 
passed and will not return in exactly the same way.”78 It is this richness, this ability to 
uncover the “text and texture”79 of a rhetorical act within its historical and spatio-
temporal contexts that makes the practice of close reading (and a deictic approach to 
textual criticism) still relevant and necessary for rhetorical scholarship. Ultimately, this 
approach invites scholars to consider the ways in which these elements of context—
bodies, places, temporalities, objects, and sensations—provide a material means of 
persuasion when activated in and through speech. 
Although strands of deixis can be identified in earlier works by C. S. Peirce, 
Philipp Wegener, Karl Brugmann, and Sir Alan Gardiner, contemporary linguists most 
often credit German psychologist Karl Bühler as first organizing and systemizing a 
formal theory of deixis. In 1934, Bühler published Theory of Language: The 
Representational Function of Language and defined the communicative encounter, or 
what he also referred to as the “concrete speech event,” as composed of three primary 
elements: the person doing the speaking (“I”), the place or location of the interaction 
                                                
78 Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 610. 
79 G. P. Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," Western Journal of Speech Communication 44, no. 4 
(1980): 273. 
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(“here”), and the time this interaction occurred (“now”).80 These three terms or axes (the 
“I/here/now” triad) constitute the “deictic field” and also represent deictic or “pointing” 
words. For Bühler, these indicators (words such as “I,” “you,” “here,” “there,” “this,” and 
“now,” to name a few) operate as “expedient ways to guide the partners” and direct 
audience members to “the details of the situation.”81 Put simply, deictic indicators operate 
as verbal gestures within the speech act and enable speakers to direct their audience to the 
“persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in 
relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and 
the participation in it.”82 For many linguists, deixis offers a way to identify which 
elements of context the speaker implicates through language. However, these studies too 
often limit contextual parameters to the immediate conversational exchange, thereby 
neglecting the political, ideological, and ultimately rhetorical implications of privileging 
certain people, places, and times through speech. 
In this chapter, I advance a rhetorical theory of deixis, a theoretical and 
methodological orientation that infuses the linguistic concept of deixis with rhetorical 
understandings of ethos, place, and time. As a discipline, rhetoric is uniquely qualified to 
interrogate how these relational, spatial, and temporal axes implicate each other. A 
rhetorical approach to deixis does not simply identify these coordinates; it asks why they 
are there, what they symbolize, and how this symbolization constitutes specific 
audiences, geopolitical realities, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. This 
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rhetorical appropriation of Bühler’s deictic field also thickens our contextual 
understanding of the rhetorical situation by adding bodies, physical locations, and 
temporalities into the equation. It pushes us to consider the text in its historical, spatial, 
and temporal totality, as a speech act designed for and delivered in place, within a 
specific historical/temporal moment, to real people—bodies in their lived experiences. 
Here my aim is to begin a conversation about how public address scholars might 
incorporate these sensory aspects—what we can see, hear, touch, and imagine—into our 
analysis of rhetorical texts.  
Debra Hawhee underscores the importance of “rhetoric’s sensorium” when she 
describes it as “the corporeal limn that guides sensory perception. It is the participial stem 
of the Latin sentire, a physical verb that means to discern by the senses, to feel, hear, see, 
etc.; to perceive, be sensible of.”83 Of course, one way to interpret this sensory turn 
within rhetorical studies is to consider rhetoric’s affective qualities—that is, what rhetoric 
causes us to feel, hear, and see, but this approach often treats affect as a product of, yet 
distinctive from, the spoken text. My approach, however, asks how rhetors might 
accomplish persuasion by pointing their audience to places, bodies, and objects that 
induce specific affective responses. Because the spoken word plays an integral role in 
producing affect, audience members then experience emotional affect within and as a 
result of oratory. What if our sensory experiences of rhetorical action are in some way 
induced by discourse? What if rhetors used their spoken word to point us to the elements 
they most wanted us to sense? What if we approached public address as a verbal and 
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material act, one that appropriates the physical elements of the speech situation as a 
primary form of evidence? 
If we consider rhetoric’s classical origins, these conjectures are not so radical or 
remarkable. In fact, they describe what classical orators knew all along—that the physical 
location and speech setting of a rhetorical act provide invaluable evidence and a powerful 
means of persuasion. Although multiple studies demonstrate that the physical location 
and/or speaking space for an oratorical performance worked as an important “means of 
persuasion” in Greece and Rome,84 modern rhetorical critics virtually have ignored this 
relationship in studies of contemporary public address.85 Christopher Lyle Johnstone 
argues that because 
 [t]he criticism of public address during the past decade or more has 
become increasingly preoccupied with text. . . . [l]ittle if any attention has 
been paid to the physical context within which oratory is presented and 
experienced. The setting for public address, nonetheless, is an important 
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consideration in understanding and appraising oratory. If the invention of 
techniques of persuasion, arrangement, and expression is best understood 
in term of the historical and cultural circumstances in which speech 
occurs, clearly the verbal style and active presentation of the matter of 
speech owe at least something to physical setting.86 
In other words, the physical setting can reveal much about how an orator delivers—and 
how the audience experiences—a rhetorical act. I argue that although theorists outside of 
rhetoric provide important perspectives on how places can work rhetorically in and of 
themselves, critics must attend to a rhetor’s verbal references to locations, bodies, and 
objects if we are to understand fully the relationship between rhetoric and place. 
My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I turn to classical rhetorical theory to 
show that rhetoric has always been placed; that is, that the ancients understood the 
physical location and speech setting of a rhetorical act as an integral and irreducible 
aspect of oratorical performance. Second, I consider how place has functioned within the 
public address tradition during the twentieth century, paying specific attention to the 
debates over text, context, and materiality. Third, I provide an overview of Bühler’s 
initial theory of deixis and then detail how a uniquely rhetorical approach to deixis 
extends our understandings of ethos, place, and temporality. 
 
Classical Invocations of Place 
Ancient rhetorical theorists recognized the power of place or scene—either 
imagined or physically present—as an effective means of persuasion. Aristotle first 
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introduced the concepts of energeia, bringing-before-the-eyes, and phantasia, all of 
which suggest that a speaker can use various rhetorical techniques to communicate lively 
activity and prompt the audience to see the events of a certain situation in their mind’s 
eye. Although classical theorists focused primarily on the rhetorical powers of mental 
imagery or sight, they also hinted at the possibility that physical and material objects, 
people, places, and things could work persuasively. We see this not just in oratorical 
practices in Greece and Rome, but also in Aristotle’s initial definition of what rhetoric 
does or accomplishes. 
In the first pages of the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes that the orator’s task is “to see 
the available means of persuasion” in each particular case.87 George Kennedy extends 
this definition, parsing out the Greek to explain that we can understand Aristotle to 
understand rhetoric as “an ability [dynamis; ‘ability, capacity, faculty’], in each particular 
case [peri hekaston; [that] ‘refers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific 
circumstances (e.g. particular political or judicial decisions)’], to see [theōrēsai; ‘to be an 
observer of and to grasp the meaning or utility of’] the available means of persuasion 
[endekhomenon pithanon; ‘what is inherently and potentially persuasive’ in the facts, 
circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc.’].”88 To paraphrase, 
then, rhetoric can be defined as one’s ability, capacity, or faculty to observe and grasp 
what is inherently and/or potentially persuasive in a specific circumstance. I note that 
Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric suggests that one potential vehicle for persuasion in 
a specific case is the rhetor’s surroundings; that is, where the rhetorical act is placed. 
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This idea of physical places or objects working persuasively continues throughout 
the Rhetoric. For example, in book II, Aristotle implies that orators can use as the 
arrangement of one’s body, projection of the voice, and one’s clothing as a way to help 
the audience physically see what the orator describes.89 Later, in book III, he discusses 
the rhetorical strategy of “bringing before the eyes,” or the idea that words should enable 
the audience to mentally envision what the speaker describes.90 In one of his examples, 
Aristotle notes how Lycoleon, a famed Attic orator, alluded to the bronze statue of 
Chabrias, a mighty Athenian warrior, to remind the people that the statue would protect 
the city in battle. Speaking about the statue of Chabrias, Lycoleon said he was “not 
ashamed of his supplicant attitude in that bronze statue.” Aristotle adds that “it was a 
metaphor at the time it was spoken, but not at all times, but it [the statue] was before-the 
eyes, for when he [Lycoleon] was in danger, the statue [seemed to] supplicate, the lifeless 
for the living, the memorial of his deeds for the city.”91 This example is significant 
because it references a physical, literal statue located outside the city walls, and Aristotle 
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notes that by referring to this statue and its physical location or place, Lycoleon used its 
physicality as evidence.92 
Other classical theorists saw the physically real as a way to trigger rhetorical 
vision (or mental “sight”) and advance their persuasive purposes. In her analysis of 
Demosthenes’ funeral oration, Debra Hawhee describes how Demosthenes used the 
material aspects of the rhetorical situation—the dead bodies, cypress caskets, grieving 
family members—to activate “the visual capacity of phantasia, thereby effecting a shift 
in focus from the corpses of the present to activities of the past and future.”93 These 
physical sensations—the smell of dead bodies, the sight of cypress caskets, the sound of 
weeping women—became material evidence for Demosthenes’ argument while 
triggering rhetorical vision and public memory. “The lifeless, sacred bodies of the war 
dead are reanimated, their memory vivified, energeia projected into the future, all by 
means of rhetorical vision, all before the eyes of the audience.”94 In this instance, 
Demosthenes utilized what was immediately present to spark mental images in his 
audience. Roman orators also understood the rhetorical power of the physically real. 
Quintilian acknowledges the power of physical objects when he referenced the potential 
emotional power of the orator’s display of a bloody toga.95 In her study of Roman 
oratory, Kathleen S. Lamp observes that “things like scars can serve as symbols to move 
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an audience in the same way speech can or even in a way speech alone cannot.”96 In other 
words, that which is physically real (such as a bloody toga or a scar) can have greater 
persuasive powers than words alone. 
This reliance on the physically real also impacted the orator’s choice of a 
speaking space or site of delivery in ancient Greece. Christopher Lyle Johnstone 
examines the explicit linkage between oratorical settings and epideictic, forensic, and 
deliberative occasions in ancient Athens, noting that spaces such as gravesites, law 
courts, and large public forums provided the orator with rhetorical opportunities and 
obstacles. In his discussion of deliberative or political speeches in Athens, Johnstone 
notes that “the topographical features of the site provided both speaker and auditor with 
significant reference points for invoking civic duties, accomplishments, and 
aspirations.”97 In other words, the speech setting featured physical reminders of Athenian 
political ideology. These civic values—as represented in monuments, temples, 
memorials, and the like—were literally “before the eyes” of the audience as they listened 
to an orator’s speech in the Agora. M.P. de Bakker also documents the important function 
of speech settings in Greek oratory, praising Demosthenes’ “ability to draw links between 
the space outside the law courts and the Assembly and the space of those venues 
themselves where the speeches were delivered.” In his speeches, the famed Greek orator 
would refer frequently to the “immediate urban environment, the political and religious 
centre of the city and its monuments” to evoke emotions and “manipulate the feelings of 
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the audience.”98 What was physical and tangible helped the audience imagine previous 
events. In this sense, then, the material aspects of the speech setting—the objects, 
monuments, and people directly in front of the audience—triggered the mental faculties 
(phantasia) responsible for rhetorical vision. 
The physical place and location of a rhetorical act also carried persuasive powers 
in Roman oratory. Ann Vasaly writes that Cicero worked to “mediate the audience’s 
interpretation of what they saw through the words of the speech,” and through his 
“presentation, the manner of description or allusion, the role played by places and things 
in various kinds of appeals,” Cicero attempted to “manipulate the audience’s images of 
the real world and their interpretation of those images.”99 Vasaly recounts multiple 
instances in which Roman orators saw the physical location of their speeches as a vital 
part of their persuasive appeal. For example, the Roman historian Livy wrote that 
Manilius Capitolinus was acquitted because of “the site” rather than his own rhetorical 
defense. Livy explained that Manilius’s trial took place at the Campus Marcus, a public 
field in Rome, which Manilius had previously defended from the Gauls. According to 
Livy, the jurors in the case “realized that it would be hopeless to attempt to secure a 
conviction in a place where people could be visually reminded of Manilius’s glorious 
deeds.”100 Vasaly argues that this connection between a speech and its location was an 
important component of rhetorical training in ancient Rome. 
It seems clear that a Roman orator was trained (a) to observe and describe 
concrete details of a place in order to provide his listeners with a vivid and 
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moving description of a particular scene and the actions that occurred 
there, (b) to consider the objective and subjective characteristics of 
particular places in creating a convincing narration, (c) to draw on these 
same characteristics in claiming the inevitability of his version of events in 
the argumentatio, and (d) use associations of specific places to manipulate 
the feelings of the audience. An orator trained and practiced in using these 
techniques to exploit the associations of places and monuments not visible 
to his audience would obviously be well equipped to draw on the 
characteristics of the place where he gave his speech as well, in order to 
amuse, convince, or arouse his listeners.101 
Vasaly’s observation reveals how Roman orators utilized their physical location and the 
objects, monuments, and bodies situated in that location to support their argument. 
To direct audience members toward a particular object or statue, classical orators 
incorporated physical gestures into their rhetorical performance. “Orators in Rome 
routinely gestured to their surroundings, including buildings, statues, and monuments, to 
harness the memory or emotion of a certain structure,” writes Lamp. “[T]hey used the 
built environment as a means of invention, thus suggesting the potential of the built 
environment to shape or even control the oratorical act.”102 Lamp’s account suggests that 
the material elements of a speech setting worked not only as a means of rhetorical 
invention, but they also triggered cultural memories and political symbols associated with 
these buildings, statues, and monuments. Gregory S. Aldrete extends this discussion, 
                                                
101 Vasaly, Representations, 24. 
102 Lamp, A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome, 32. 
  53 
writing that the “buildings and spaces themselves that formed the background or setting 
[of rhetorical performances] were often loaded with symbolic meanings or powerful 
associations.” He continues, 
An orator speaking in a temple, for example, could simply gesture toward 
the cult statue to allude to virtues associated with that deity. . . . Roman 
orators speaking in [the Forum] were surrounded by statues, temples, war 
trophies, altars, sacred sites, monuments, buildings, and other physical 
objects possessing powerful emotional associations with Roman religion 
and identity. . . . By a simple pointing motion, a speaker could use these 
settings to emphasize, elaborate upon, or even convey messages.103 
By pointing to or gesturing towards various sites, spaces, and objects, Roman orators 
utilized their material surroundings to advance their spoken argument. In addition, this 
physical “pointing” linked the orator’s spoken word to the buildings, objects, bodies, and 
memories located in that setting. As Lamp puts it, what was physically and materially 
real “became part of the speech through the orator’s gestures.”104 Lamp’s final 
observation here is important for this project because it suggests that the act of referring 
or pointing to what is physically and literally “before the eyes” fuses the verbal text with 
its physical location and speech setting. 
My aim here has been to demonstrate that classical oratory was a performative art 
in the most literal sense. The physical location and scene / setting of the speech act were 
an important means of persuasion in Greece and Rome—the stage on which the orator 
                                                
103 Aldrete, Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome, 18-20. 
104 Lamp, A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome, 33. 
  54 
presented his argument to the assembled audience. Moreover, the rhetorical act was not 
limited to the verbal; instead, it included what was immediate to the senses. Although 
scholars of classical oratory have turned their attention to understanding the physical and 
material aspects of Greek and Roman oratorical practice, students of contemporary public 
address rarely include an analysis of the site of delivery. One reason for this oversight is 
rooted in disciplinary history and debates over how (and how much) critics should focus 
on the historical and contextual elements of a particular rhetorical act. In the next section, 
I trace the role of place within rhetoric’s disciplinary history to show that the 
performative aspects of rhetoric are an important element of the public address tradition. 
Ultimately, I argue that that by analyzing the significance of place in public address, 
critics return to a rich disciplinary orientation first set out by Aristotle, Demosthenes, 
Cicero, and Quintilian and continued by Herbert Wichelns, Marie Hochmuth Nichols, 
G.P. Mohrmann, Stephen E. Lucas, Michael Leff, and Michael Calvin McGee. 
 
(Re)Locating Place in the Public Address Tradition 
In 1925, Herbert A. Wichelns published his seminal essay, “The Literary 
Criticism of Oratory,” as a chapter in a book honoring James A. Winans.105 Wichelns’ 
essay represents the moment at which public address emerged as a discipline separate and 
distinct from literary criticism.106 Wichelns contended that “[w]e have not much serious 
criticism of oratory,” and noted that while literary critics assessed oratorical discourse for 
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its enduring nature or aesthetic appeal, they ignored one of rhetoric’s chief ends: effect.107 
If critics were to take rhetoric seriously, Wichelns argued that it was not enough to 
describe the literary or historical aspects of a rhetorical act. Instead, the rhetorical critic 
needed to “conceive of the public man as influencing the men of his own times by the 
power of his discourse.”108 To do this, Wichelns put forth the study of rhetoric as 
“concerned with effect. It regards speech as a communication to a specific audience, and 
holds its business to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator’s method of imparting 
his ideas to his hearers.”109 Wichelns defined the rhetorical critic as one who studied the 
methods by which speakers imparted ideas to their audiences. As such, Wichelns argued 
for a “scheme of rhetorical study” that assessed the speaker’s character (or “what he was 
thought to be”), the assembled audience, and the main ideas, topics, and proofs the 
speaker employed to persuade the audience.110 He also noted that critics should consider 
the stylistic and performative aspects of delivery: “the speaker’s mode of arrangement 
and his mode of expression . . . his habit of preparation and his manner of delivery from 
the platform.”111 Although Wichelns suggested that delivery was not as important as 
arrangement or expression, it is still important to note that Wichelns saw rhetoric as a 
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performative act—one that was located in a certain place and speaking space (the 
platform). I use Wichelns’ essay to show that rhetoric’s disciplinary identity is rooted in a 
quest to understand the ways in which rhetoric persuades audiences in particular contexts 
throughout history. From its inception, therefore, the public address tradition has been 
concerned with the relationship between texts, their historical and situational contexts, 
and the performative aspects of delivery. 
After Wichelns, however, rhetorical scholars in the 1920s and 1930s wrote 
“virtually nothing about the speech itself as an artistically structured message,” and it was 
not until 1937 that the first analysis of a single speech text was published in Quarterly 
Journal of Speech.112 Robert D. King’s analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s second 
inaugural was only five pages in length.113 In 1943, William Norwood Brigance edited 
and published A History and Criticism of American Public Address, a two-volume work 
that he characterized as examining “the influence of American public address on the flow 
of history.”114 The essays dealt primarily with the biographies of individual orators and 
the historical contexts in which they spoke. Eight years later, in 1955, Marie Hochmuth 
edited and published the third volume of A History and Criticism of Public Address. In 
her introductory essay, Hochmuth argued that “[t]he criticism of speeches must proceed 
from a clear conception of the nature of a speech.”115 To aid critics in a rhetorical (and 
not literary) analysis of speeches, Hochmuth compared the speech act to “a multi-celled 
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organism, whose units consist of speaker, audience, place, purpose, time, and form.” She 
continued, “[i]n order to evaluate the speech, all these elements, verbal and nonverbal, 
must be examined.”116 Although Wichelns referenced the speech location indirectly, 
Hochmuth singled out place as an element on par with speaker, audience, purpose, time, 
and form. In fact, Hochmuth listed place right after speaker and audience—and before 
purpose, time, and form. Her treatment of place is worth quoting in length: 
[W]e must consider the function of place. Place, of course, is not merely a 
physical condition. It is also a metaphysical condition, an ideological 
environment. We hear much of the “industrial” East, the “conservative” 
Midwest, the “progressive” Far West, “rumor-ridden” Washington. 
Speeches take place in halls, to be sure, but halls are “sacred halls,” 
“smoke-filled rooms,” places “hallowed by the memory of the sacred 
dead.” The church is an “atmosphere” as well as a place. Place conditions 
both the speaker’s method and the audience’s reaction. People do not react 
in a smoke-filled room the way they do in the restrained atmosphere of the 
Senate gallery. I do not intend to minimize the purely physical aspect of 
place, for this is sometimes important, of course. Comfort and discomfort, 
audibility or inaudibility may take on considerable proportions. . . . an 
inaugural crowd in a chill wind is not likely to be giving itself completely 
to the speaker no matter how superlative his genius. . . . In evaluating 
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speeches, the aspect of place must be recognized as a conditioning 
factor.117 
Here Hochmuth explicitly linked place—both the physical location and the speaking 
environment—to the invention and reception of public address. One year earlier, in her 
essay on Lincoln’s First Inaugural, Hochmuth illustrated her method by providing a 
richly detailed account of the physical scene and setting on March 4, 1861.118 In both 
theory and critical practice, Hochmuth’s discussion of place pushed the critic to attend to 
the physical and material aspects of a speech situation, and to consider how these 
elements impacted the speaker and the audience. After Hochmuth, however, a treatment 
of place in relation to discourse virtually vanished from public address scholarship. 
Although these studies almost universally consider the speaker, audience, purpose, time, 
and form of a speech act, critics have overlooked the significance of place.119 I believe 
the primary reason for this oversight is because place is often compartmentalized in terms 
of the historical and contextual elements surrounding the speech situation, whereas the 
speaker, audience, purpose, time, and form can be examined—to some extent, although 
not fully—through an analysis of the verbal text of a speech. Thus, I see the exclusion of 
physical place and speech setting from critical rhetorical analysis—both of which were 
integral elements of ancient rhetorical practice—as a casualty of the rigorous debates 
over text, context, and rhetoric’s disciplinary identity as a whole. 
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 Of course, the history of rhetoric’s attempt to determine “what we are about” is 
lengthy.120 However, a few moments are important for the purposes of this project. 
Following Edwin Black’s scathing critique of neo-Aristotelian criticism in 1965, and 
amid other political and social changes of the 1960s and 1970s, many scholars turned 
their attention from “traditional” analyses of “great speeches” (read, historical and 
biographical studies of white male speakers with little attention to the text itself) to 
ideologically driven critical practice. One of the results of this turn, however, was a hasty 
rejection of rhetorical history for an exclusive focus on critical method and theory. In 
1980, G.P. Mohrmann chastised rhetoricians for rejecting their own intellectual tradition. 
“We do not all have to be critics,” he wrote, “but when we set up shop for a critic, we 
ought to know what we are about.”121 Mohrmann argued that by failing to learn their own 
discipline, critics had “not done much more than achieve a nervous novelty.”122 
Rhetoricians had either veered towards historical and biographical examination of “Old 
Dead Orators” or turned to other disciplines to produce critical methods by which to 
explain rhetorical action, neither of which was successful.123 Instead, Mohrmann called 
on critics to draw on the “common topics available in the rhetorical tradition and employ 
those topics to make close and careful inspection of rhetorical texts.”124 Mohrmann’s 
insistence that critics return to the study of rhetoric itself is important for the purposes of 
this project because he argued that applying traditional rhetorical methods with 
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“intelligence and imagination” would enable critics “to appreciate the text and texture of 
messages.”125 
 Where Mohrmann lamented the discipline’s denial of its own rich oratorical 
tradition, Stephen E. Lucas identified another problem that pertains to this project: the 
disciplinary divide between text and context, one he described as the “schism in 
rhetorical scholarship.” In 1981, one year after Mohrmann’s essay appeared, Lucas 
observed that “[t]here appears now to be crystallizing a keen sense of schism between 
history and criticism, as the two are increasingly characterized—formally and informally, 
in published writings and private colloquies—as conflicting rather than complementary 
activities.”126 Here it is important to note that this divide between “doing history” and 
“doing criticism” reflected rhetoric’s implicit rejection of the historical and biographical 
approach best demonstrated in the three volumes of A History and Criticism of American 
Public Address. But Lucas’ observation also underscored Mohrmann’s concern. If 
rhetoricians did not “know what [they] were about,” how could they expect to 
understand, much less successfully utilize, the relationship between historical context and 
textual criticism? In response, Lucas proposed joint consideration of both history and 
criticism. For Lucas, the task of the rhetorical historian was the same as the rhetorical 
critic: “to explicate how rhetorical communication works.”127 To do this, Lucas and 
others argued for a close attention to and critical examination of the text itself. 
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Five years later, in an essay memorializing G.P. Mohrmann, Michael Leff called 
on critics to adopt Mohrmann’s view of “oratory [as] an art form” and consider the 
rhetorical artifact on its own terms.128 Rejecting previous critical approaches that 
divorced text from context, Leff argued that “[t]o rely exclusively either upon a 
formal/intrinsic or a representational/extrinsic criterion is to distort the rhetorical integrity 
of the discourse.” Leff continued,  
Though rhetorical analysis can separate these dimensions, the fact is that 
they occur simultaneously and work cooperatively within the fabric of the 
discourse. . . . From this perspective, the oration achieves unity as it 
formulates a response to circumstances and events in public consciousness 
and deploys its own internal resources to alter public consciousness about 
these circumstances and events. This rhetorical process negotiates between 
the symbolic action manifested by the text and the more ambiguous 
symbolic world based in the plurality of ordinary public experience.129 
According to Leff, one of rhetoric’s distinguishing features was the interrelationship 
between the text and the “symbolic world” to which it responded. He argued that critics 
could appreciate discourse only by attending to what Mohrmann had called “the text and 
texture of messages.”130 Rhetorical analysis by its very nature must examine the speech 
act within its historical, situational, and material realities. This approach, what Leff called 
“a program of close textual analysis,” pushed critics to analyze rhetorical discourse “on 
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the particulars of the case—the local circumstances that frame and motivate the work and 
the unique blend of formal and material elements that constitute its substance.”131 For 
Leff, the “local circumstances that frame and motivate” the rhetorical act and the “formal 
and material elements that constitute its substance” are crucial to our study of 
contemporary public address. Moreover, it is only by adopting this perspective that critics 
can understand the “text and texture”132 of the rhetorical act. I argue that analyzing the 
physical place and scene / setting of rhetorical discourse is an obvious component in 
understanding the “local circumstances” and “material elements” of a speech. Doing so 
points critics to the intertextual dynamics at work between text and context, or rhetoric 
both as delivered and situated. 
Emphasis on the “material elements” of a speech setting also pushes the critic to 
consider debates over rhetoric’s materiality. As Leff called rhetorical scholars to return to 
their primary object of study—the oratorical text—Michael Calvin McGee advocated 
approaching rhetoric as “a thing, a material artifact of human interaction” requiring not 
just an analysis of abstract theoretical principles of how rhetoric ought to work, but a 
careful consideration of how speakers “acted in and on the real world.”133 Since McGee’s 
initial introduction of rhetorical materialism in 1982, many scholars have debated what 
such a concept might look like in theory and practice. As Carole Blair notes, the 
materialist “turn” within rhetorical studies has produced at least three “camps”: “a 
traditional one that insists upon considering the material conditions of discourse, another 
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that focuses upon the lived-in body as a condition and consequence of rhetoric, and still 
another that understands rhetoric as itself material.”134 My aim is not to rehash these 
debates. Instead, my goal is to highlight how McGee’s initial foray into materialism 
pushed scholars to consider the lived experiences, embodied sensations, and everyday 
practices that accompany rhetorical action. 
To understand rhetoric’s materiality, McGee argued, was to recognize that 
“rhetoric is ‘material’ by measure of human experiencing of it.”135 This focus on the 
human experience of rhetoric—real bodies interacting in real places in real time—was 
transformative. More recent moves toward rhetorical field methods, ethnography, and 
audience studies have extended our understanding of “context” beyond the 
historical/biographical work that characterized the discipline’s early years. Although 
questions of speaker’s personal background, his/her persuasive agenda, and a specific 
historical narrative are still quite relevant, these are not the only elements of context that 
deserve our critical attention. As Michael K. Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and 
Danielle Endres observe, “rhetoric is not constituted simply by texts or textual fragments, 
but through a combination of material contexts, social relationships, identities, 
consciousnesses, and (interrelated) rhetorical acts that produce meanings and that are 
coconstructed between rhetor, audience, and particular contexts.”136 The authors posit 
that “in situ rhetorical analysis can create a focused starting point for debate on the 
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questions posed by a shift from analysis of objectified texts to a critique of ‘live’ 
rhetorics”—or rhetorical action happening in the here and now.137 To be sure, critics who 
participate in the rhetorical action they study are able to provide unique insights into the 
practices and processes of particular groups engaged in persuasive movements simply—
and perhaps most especially—because they are there. And yet, is it possible to include 
these questions of materiality, bodies, and sensation into our analysis of historical texts? 
Put another way, how might critics of historical texts uncover the “smells, sounds, time, 
space, and other factors” that Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres claim are “excluded by 
a focus on text”?138  
I argue that a rhetorical theory of deixis helps scholars discover and recover a 
text’s materiality even as it reveals how spoken oratory responds symbolically to the 
world around it because “deixis links language to context in distinguishable ways, [and] 
the better we understand it, the more we know about context.”139 A rhetorical theory of 
deixis draws on the principles of close textual criticism to analyze how the relational, 
spatial, and temporal coordinates of a speech act—both the symbolic coordinates within 
the text and the tangible bodies, locations, and times that comprise the physical speech 
situation—constitute a shared social world that is both linguistically constructed and also 
materially real. Identifying the deictic references within an orator’s speech act provides 
tangible evidence for the historical events, social relationships, symbolic places, shared 
communities, and dimensions of temporality the rhetor invokes through speech. This 
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approach allows the critic to identify where and how the speaker uses language to 
activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-political 
context for his/her persuasive purposes. Ultimately, I argue that a deictic approach to 
close textual criticism offers one way to understand how oratorical texts activate, operate 
within, and speak through their contexts. 
Beata Stawarska underscores the symbolic (and inherently rhetorical) potential of 
deixis when she observes,  
[D]eixis is not to be narrowly construed as an exclusively linguistic category, for 
it denotes a social and corporeal expertise which harnesses and mobilizes our 
abilities to orient in a shared spatial environment using the repertoire of available 
perceptual and motor skills. That is why deixis . . . cannot be accounted for in 
terms of syntax and semantics alone, but also requires explanation in terms of 
embodied existence embedded in the shared natural and social world.140 
This is why a specifically rhetorical approach to deixis is more than a simple counting 
exercise of the number of times a speaker says “I” or “here” or “now.” Instead, deixis 
provides a link between what is spoken and what is seen—what the audience experiences 
during, because of, and through a speech act. Deictic indicators reveal the potential of 
speech to activate its sensory dimensions even as it constitutes our social and political 
worlds. They “establish a direct referential link between the world and language,” 
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revealing the symbolic and material links between the spoken word and its material 
situation—or, the text and its context.141 
 
Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis 
In this section, I trace the etymological and conceptual linkages between rhetoric 
and deixis to argue that deixis has always been a part of rhetoric. Second, I consider how 
Bühler’s conceptions of the “deictic field of language” and three “modes” of deixis 
interact with rhetorical perspectives on situation, place, and vision. Third, I extend these 
linkages by detailing how a specifically rhetorical theory of deixis might enrich our 
perspective on (1) rhetoric in place and place-as-rhetoric; (2) rhetorical authority and 
ethos; (3) chronos and kairos in space-time; (4) rhetorical vision and the mediation of 
public discourse. 
 
Deixis: Always Already Rhetorical 
From the outset, it is important to note that deixis is a rhetorically loaded term. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines deixis as noun that refers to an “indication” or 
“pointing out.”142 But this term has a much longer history, one that is rooted in classical 
rhetorical theory. Deixis is the English version of δεῖξις (deîksis), a Greek noun that 
classical translators Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott define as a “mode of proof,” 
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“specimen,” “display,” or “exhibition.”143 Both deixis and δεῖξις (deîksis) come from the 
Greek verb δείκνυµι (deíknūmi), which Liddell and Scott translate as “to bring to light, 
display, exhibit,” “to set before one,” and “to point out by words, to tell, explain, 
teach.”144 Richard McKeon explains that Aristotle used two Greek words to describe 
speech that accomplished the goals of showing forth or making known: apodeiktikos and 
epideiktikos. The first, apodeiktikos (or apodeixis), referred to speech that proves or 
shows forth from or by something. This most often referred to scientific or logical proof. 
The second, epideiktikos (or epideixis), described speech that displays or shows forth on 
or for something.145 Debra Hawhee argues that “[t]he very term epideixis displays the 
necessary relation between showing and telling. . . . epideixis primarily meant a material 
or bodily display. . . . display [that] itself becomes manifest via discourse.”146 A speaker’s 
epideixis suggested a rhetor’s ability to display or show forth what was materially real or 
physically present to the audience. Similarly, Barbara Cassin writes that epideixis 
connotes the idea of a public show such as a military parade or crowd demonstration: “by 
putting an object on display, one makes use of it as an example or a paradigm.” Epideixis, 
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Cassin explains, “is a matter, then, in the broad sense, of a performance; it may be 
improvised or planned, written or spoken, but it is always related to the show, the 
public.”147 Central to both these descriptions is the idea of showing forth or displaying 
through speech, and deixis is the primary means by which this showing and telling 
happens. 
As discussed previously, one way this display took place in classical oratory was 
through bodily gesture and vivid, active language. Interestingly enough, when Karl 
Bühler systematized the theory of deixis in 1934, he connected deixis with the Latin term 
for “showing, pointing out, description,”148 demonstratio: “Our own feel for language is 
quite adequate to help us understand why the Greek word ‘deixis’ and its Latin 
translation, ‘demonstratio’, also mean logical proof,” Bühler wrote. “[T]he person being 
guided is supposed somehow to reach an ‘insight’, either a sensory one or a logical 
one.”149 Here Bühler gestured toward a key rhetorical concept first introduced in 
Rhetorica ad Herennium to describe a speaker’s ability to describe an event in vivid 
detail, amplifying its emotional weight.150 As a technique of rhetorical vision, 
demonstratio achieves clarity and vividness through language, a brilliance so striking that 
the audience cannot help but feel as if the event—and the people, objects, places, and 
times within that event—is physically before them. Jeanne Fahnestock, one of the few 
scholars to connect contemporary linguistic concepts of deixis with rhetoric, observes 
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that deixis plays a direct role in “conjuring up an external setting, moment, and 
participants in an ambient ‘as if’ situation. . . . Every description of a person, object, or 
act in a text, and every reference to an accompanying visual, can be thought of as the 
creation of an interactive encounter signaled with deictic elements.”151 Each and every 
time a speaker uses vivid language to describe a particular scene or event, the deictic 
indicators—words that orient the audience to the speaker, the place, and the time—
activate this mental sight. 
If rhetoric is the art of seeing or discovering all the available means of persuasion, 
deixis—the act of displaying, exhibiting, showing forth—reveals these elements to an 
audience. But what makes the linguistic approach to deixis particularly fruitful for 
rhetorical scholars is that it offers a way of identifying how speakers use language to 
invite listeners to actively engage with the spoken discourse to identify the people, 
locations, and spatio-temporal moments being physically displayed through speech. 
 
Bühler’s Theory of Deixis 
In 1934, German psychologist Karl Bühler introduced the concept of deixis as the 
linguistic equivalent of physically gesturing towards or pointing to someone or something 
in a speech situation. From the outset, it is imperative to note that Bühler’s conception of 
a “deictic utterance,” or a speaker’s “pointing” with words, is quite similar to the classical 
idea of gesturing towards places and objects the rhetor deemed important. Although 
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Bühler does not connect his theory of deixis with classical oratory, he compares the 
deictic utterance to a speaker’s physical gesture: 
The arm and finger gesture of man, to which the index finger owes its 
name, recurs when the signpost imitates the outstretched “arm”; in 
addition to the arrow symbol, this gesture is a widespread sign to point the 
way or the direction. . . . There is more than one way to point with 
gestures; but let us dwell on the signpost: where the pathway branches, or 
in countryside lacking pathways an “arm” or an “arrow” is erected so that 
it can be seen from far off; an arm or arrow that normally bears a place-
name. If all goes well it does good service to the traveler; and the first 
requirement is that it must be correctly positioned in its deictic field. Not 
much more than this trivial insight need be retained, and the question 
posed as to whether spoken language contains signs that function as 
signposts. The answer is yes, deictic words such as here and there have a 
similar function.152 
In this introductory passage, Bühler argues that just as a person or a signpost directs an 
individual to a certain place or location, words can also “function as signposts” and point 
the listener to a certain person, location, or object within a “concrete speech event.” In 
this way, then, deictic indicators operate as verbal gestures within a rhetorical act. 
The meaning of deictic indicators (or pointing words) is defined completely by 
each individual speech situation, or what Bühler refers to as the “deictic field.” Pointing 
words are, according to Bühler, 
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symbols (and not only signals); da and dort (there) symbolize, they name 
an area, they name the geometrical location, so to speak, that is, an area 
around the person now speaking within which what is pointed to can be 
found; just as the word heute (today) in fact names the totality of all days 
on which it can be spoken, and the word I [refers to] all possible senders 
of human messages, and the word thou the class of all receivers as such. 
But one difference still remains between these names and the other 
naming words of language; it lies in the fact that they expect their meaning 
to be made definite from case to case in the deictic field of language and 
in what the deictic field is able to provide for the senses.153 
Here Bühler argues that pointing words are not just directional signals; they are symbols 
that name, describe, and define the world around them. This is an important distinction 
for rhetoric because it not only aligns with Kenneth Burke’s view that all language is 
symbolic action, but it explains why pointing words are more than a simple linguistic 
device. Deictic indicators point the audience to places, people, and temporal dimensions 
while simultaneously naming and defining the historical context and symbolic meaning 
imbedded in these places, people, and times. 
For Bühler, this “deictic field” was comprised of three primary elements: the 
person speaking (“I”), the place or location of the interaction (“here”), and when this 
interaction occurred (“now”). These three terms or axes (the I/here/now triad) constitute 
the “deictic field” and define the communicative encounter. For Bühler and contemporary 
linguists, all deictic words “expect their meaning to be made definite from case to case in 
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the deictic field of language and in what the deictic field is able to provide for the 
senses.”154 This view of a “concrete speech event”—what critics might call the rhetorical 
situation—requires the co-presence of a rhetor (“I”) and his/her audience (“you”) in the 
same place (“here”) within the same historical-temporal moment (“now”). And yet, as 
rhetoricians know, rhetorical acts are never quite this simple. Indeed, more recent work 
theorizing the rhetorical situation reminds us that rhetoric can be much more than a 
communicative exchange between speaker and audience.155 Instead, rhetoric shifts and 
moves and circulates within, between, and among persons, communities, organizations, 
campaigns, and social movements. It persuades through monuments and museums, flows 
through marches, protests, and rallies. It constitutes political actors and constrains 
political subjects. In short, much of the rhetoric we encounter today quickly extends 
beyond the exigence-audience-constraints model described by Lloyd Bitzer in 1967. 
Jenny Edbauer observes that such “element-based theories of discourse” that focus on 
distinct, containable elements miss how these elements interact, shift, and change “in a 
wider sphere of active, historical, and lived processes.” Instead, Edbauer calls rhetorical 
critics to consider these elements “in their temporal, historical, and lived fluxes” and “add 
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the dimensions of history and movement (back) into our visions/versions of rhetoric’s 
public situations, reclaiming rhetoric from artificially elementary frameworks.”156 
Building on the work of Edbauer and others, I contend that this emphasis on the 
material and lived processes suggests that the place or location of a rhetorical encounter 
and its historical/temporal moment is quite significant. What if we conceptualized the 
rhetorical situation in its most literal sense and examined the significance of where a 
speech act is located or placed? As noted earlier, classical notions of epideixis involved a 
displaying or showing forth on something. Epideixis required a situation that was 
materially real. Contemporary linguists use deixis to uncover how a speaker describes 
and defines the immediate situation (or an imaginary scene) through language. A 
rhetorical theory of deixis advocates a similar approach to the rhetorical situation. 
Identifying how a speaker names and describes himself/herself, the audience he/she is 
addressing, the place of the rhetorical act, and the historical/temporal moment in which it 
takes place tells us something about how rhetorical situations circulate in place while 
simultaneously moving through place to (re)define what that place means for present and 
future action. 
The second concept of particular interest for scholars of rhetoric is the three types 
(or “modes”) of deixis: (1) “ocular demonstration”; (2) “imagination-oriented deixis”; 
and (3) “anaphoric deixis.” These terms are important for rhetoricians because they 
describe deixis as a faculty of language carrying sensory dimensions, particularly those 
related to sight. Deictic words direct gazes, activate perception, and trigger “readiness for 
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sensory reception.”157 It is no accident that Bühler invoked vision as a key element of 
deixis, for all three of his “modes” of deixis are in some way related to what the audience 
can see or imagine. 
The first mode, “ocular demonstration,” describes situations in which deictic 
words point the audience to places, people, and temporal dimensions that are physically 
present within the immediate speech situation.158 In his original German work, Bühler 
used the Latin phrase “Deixis ad oculos” to describe this first mode; “ocular 
demonstration” is the English translation for this phenomenon. In Latin, oculos refers to 
the physical eye; ad oculos can be roughly translated “in/near our very eyes” or “in/near 
our eyeballs.”159 Classicist Lowell Edmunds argues that “Deixis ad oculos” insinuates: “I 
point to (something) which you can see.”160 Thus, this first mode of deixis refers to what 
is physically present before the audience—locations, people, and objects that can “be 
found with the external eye and ear.”161 The second mode of deixis, “imagination-
oriented deixis,” describes how a speaker refers the audience to imaginary scenes created 
through language, “lead[ing] the hearer into the realm of what is absent and can be 
remembered or into the realm of constructive imagination. . . . Not with the external eye, 
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ear, and so on, but with what is usually called the ‘mind’s’ eye.”162 It should be 
immediately apparent that this second mode of deixis is strikingly similar to classical 
ideas of rhetorical vision or phantasia.163 In fact, Bühler used the Latin “Deixis am 
Phantasma” (later translated “imagination-oriented deixis” in English) for this second 
mode of verbal pointing. Edmunds explains that “Deixis am Phantasma” contains the 
proposition: “I point to (something) which you can see in your mind’s eye.” According to 
Edmunds, if “Deixis ad oculos” and “Deixis am Phantasma” are to be read in conjunction 
with one another, then “phantasma has to be understood as phantasia.”164 Just as the 
Greeks and Romans believed that an orator could use language to trigger the mental 
ability to see images (phantasia) and create images through vivid description (enargeia), 
Bühler argued that “imagination-oriented deixis” provides a “visual account of absent 
objects” in the minds of the audience. 
The third type of deixis, what Bühler terms “anaphoric deixis” and more 
contemporary scholars call “intertextual deixis,” describes how a speaker directs the 
audience “to something that is to be looked for and found not at places in the space of 
actual perception but rather at places within the totality of speech.”165 What is particularly 
interesting about this third mode is that listeners do not find what they are looking for in 
the immediate vicinity; they do not see it before their literal eyes, and they do not enter 
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into an imaginary scene created through language. Instead, anaphoric deixis triggers 
something else: memory of what has come before or anticipation of what might come in 
the future. Bühler specified that “every anaphoric use of deictic words presupposes one 
thing: that the sender and the receiver have the flow of the speech in front of them and can 
reach ahead and back to its parts.”166 In order to remember what has been said and “reach 
ahead” (or anticipate) what will come next, the audience must draw on their past 
experiences and the present moment to remember the past and anticipate future 
utterances. Although Bühler conceived of anaphoric deixis as linked to the spoken text, I 
argue that one way to understand various moments within the text is to attend to the 
multiplicity of texts delivered in a particular location. Just as a written text encourages 
readers to remember what happened earlier in the text and to anticipate what might 
happen in the future, the place or location of a rhetorical act anchors the spoken word 
while also harnessing memories of what has happened in that place and what may happen 
occur in that place in years to come.167 
Although there are additional concepts from deixis that might be useful to 
scholars of rhetoric, I have chosen to focus on these two specific aspects because they 
directly address two critical dimensions of rhetorical action: what constitutes a rhetorical 
encounter, and how language can activate physical people, places, and objects, imaginary 
scenes, and the faculties of memory to persuade. I now turn to describing how a 
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rhetorical theory of deixis works together with more recent scholarship on ethos, place, 
temporality, and mediation and circulation. This perspective takes into account the 
unique insights linguistics might offer to rhetoric even as it outlines how a specifically 
rhetorical approach to deixis extends its theoretical and methodological potential. 
 
Rhetorical Authority and Ethos Rooted in Place 
A rhetorical theory of deixis reveals how the speaker defines the social 
relationship between a speaker and audience not simply in terms of strategies of 
identification, but in how speakers create a relationship with the audience through 
symbolic language and embodied presence in place. Although rhetorical scholars long 
have examined how inclusive or exclusive pronouns establish relationships, invite 
identification, create division, and constitute publics, deixis extends this analysis to the 
embodied existence of individuals present within the speech setting. A careful 
consideration of the pronouns embedded in spoken texts not only reveals how language 
physically links bodies together in time and place, but it also marks “characteristic[s] of 
the sender,”168 suggesting that audience members will recognize “characteristics” or 
qualities they associate with the speaker—ethos. A rhetorical theory of deixis asks how a 
speaker’s rhetorical authority is linked to (and perhaps even established in) that place or 
location.169 The decision to situate a speech in a particular location is one way that 
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speakers can bolster their own ethos, for, as Risa Applegarth notes, “ethos is a situated 
practice.” Understanding ethos in relation to place reveals how speakers “draw on places 
to meet their rhetorical aims and to position themselves persuasively—in material 
contexts and in genres which shape relations between rhetors and audiences in significant 
ways.”170 Michael J. Hyde describes the rhetor as one “whose symbolic constructions 
both create and invite others into a place where they can dwell and feel at home while 
thinking about and discussing the truth of some matter that the rhetor/architect has 
already attempted to disclose and show-forth (epi-deixis) in a specific way with his or her 
work of art.”171 Orators, then, have the ability to symbolically construct the meaning of 
their rhetoric in situ in both senses—what that rhetoric means because it is located in that 
place, and what that place comes to represent because of their rhetorical action. In turn, 
rhetors invite their audiences to deliberate together over what they have heard and seen in 
that place. 
A rhetorical theory of deixis also offers another way to conceptualize the 
relationship between a speaker’s persona or ethos and the responsibilities he/she assigns 
to the assembled audience. Aristotle described the epideictic audience not as judges 
(kritês) but as witnesses (theôros), a term that Jeffrey Walker translates as “one who is to 
make ‘observations’ (theôriai) about what is praiseworthy, preferable, desirable, or 
worthy of belief in the speaker’s logos. . . . The role of the theôros, in short, is not to 
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make rulings but to form opinions about and in response to the discourse presented.”172 
Note here that the primary responsibility of an epideictic audience is to bear witness to an 
orator’s display (epideixis) of past virtue or vice and, if necessary, reorient the 
community toward what is good and just. As Megan Foley observes, “epideictic points 
toward a moment of movement. Epideictic points toward the promise of change.”173 The 
community bearing witness, then, also assumes a responsibility for preserving past 
greatness for generations to come, for “the theōros sees what could be.”174 Rhetorically 
understood, deixis works in tandem with epideixis to display people, places, and events 
that are worthy of this communal reflection. It invites the audience to observe and bear 
witness to the past and respond accordingly. It is the means by which a speaker can 
“unshroud men’s notable deeds in order to let us gaze at the aura glowing from 
within.”175 A rhetorical theory of deixis helps the critic pinpoint the ways in which the 
speaker uses the material and symbolic dimensions of a place to remind the audience of 
previous events and future possibilities. Thus, when rhetors speak in place about what 
that place symbolizes for the community, their language constitutes the assembled 
audience as theōros responsible for living and acting in such a way that the lessons of the 
past might be (re)constituted for future generations. 
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Rhetoric in Place and Place-as-Rhetoric 
A rhetorical theory of deixis pushes the critic to include the location or place of 
public address as a key analytic and to consider the mutually constitutive relationship 
between rhetoric as delivered in place and place-as-rhetoric. As noted previously, rhetoric 
always has been designed for a particular location or place. Classical rhetors situated their 
performances in front of scenic landscapes and directed their audiences to monuments, 
statues, and temples that symbolized specific civic virtues and political ideologies. This 
approach saw place, location, and/or situation as a primary element of rhetorical 
invention—rhetoric that was designed for and delivered in situ, or in place. Linguists 
conceptualize the “here” or location of a speech act in terms of how spatial deictics 
establish joint attention of both the speaker and the audience “on concrete entities in the 
surrounding situation.”176 But these spatial deictics (terms such as “here,” “there,” “this,” 
or “that”) also “may indicate whether the referent is visible or out-of-sight,” suggesting 
that a listener’s bodily presence in that place—what they may not directly see but 
intuitively know is there—also contributes to the meaning of a concrete speech event.177 
A rhetorical theory of deixis, then, conceptualizes place not simply as a geographical 
location or physical marker, but also as a symbolic construct that can operate as a means 
of invention (rhetoric in place) and as a persuasive argument in and of itself (place-as-
rhetoric). 
Recent work articulating the connections between rhetoric and place reveals, as 
Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott note, that place “assume[s] an identity 
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precisely in being recognizable—as named, bordered, and invented in particular ways. . . 
. [and] rendered recognizable by symbolic, and often material, intervention.”178 These 
studies also provide a helpful framework for thinking about how a place or location can 
come to represent civic patriotism, social moments, or ideology—“place-as-rhetoric.”179 
A rhetorical theory of deixis builds on this understanding of place-as-rhetoric, and yet 
suggests that a co-constitutive relationship exists between rhetors locating their speech 
acts in a particular location and the rhetorical dimensions of that place. It attends to the 
placement of situated public addresses, extending our understanding of how speakers 
draw on place-as-rhetoric as one way to advance their rhetoric in place. Put another way, 
deixis helps the critic to account for the ways rhetors invoke the material and symbolic 
dimensions of where their speech is placed as a rhetorical strategy, a way of persuading a 
specific audience within a particular historical/temporal moment. Deixis is concerned 
with “speakers and hearers in a situation, taking this word in its original sense of being in 
situ or in a location. Needless to say, the location is not to be taken in a purely objective, 
geographical sense, but rather as the natural and social context of communicative practice 
shared, and in part created, by the interlocutors.”180 
To understand the inventive possibilities of place, a rhetorical theory of deixis 
approaches the rhetorical situation both as a symbolic construct and as materially real. In 
what ways is this place “always already rhetorical?”181 That is, what prior symbolic 
meanings has this place accrued? What does speaking in this place—and thus linking a 
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rhetorical act to this place—signify? And what will the bodies—both of speaker and 
audience—see, hear, sense, and experience when they are in this place?182 In what ways 
does the physical makeup of the speech location encourage visitors to be still and reflect, 
to engage in controversy, to listen attentively? A rhetorical theory of deixis helps critics 
to identify how rhetors use the spoken word to invoke the rhetorical possibilities of a 
place while simultaneously rooting their discourse in that particular location. It examines 
how the text directs the audience to what is particularly meaningful and consequential 
about that place. It emphasizes the centrality of place to all rhetorical action, whether 
immediate or imaginary, and provides a method for identifying how rhetors invest places, 
people, things, and temporal dimensions with symbolic meaning while simultaneously 
appropriating these symbols for their overall rhetorical purposes.183 
 
Chronos and Kairos in Space-Time 
A rhetorical theory of deixis understands time as both a specific temporal marker 
on a timeline of history (quantitative time, or chronos) and as a symbolically constructed 
moment that is ripe or opportune for rhetorical action (qualitative time, or kairos). This 
approach also underscores the relationship between time and place, paying specific 
attention to how rhetorical acts link speech to physical locations, historical/temporal 
moments, and the bodies that interact with them. From this perspective, deixis 
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understands texts as radically temporal and yet also extendable across space and time. 
Deixis, then, encourages the critic to read a text within its particular historical moment 
while also accounting for how the meaning of a place can shift over time, in and through 
rhetorical action. 
Identifying the deictic references to time within a speech text reveals how 
speakers create historical narratives and kairotic encounters that are also rooted in place. 
“Time, in the chronos sense, permits . . . a chronology to be constructed, and therefore a 
chronicle of events which forms the initial material for the writing of history.”184 This 
chronos view of time is also reflected in scholarly treatments of deixis, where “[t]ime is 
commonly conceptualized as a straight line providing the conceptual ground for a fictive 
observer.”185 For example, temporal deictics such as “now,” “yesterday,” or “tomorrow” 
orient the listener to a specific point along a historical trajectory. “Now” becomes the 
anchoring point (or the “deictic centre”) for the speech act, with “yesterday” coming 
before the “now” and “tomorrow” coming after it. And because this concept of linear 
time is profoundly spatial, linguists also recognize that “spatial deictics can function to 
‘locate’ an event on the time line relative to the moment of the speech event.”186 A 
rhetorical theory of deixis approaches chronos time as both a temporal and a spatial 
phenomenon, a concept that is defined both by its location along the timeline of history 
and its physical situatedness in a particular location, a place that is often profoundly 
rhetorical. Kairos adds an additional layer to this understanding of time, the idea of a 
right or perfect time. Where chronos describes time that can be marked or measured on a 
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continuum, kairos expresses the significance of a certain moment within a larger 
historical flow. According to Eric Charles White, kairos refers “to a passing instant when 
an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be 
achieved.”187 To achieve kairos, a rhetor must approach the “the present as 
unprecedented, as a moment of decision, a moment of crisis,” and adapt his/her speech to 
the particular needs of the occasion, to the uniqueness of the moment.188 
A rhetorical theory of deixis understands time in both the quantitative and 
qualitative senses, revealing how speakers use temporal indicators to stress both historical 
(or linear) time and the appropriateness of the moment. A speaker’s description of “now” 
also can refer to both historical time (chronos) and the appropriateness of the occasion 
(kairos), communicating both the exact historical moment of a speech act and also the 
larger time period in which the speech occurs. Although chronos and kairos may operate 
separately or simultaneously within a particular speech text, orators can shift the 
interpretation of a particular moment from a simple historical event to “a point in time 
filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end.” As 
speakers use language to evoke past memories, address present realities, and created a 
shared vision for the future, “that which was conceived of as simply successive [time] 
becomes charged with past and future: what was chronos becomes kairos.”189 A 
rhetorical theory of deixis identifies the transformative potential of language to 
accomplish this shift. Locating the temporal deictic indicators with a speech text (those 
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that describe time in both a chronos and a kairos sense) enables the critic to analyze how 
speakers use language to create kairotic encounters that are both timely and timeless, 
rooted in places that are symbolically constructed and materially real. 
Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis acknowledges that the “concrete speech 
event”190 is a product of the social, temporal, and spatial relations. This view corresponds 
with Doreen Massey’s conception of space-time, or the idea that “space and time are 
inextricably interwoven. . . . [and] the definitions of both space and time in themselves 
must be constructed as the result of interrelations.”191 Massey underscores this 
relationship between social actors, space, and time, writing that if “the spatial is thought 
of in the context of space-time and as formed out of social interrelations at all scales, then 
one view of a place is as a particular articulation of those relations, a particular moment 
in those networks of social relations and understandings.”192 Massey’s description of the 
relationship between space, place, and time suggests that the meaning of place is 
constantly changing and is defined not just by what is physically present in that place, but 
by how that place is linked to and defined by broader social and political relations, 
networks, and ideologies. A rhetorical theory of deixis adds to this discussion by 
uncovering how texts accrue meaning over time in and through place. Deixis helps critics 
approach rhetoric as a product of a specific historical/temporal moment and a physical 
location. This approach reveals the potential for texts to constitute themselves in place 
and, in so doing, invite future rhetorical action linked to that place. As Michael Leff 
notes, “rhetorical discourses are themselves temporal phenomena. They emerge in time; 
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they are conditioned by other discourses and by the progression of events, but they are 
also constructed things that occupy a span of time. . . . The rhetorical text, then, is a 
historical development occurring within a broader context of historical developments.”193 
A rhetorical theory of deixis is concerned with how a speaker defines his/her rhetorical 
act within both senses of time (chronos and kairos), place, and space-time while also 
attending to the ways a discourse might change over time in response to historical events, 
moments that often define, and are defined by, their placement. 
 
Rhetorical Vision and the Mediation of Public Discourse 
Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals how texts activate the sensory 
dimensions of rhetoric in at least three ways: (1) how language points the audience to 
what they see and feel in the rhetorical situation; (2) how these physical elements of the 
speech setting spark mental images and trigger memories of the past; and (3) how the 
visual mediation of public rhetorical acts amplifies its placement. As discussed earlier, 
Bühler linked deixis with demonstratio, a term that describes a rhetorical technique of 
pointing out, displaying, or showing forth through language, physical movement, or both. 
Deixis extends this understanding in that it provides a theoretical frame for thinking 
about the potential words themselves have to gesture to people, places, objects, and 
imaginary realms that the speaker deems important. Debra Hawhee notes that “a host of 
bodily processes are enlisted in a speaker-audience exchange, most of them sensuous.”194 
How might we understand rhetoric’s role in activating this sensorium? I argue that one 
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way to think about how rhetoric and sensation interact is to analyze the moments when 
language activates the sensory realm either through what is immediately present (Deixis 
ad oculos) or what can be seen imaginatively with the “mind’s eye” (Deixis am 
Phantasma). A rhetorical theory of deixis reminds us that spoken oratory continually asks 
the audience to look at the particulars of a rhetorical situation and experience the verbal 
text alongside the visual images (either immediate or imaginary) that the speech act 
provides. 
A rhetorical theory of deixis also offers insight into how rhetorical vision might 
be sparked by the physically real. Bühler’s description of imaginary-oriented deixis 
(Deixis am Phantasma) explains how orators can use language to situate the audience in 
an imaginary place or scene. This discussion, as noted earlier, mirrors classical ideas of 
rhetorical vision in a remarkable way. Similarly, Bühler explains that deictic indicators 
prepare the audience “for sensory reception” through “clues” that point and orient them 
to “the details of the situation.” 195 Just as rhetorical vision traditionally prompts mental 
images to members of the audience, Deixis am Phantasma works “to make something 
that is [physically] absent present” to the audience.196 Often, these images are triggered 
by what is immediate to the senses. A rhetorical theory of deixis suggests that critics must 
attend more closely to the sensory elements of persuasion, particularly the relationship 
between verbal imagery and physical sight. Just as Greek and Roman orators physically 
gestured to their material surroundings, deixis describes how rhetors use words to point to 
the physical elements of the speech setting. 
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Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis considers how the mediation of texts—
through television, the Internet, social media, You Tube, and other avenues—amplifies 
the visual components of the rhetorical situation. Classical conceptions of epideixis and 
demonstratio included the possibility that orators could amplify or enumerate details to 
such a degree that the description of an event would achieve more emotional power than 
the actual event itself. Deictic utterances also accomplish this work when speakers 
repeatedly direct their audiences to what is physically before them or the mental images 
sparked by the immediate context. A rhetorical theory of deixis considers how texts 
amplify the visual dimensions of their contexts, but it also examines how mediated 
images of the text’s context—that is, the visual images a rhetorical act provides—
circulate in and through place. How do texts “speak” through the images they provide? 
How do rhetors amplify these visuals by continually directing audiences to what is 
physically present before them? What role does deixis play in helping orators spark 
visual images through what the speaker and the audience both “see,” whether those 
shared images are made possible through television, the internet, or a (re)circulation of a 
speech on YouTube? Deixis provides one way for scholars of rhetoric to discover where, 
and how, speakers rely on what their audience can see—physically and mentally—as a 
way to induce specific action and help them, quite literally, “‘visualize’ public 
address.”197 
Taken together, rhetorical understandings of ethos, place, temporality, and the 
mediation and circulation of texts enrich and extend the linguistic concept of deixis. 
Where Bühler’s initial theory focused on identifying the discrete bounds of the “concrete 
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speech event,” a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals the dynamic interplay between text 
and context by examining how speakers use language to activate the people, places, and 
times embedded in the concrete speech situation as a material means of persuasion.198 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals the 
rhetorical dynamics within the fabric of spoken discourse, dynamics that often refer to 
what is outside the text to make sense of what is within it. Simply put, a rhetorical theory 
of deixis points to, displays, and shows forth how texts speak in and through their 
contexts. Because every rhetorical act is unique, a deictic approach to close textual 
criticism will operate differently in every instance. In the analysis chapters that follow, 
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Chapter Three: Truman at the Lincoln Memorial 
 
 
On June 29, 1947, Harry S. Truman became the first U.S. president to address the 
NAACP in person.199 Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial at the closing 
session of the organization’s thirty-eighth annual meeting, Truman argued that the United 
States had a moral duty to extend the full benefits of citizenship to all citizens, regardless 
of race, color, religion, or creed. Historian David McCullough writes that Truman’s 
NAACP speech was “the strongest statement on civil rights heard in Washington since the 
time of Lincoln,”200 and rhetorical critic Garth E. Pauley observes that Truman’s speech was 
significant because he was “the first president to define civil rights as a crisis.”201 Truman’s 
argument for federal civil rights legislation was notable, particularly because this speech 
came a full year before his decision to make race a central issue of his 1948 presidential 
campaign.202 Far from simply a political calculation, Truman’s insistence that the U.S. 
government take active steps to secure civil rights for “all Americans” was a bold step as 
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police brutality, lynchings, and Jim Crow transcended any supposed promise of racial justice 
on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. 
To understand fully the rhetorical significance of the president’s address to the 
NAACP, it is essential to examine Truman’s spoken text within its larger context. 
Specifically, I utilize a rhetorical theory of deixis to uncover how references to 
speaker/audience, location, and time activated the contextual elements of Truman’s speech 
situation as a material means of persuasion. Critical sensitivity to bodies, places, and 
temporalities reveals how Truman linked his presidential ethos to a particular location, the 
Lincoln Memorial, and interpreted this particular moment as a critical juncture in U.S. 
history, a time that was ripe for political action. This approach reveals how Truman’s 
rhetorical authority and ethos—as displayed through speech—activated, interacted with, and 
ultimately transformed the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial in U.S. political 
culture and the global imaginary. More broadly, this chapter provides an example of the 
transformative potential of presidential rhetoric in place, demonstrating how a chief 
executive’s institutional authority can challenge, (re)affirm, and (re)constitute the 
symbolic meaning of place for the U.S. public and the larger geopolitical community. At 
the same time, this case study reveals how presidential authority can be linked to and 
established in place even as it transforms the symbolic potential of that place-as-rhetoric. 
Here I first focus on the historical/contextual background of this particular 
moment in Cold War U.S. history. I then examine Truman’s history with the issue of race 
relations to explain why his physical presence at the Lincoln Memorial on June 29, 1947, 
was so remarkable and describe the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial 
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within U.S. political culture at the time of Truman’s speech, paying particular attention to 
President Warren G. Harding’s dedication of the site in 1922 and Marian Anderson’s 
outdoor concert in 1939. I then offer a close reading of Truman’s address to show how 
spatial, relational, and temporal coordinates operate within and extend beyond Truman’s 
speech text into the material realities of his rhetorical situation. Finally, I consider some 
of the responses to the speech from the news media and the broader U.S. public. 
 
Setting the Scene: From World War II to the Cold War 
President Truman’s Address to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, was not just a 
statement on U.S. race relations. Instead, it represented a pivotal moment in U.S. foreign 
policy as the nation’s political leaders struggled to formulate a response to what Winston 
Churchill famously described as the “iron curtain” descending over Eastern Europe.203 
Although FDR, Churchill, and Soviet premier Josef Stalin had agreed to free elections in 
their “Declaration on Liberated Europe” at Yalta in February 1945, the Soviet leader 
quickly rescinded his promise, and U.S. State Department officials argued over the best 
way to respond to obvious Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Before Roosevelt could 
chart out a plan of action, he died of a massive stroke on April 12, 1945, and Truman was 
elevated to the highest office in the land after serving only eighty-two days as Vice 
President.204 The former U.S. Senator from Missouri had little to no foreign policy 
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experience and was excluded from war planning meetings, even as Vice President. “To 
the country, the Congress, the Washington bureaucracy, to hundreds of veteran New 
Dealers . . . the news of Franklin Roosevelt’s death, followed by the realization that 
Harry Truman was President, struck like massive earth tremors in quick succession, the 
thought of Truman in the White House coming with the force of a shock wave,” historian 
David McCullough has written. “To many it was not just that the greatest of men had 
fallen, but that the least of men—or at any rate the least likely of men—had assumed his 
place.” Upon receiving the news of FDR’s death in Marburg, Germany, General George 
Patton wrote, “It seems very unfortunate that in order to secure political preference, 
people are made Vice President who are never intended, neither by Party or by the Lord 
to be Presidents.”205 Yet when Truman took office after FDR’s sudden death, he became 
the chief U.S. diplomat responsible for working with Stalin and Churchill to end the 
Second World War—a relationship that would quickly shift from World War II allies to 
Cold War enemies. 
On May 8, 1945, less than a month after FDR’s death, Germany agreed to an 
unconditional surrender in Europe (“Victory in Europe” Day), and Japan surrendered four 
months later. In the weeks and months following the Allied victory, the U.S. public was 
eager to return to a war-free, “normal” life. As historian Tony Judt explains,  
The United States in 1945 and for some time to come seriously expected to 
extricate itself from Europe as soon as possible, and was thus understandably 
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keen to put in place a workable settlement that would not require American 
presence or supervision. This aspect of American post-war thinking is not well 
remembered or understood today, but it was uppermost in American calculations 
at the time—as Roosevelt had explained at Yalta, the U.S. did not expect to 
remain in occupation of Germany (and thus in Europe) more than two years at 
most.206 
With the Soviet Union’s steady advance across Eastern Europe and a flurry of heated 
rhetoric, it was clear that Stalin had no intention of holding up his end of the post-war 
commitments made at Yalta. In a rare speech to the Russian Politburo on February 9, 
1946, Stalin declared that capitalism and communism could not coexist and predicted 
another war within the next fifteen to twenty years.207 The State Department asked 
George Kennan, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, for an 
analysis of Stalin’s speech and its implications for U.S.-Soviet relations.208 Sent to 
Washington on February 22, 1946, Kennan predicted in his “Long Telegram” that the 
Soviet Union would direct its efforts “toward deepening and exploiting the differences 
and conflicts between capitalist powers” and believed it to be “desirable and necessary 
that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be 
destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be 
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secure.”209 In response to this growing international threat, Kennan outlined specific 
recommendations for how the United States could combat this ideological attack, and 
several of his comments are particularly pertinent in thinking not just about Truman’s 
speech to the NAACP in 1947, but analyzing how later U.S. presidents returned to these 
rhetorical themes (or “commonplaces”) to advance a particular vision of the United States 
during the Cold War. 
First, Kennan argued that the United States needed to attend to the “health and 
vigor of our own society. World communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds 
only on diseased tissue. . . . Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal 
problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and 
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a 
thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués.”210 Although Kennan did not mention 
the issue of race specifically, President Truman used his address to the NAACP to argue 
that the United States needed to “put [its] own house in order” if it were to advance the 
principles of democracy in the rest of the world.211 
Second, Kennan argued that the United States needed to articulate a specific 
vision of why U.S. democracy was the better alternative to Soviet communism. It is 
particularly important to note Kennan’s use of visual metaphors in the passage below: 
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We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and 
constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to see than we have put 
forward in the past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes 
similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and 
frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than 
in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be 
better able than [the] Russians to give them this. And unless we do, [the] Russians 
certainly will.212 
Here Kennan suggested that it was only through specific “positive and constructive 
picture[s]” that the rest of the world would “see” the merits of democracy, and it was up 
to the United States to provide this international leadership, moral resolve, and 
“guidance.” To present such a picture, Kennan argued, the nation would need to “have 
courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human 
society. After [all], the greatest danger than can befall us in coping with this problem of 
Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we 
are coping.”213 
 Praised by top State Department officials in the United States, Kennan’s report 
was circulated to diplomatic posts around the world. Denise M. Bostdorff notes that 
although Kennan’s Long Telegram “did not lead immediately to a change in U.S. foreign 
policy . . . it planted the seeds for such a change.”214 George Elsey, a White House special 
counsel to the president, discussed the document with Truman, although his reaction to 
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the document is unknown. Similar themes would be reflected in the president’s “Truman 
Doctrine” pronouncement of March 12, 1947, in which Truman not only implored the 
U.S. Congress to send military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey so that these 
countries could withstand communist takeover, but argued that the United States had a 
moral imperative to “the free peoples of the world” who looked to the United States “for 
support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership,” Truman warned, 
“we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of 
this Nation.”215 This bold pronouncement, writes Bostdorff, “articulated a new policy—
the Truman Doctrine—and marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, setting a new 
course for the nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union and the rest of the world,” 
including the Marshall Plan which Truman Administration officials would introduce later 
that year.216 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is most important to recognize that a 
crucial element of Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and Truman’s March 12, 1947, speech 
was its emphasis on the place—both literal and metaphorical—that the United States 
would occupy in the Cold War. Both documents underscore how important it was for the 
nation to offer a clear picture of democracy to peoples tempted by Soviet communism. 
This theme continued throughout Truman’s speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947. 
Even as he articulated his domestic civil rights program to the nation and to the world, 
Truman directly refuted critics—most notably, the Soviet Union—who claimed that the 
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United States had no business preaching democracy to the rest of the world when it 
disenfranchised its own citizens. Mary Dudziak observes, “[a]t a time when the United 
States hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the international attention 
given to racial segregation was troublesome and embarrassing. The focus of American 
foreign policy was to promote democracy and to ‘contain’ communism, but the 
international focus on U.S. racial problems meant that the image of American democracy 
was tarnished.”217 Thus, when Truman delivered the closing address at the NAACP 
conference, he spoke to a global audience—citizens and nations choosing between 
democracy and communism, the “two ways of life” that Truman had described in his 
address to Congress on March 12, 1947. Although much more could be said about this 
period in U.S. history, I now turn my attention to Truman’s political ethos and, more 
specifically, his personal history with the issue of race, to reveal the symbolic potential of 
presidential presence in place. 
 
Harry S. Truman, a Son of the South 
When Truman delivered the keynote address at the closing session of the thirty-
eighth annual conference on June 29, 1947, his physical presence—both as President of 
the United States and as border-state Democrat whose grandparents were proud slave 
owners—lent executive and political authority to the issue of civil rights in the United 
States. Indeed, Truman’s southern upbringing and his own history with race relations 
made this particular address at the Lincoln Memorial to the NAACP all the more 
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remarkable—and transformative. 
Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, just eighty miles from the 
Arkansas border. All four of Truman’s grandparents were born in the South and owned 
slaves.218 The War Between the States affected Truman’s grandparents and parents in 
very personal ways. Union soldiers looted Solomon Young’s farm on five separate 
occasions between 1861 and 1863, setting fire to barns, slaughtering chickens and hogs, 
and confiscating $21,442 in possessions, “the equivalent in present-day money of a 
quarter of a million dollars.” After these attacks came General Order No. 11. Issued on 
August 25, 1863, by Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, the Union commander in Kansas 
City, the directive forced all residents of Jackson, Cass, and Bates counties—including 
Truman’s mother, Martha Ellen Young, and her family—to abandon their homes with 
only one wagonload of possessions. Martha Ellen was only eleven, and would remember 
walking behind her family’s wagon to their “bitter exile” in Kansas City.219 William E. 
Leuchtenburg writes that Truman “literally learned at his mother’s knee to share the 
South’s view of the War Between the States. . . . [and] acquired an abiding belief in white 
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supremacy.” Years later, when Truman’s mother Martha visited her son in the White 
House and was offered the Lincoln bedroom, she said, “You tell Harry if he tries to put 
me in Lincoln’s bed, I’ll sleep on the floor.”220 
Truman’s initial attitudes on race mirrored those of his parents and grandparents. 
Perhaps nowhere else is this more evident than in a letter he wrote to Bess Wallace in 
1911: 
I think one man is just as good as another so long as he’s honest and decent and 
not a nigger or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a white man from 
dust[,] a nigger from mud, then He threw up what was left and it came down a 
China man. He does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I. It is race prejudice I guess. 
But I am strongly of the opinion that negros [sic] ought to be in Africa, yellow 
men in Asia[,] and white men in Europe and America.221 
Shocking as these comments are, however, they reflect the social and political mores of 
Independence, Missouri, a town that Truman biographer Merle Miller described as “a 
Southern town, a border town, one of whose more prominent organizations had been the 
United Daughters of the Confederacy.”222 Although he would continue to make similar 
racially charged comments throughout his life and even post-presidency,223 Truman took 
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steps that were, at the time, notable toward securing civil rights for African Americans, 
particularly in the border-state of Missouri.224 As U.S. Senator, Truman supported a 
progressive civil rights agenda in the Senate, including anti-lynching legislation, 
eliminating discrimination in the armed forces, and outlawing the poll tax.225 At the same 
time, however, although Truman supported “legal equality” for African Americans 
“because [they were] human being[s] and . . . natural born American[s],” he did not 
believe in the equality of the races.226 In an address to a black audience in Chicago in 
1940, Truman made this point explicit: “I wish to make clear that I am not appealing for 
social equality of the Negro. The Negro himself knows better than that, and the highest 
types of Negro leaders say quite frankly that they prefer the society of their own 
people.”227 Yet in the end, Truman saw his constitutional oath as paramount to any 
sectional affiliation—including his Southern upbringing. “Truman’s reading in history 
and in documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights had led 
him to question the assumptions on which he was raised,” writes Leuchtenburg. “He 
acted as he did not because he believed in the social equality of the races, not because he 
was ‘anti-South,’ but because he took solemnly the oath he had sworn to sustain the 
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Constitution.”228 In his address to the NAACP and other public statements, Truman made 
it clear that he represented neither the North nor the South. Instead, he spoke as President 
of all the United States, to and for both the North and the South. Any sectional allegiance 
to the South was eclipsed by a larger commitment to the nation as a whole. 
When Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945, he inherited Roosevelt’s 
less than stellar record on civil rights. During his construction of the New Deal during the 
1930s, FDR catered to Southern Democrats. Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel 
Kryder argue that the president and congressional leaders “reached an implicit modus 
vivendi: southern civil society would remain intact and southern representatives would 
support the key elements of the administration’s program. There would be no attempt to 
build a mass biracial base in the South; nor would even the most heinous aspects of 
regional repression, such as lynching, be brought under the rule of law.”229 Thomas 
Borstelmann writes that although FDR was “[p]ersonally inclined against colonialism and 
racial discrimination, Roosevelt was foremost a pragmatist who accepted the necessity of 
working with reactionary allies for common ends.”230 Political scientist Kevin J. 
McMahon summarizes, “FDR did not lack the opportunity to improve the plight of 
African Americans, just the will.”231 Throughout the Roosevelt Administration, it was 
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt who championed the issue of civil rights and became the 
moral conscience of the nation, meeting often with black political leaders and urging her 
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husband to support anti-lynching legislation in the U.S. Congress (something that FDR 
would never agree to do). After Roosevelt’s sudden death in April 1945, Southern 
Democrats were confident that on the race question, Truman had their back. As South 
Carolina Senator Burnet Maybank told a friend, “Everything’s going to be all right—the 
new President knows how to handle the niggers.”232 Although Truman lacked experience, 
he made up for it with conviction and moral resolve. Despite his own familial history and 
fully aware that his civil rights program could cost him reelection in 1948, Truman was 
determined to enact change. In the end, “Harry Truman would come to be seen as a 
president who put civil rights firmly on the nation’s agenda.”233 
Although Truman took steps to support civil rights legislation as U.S. Senator, it 
was a meeting with delegates from the National Emergency Committee Against Mob 
Violence (which included NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White) in September 
1946 that instigated decisive action from President Truman on the issue of race. 
Following a series of brutal beatings and lynchings of African Americans in the South 
(including U.S. service members returning from World War II), the committee decided to 
petition Truman for his help in an Oval Office meeting on September 19. This was not 
the first time that the group had made similar requests. White later recalled his skeptical 
view of the meeting, noting that he had been a part of such events in the past: “Either 
individually or as a member of a delegation, I had been to the White House on numerous 
occasions to discuss this question with presidents from Coolidge to Roosevelt. I frankly 
doubted that our efforts on this occasion would be any more rewarding than had been 
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those we had made with any of Truman’s predecessors.”234 When White recounted 
various incidents of racial violence and hate crimes around the country, including the 
police beating and blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodward who was returning home to his 
wife and child after three years of military service, Truman was horrified. With his hands 
clenched and the color drained from his face, “My God! I had no idea it was as terrible as 
that! We’ve got to do something!”235  
The next day, the president recounted the meeting to his attorney general, 
southerner Tom Clark from Texas, in a letter dated September 20, stating, “I have been 
very much alarmed at the increased racial feeling all over the country and I am 
wondering if it wouldn’t be well to appoint a commission to analyse [sic] the situation 
and have a remedy to present to the next Congress. . . . I think it is going to take 
something more than the handling of each individual case after it happens – it is going to 
require the inauguration of some sort of policy to prevent such happenings.”236 Less than 
three months later, on December 5, 1946, Truman signed Executive Order 9808, creating 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). Truman appointed a diverse body of 
fifteen individuals to the committee and told them that he wanted to see the “Bill of 
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Rights implemented in fact as well as on paper. . . . There are certain rights under the 
Constitution of the United States which I think the Federal Government has a right to 
protect, and I want to find out just how far we can go.”237 The Commission would deliver 
its report to Truman in October 1947, just four months after the president’s speech to the 
NAACP.  
The president’s creation of the PCCR was the first of many steps he would take to 
extend civil rights on a national scale. On February 2, 1948, the president sent a special 
message on civil rights to Congress outlining comprehensive reform.238 On July 26 that 
same year, Truman ended the policy of segregation in the U.S. military through executive 
order 9981, which declared in no uncertain terms that “there shall be equality of 
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, 
color, religion or national origin.”239 Although black political leaders and the NAACP 
were thrilled to finally have an ally in the White House, southern Democrats were 
furious. After Truman’s special message to Congress in February 1948, a U.S. 
Congressman from Georgia said his state had been “kicked in the teeth” by the president. 
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Rep. William M. Colmer of Mississippi stated: “Not since the first gun was fired on Fort 
Sumter, resulting as it did in the greatest fratricidal strife in the history of the world, has 
any message of any President of these glorious United States . . . resulted in the driving of 
a schism in the ranks of our people, as did President Truman’s so-called civil rights 
message.” Another Congressman from Mississippi, Rep. John Bell Williams, agreed, 
stating that the president “has . . . run a political dagger into our backs and now he is 
trying to drink our blood.”240  
But Truman was resolute, believing that he had a moral duty to ensure that all 
citizens enjoyed the rights laid out in the U.S. Constitution. When Democratic leaders 
asked him to back down on his civil rights agenda, the president replied:  
My forebears were Confederates. . . . Every factor and influence in my 
background—and in my wife’s for that matter—would foster the personal belief 
that you are right. But my stomach turned over when I learned that Negro 
soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of Army trucks and 
beaten. Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as 
President I know this is bad. I shall fight to end evils like this.”241  
In another letter to a southern friend, Truman referenced the beating and blinding of 
Sergeant Woodward by local authorities as evidence that “something is radically wrong 
with the system. I can’t approve of such goings on and I shall never approve of it, as long 
as I am here . . . I am going to try to remedy it and if that ends up in my failure to be 
                                                
240 Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman." 
241 Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman." 
  107 
reelected, that failure will be in a good cause.”242 In an interview after he left office, 
Truman explained, 
All those Southern fellas were very much surprised by my program for civil rights 
in 1948. What they didn’t understand was that I’d been for things like that all the 
time I was in politics. I believe in the Constitution, and if you do that, then 
everybody’s got to have their rights, and that means everybody, doesn’t matter a 
damn who they are or what color they are. The minute you start making 
exceptions, you might as well not have a Constitution. So that’s the reason I felt 
the way I did, and if a lot of folks were surprised to find out where I stood on the 
colored question, well, that’s because they didn’t know me.243 
Truman saw the U.S. Constitution as a sacred document and believed it was his job as 
President to ensure that the rights of citizenship extended to every U.S. citizen, regardless 
of their race. Truman’s allegiance to these founding documents and the nation 
transcended any sectional identity. He considered himself a President of all the people of 
the United States, and took decisive steps to extend civil rights to “all Americans”—a 
phrase that Truman would emphasize again and again when he spoke to the NAACP 
from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. 
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The Lincoln Memorial and the Rhetorical Power of Place 
When Truman spoke at the closing session of the NAACP’s thirty-eighth 
convention, he became to the first president to address the organization in person since its 
founding in 1909 and, of more importance, he was the “first modern president to make an 
open and public commitment to civil rights.”244 Part of what made Truman’s speech so 
remarkable was the persuasive power of its physical location—the Lincoln Memorial. 
This physical site had not always been associated with Lincoln’s stance on slavery and 
emancipation. In fact, the memorial’s designers planned a site that would emphasize 
national unity rather than the politically divisive issue of race. It was only after Marian 
Anderson’s historic concert in 1939 that the Lincoln Memorial began to be associated 
with civil rights activism. Thus, when Truman strode to the podium on the afternoon of 
June 29, 1947, he not only lent institutional authority to the cause of civil rights within 
the United States, but he built upon previous rhetorical action in this particular location, 
the Lincoln Memorial, while challenging previous presidential rhetoric in this place. To 
understand how Truman’s address worked to rededicate this monument to civil rights 
progress in the United States, I examine the rhetorical history of the Lincoln Memorial, 
particularly its creation from 1911 to 1922, the dedication ceremonies of May 30, 1922, 
and Marian Anderson’s 1939 Easter Sunday concert. These previous rhetorical moments 
reveal why Truman’s decision to speak in situ was so radical. 
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Building a Memorial “To the Memory of Abraham Lincoln” 
From its inception, the Lincoln Memorial was designed as a space for citizens to 
reflect on Lincoln’s symbolic sacrifice and to rededicate themselves to the cause for 
which he died. In every respect, the memorial was to be a commonplace, a site that was 
set apart as sacred in U.S. civil religion and yet was accessible for present and future 
generations to come to learn from the past. As the analysis below will demonstrate, there 
was some disagreement over which Lincoln the public should commemorate and what 
virtues they should seek to emulate. 
The idea of a national monument honoring Abraham Lincoln was first introduced 
in 1867, two years after the former president was assassinated. On March 29, Congress 
approved the formation of the Lincoln Monument Association, a group of individuals 
tasked with “erecting a monument in the city of Washington, commemorative of the great 
charter of emancipation and universal liberty in America.”245 This language is notable 
because the act specifically stated that Lincoln’s stance on “emancipation and universal 
liberty” would be a key component of national memory. His abolition of slavery was to 
be the focal point of the commemorative site. For reasons that are unclear, the plan 
fizzled and “no practical results appear to have been accomplished from this legislation.” 
In 1901, one of Lincoln’s contemporaries, U.S. Senator Shelby Moore Cullom from 
Illinois, introduced a bill “to provide a commission to secure plans and designs for a 
monument or memorial to the memory of Abraham Lincoln.”246 Although this specific 
bill was postponed, the U.S. Congress eventually approved Senate Bill 9449 on February 
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8, 1911, an “[a]ct to provide a commission to secure plans and designs for a monument or 
memorial to the memory of Abraham Lincoln.”247 The bill was signed into law by 
President William Howard Taft on February 9, and planning of the memorial began 
immediately. 
An important shift in national memory and U.S. civil religion is reflected in the 
language of these two bills. Where the 1867 proposal made Lincoln’s stance on slavery 
the focal point, the 1911 act made no mention of emancipation. As historian Scott 
Sandage has written, “The early twentieth century celebrated the economic and political 
reunion of North and South. Lincoln’s ties to black freedom waned as politicians and 
scholars sculpted him into a ‘pro-Southern conservative’ honored on both sides of the 
Mason-Dixon line. . . . As Lincoln assumed the role of Christ in American religion, 
signifying national redemption, it seemed he could not be both the Great Emancipator 
and the Savior of the Union.”248 As the Lincoln Memorial Commission planned their 
national shrine, they were explicit about which Lincoln it would honor. In a 1912 report 
to Congress, the commission referred to “the man who saved the Union” twenty times 
and only used the phrase “emancipator” once.249 The architect of the Lincoln Memorial, 
Henry Bacon, said that the goal of his design was to portray the slain president in such a 
way “that devotion, integrity, charity, patience, intelligence, and humane-ness will find 
incentive to growth, and by contemplation of a monument to his memory and to the 
Union the just pride that citizens of the United States have in their country will be 
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supplemented by increasing gratitude to Abraham Lincoln for saving it to them and to 
their children.”250 This was to be, to all intents and purposes, a national shrine where 
citizens could come to reflect on Lincoln’s example and rededicate themselves to national 
unity. One crucial element of Bacon’s design was where the Lincoln Memorial would be 
placed. 
The placement of the monument was of utmost importance to the commission, so 
much so that they delegated to the Commission of Fine Arts the task of making 
recommendations “as to the locations, plans, and designs for a monument or memorial in 
the city of Washington.”251 The group considered several locations within Washington, 
D.C., including several spots near the U.S. Capitol building or along Delaware Avenue, 
“one of the great radial thoroughfares converging on the dome of the Capitol.”252 But the 
Commission of Fine Arts finally settled on Potomac Park, an empty plot of land 
overlooking the Potomac River at the western-most side of the District of Columbia. In a 
report dated July 17, 1911, the group explained its rationale for selecting this location, 
noting that “[a] monumental structure standing in a broad plain surrounded by an 
amphitheater of hills is as widely seen and is as impressive as one upon a hilltop. From 
the hills of the District of Virginia the constantly recurring views of a great Lincoln 
Memorial, seen in association with the Washington Monument and the dome of the 
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Capitol, would be impressive to the highest degree.”253 Notice that the commission was 
explicit about what citizens from Virginia, a former Confederate state, could see across 
the Potomac. What the commission did not state explicitly, but most surely implied, was 
that one of the most prominent houses within these “amphitheater of hills” in “the District 
of Virginia” was Arlington House, a plantation home built by George Washington’s step-
grandson and Robert E. Lee’s home for thirty years before the Civil War.254 Although it 
was now the site of Arlington National Cemetery, Bacon commented on the close 
proximity of the Lincoln Memorial to the former South, noting that when the bridge 
between the nation’s capital and Virginia was complete, it “could be made a striking 
symbol of reunion between the North and the South, a most appropriate symbol leading 
to and from the Memorial of the man who said in his first inaugural address: ‘We are not 
enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies.’”255 
Not only was the monument’s physical location important to Bacon and the 
commission, but the Lincoln Memorial’s architect underscored the symbolic linkages 
between this national shrine to the slain president and the two other prominent landmarks 
in the nation’s capital: the Washington Monument and the U.S. Capitol building. In a 
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report to the Lincoln Memorial Commission citing his support for the Potomac Park 
location, Bacon wrote:  
Terminating the axis which unites it with the Washington Monument and the 
Capitol, [Potomac Park] has a significance which that of no other site can equal, 
and any emulation or aspiration engendered by a memorial there to Lincoln and 
his great qualities will be immeasurably stimulated by being associated with the 
like feelings already identified with the Capitol and the Monument to George 
Washington. Containing the national legislative and judicial bodies, we have at 
one end of the axis a beautiful building, which is a monument to the United States 
Government. At the other end of the axis we have the possibility of a memorial to 
the man who saved that Government, and between the two is a monument to its 
founder. All three of these structures, stretching in one grand sweep from Capitol 
Hill to the Potomac River, will lend, one to the others, the associations and 
memories connected with each, and each will have its value increased by being on 
the one axis and having visual relation to the others.256 
In this passage, Bacon explicitly stated that he designed the Lincoln Memorial to be 
interpreted in relation to the two other monuments clearly visible from its location. The 
architect believed that one of the ways the Lincoln Memorial would persuade audiences 
was through what they would see from this place. The symbolic linkages between this 
national shrine to the slain president and two other enduring symbols of U.S. democracy 
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were meant to inspire citizens to renew their commitment to patriotic ideals and virtues 
manifest by great saints of U.S. civil religion: Washington and Lincoln.  
Even the monument’s architectural design testified to the unification of North and 
South. Bacon described the Memorial as “composed of four features—a statue of the 
man, a memorial of his Gettysburg speech, a memorial of his second inaugural address, 
and a symbol of the Union of the United States, which he stated it was his paramount 
object to save, and which he did save.”257 This “symbol of the Union” would be a Greek 
Doric temple featuring thirty-six columns, one for every state in the Union at the time of 
Lincoln’s death. The inscription above the statue is also instructive: “IN THIS TEMPLE / 
AS IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE / FOR WHOM HE SAVED THE UNION / 
THE MEMORY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN / IS ENSHRINED FOREVER.” The author 
of these words, Royal Cortissoz, explained his intention to Bacon: “The memorial must 
make a common ground for the meeting of the north and the south. By emphasizing his 
saving the union you need to appeal to both sections. By saying nothing about slavery 
you avoid the rubbing of old sores.”258 
Construction on the Lincoln Memorial continued during the First World War, and 
many politicians at home and abroad drew on Lincoln’s symbolic status as justification 
and inspiration for the United States’ pledge to ensure that “the world be made safe for 
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democracy.” 259 As Merrill D. Peterson has observed, “The identification of American 
ideals with the Allied cause in the First World War gave a new dimension to Lincoln’s 
fame,” and U.S. political leaders held up Lincoln as an example for the entire world.260 
Speaking in the U.S. Senate on February 12, 1917, to mark the 108th anniversary of 
Lincoln’s birth, Senator J. Hamilton Lewis proclaimed that “when the blood-drenched 
events have come to their close, those who would take increased devotion to the new day 
will turn to the United States and dedicate their people to those holy standards burning in 
the sky of the redeemed earth—Lincoln and America.”261 In a ceremony held in 
Springfield, Illinois, the president of Princeton University, John Grier Hibben, described 
Lincoln’s iconic status not just in the United States but around the world, noting that 
“Lincoln has become indeed the type, the symbol, and the incarnation to other peoples 
the world. . . . Yearning for some great ideal to steady and inspire them, some great 
memory, some vision of a spirit standing within the shadow of this terrible war, they find 
their longing realized in the noble nature and oracular words of Lincoln.”262 Just as 
political leaders during World War I would hold up the United States and its sixteenth 
president as an example to the rest of the world seeking safe haven from the terrors of 
war, Truman would extend Lincoln’s political legacy to the international stage in 1947 
when he argued that the civil rights Lincoln championed were applicable not just to U.S. 
citizens, but to the rest of the world. 
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“Here is a Shrine at Which All Can Worship”: Dedicating the Lincoln Memorial 
On May 30, 1922, President Warren G. Harding and Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft (himself a former U.S. president) presided over the dedication ceremonies 
of the Lincoln Memorial before an immediate audience of thousands and an untold 
number of radio listeners in the United States and around the world. Because of their 
national prominence and political authority, the speeches by Taft and Harding played a 
crucial role in interpreting and defining the nature and meaning of this particular site for 
U.S. citizens and the rest of the world. The New York Times noted that “[thousands] 
assembled at the approaches to the memorial and the crowd extended down along the 
quarter-mile long mirror basin in which the Washington Monument was reflected with 
the background of a cloudless sky,” and the Washington Post explained that a “huge 
amplifier established through the splendid generosity of the electric and telephone 
company” projected sound across the National Mall.263 What this news coverage 
obscured was the segregated seating at the dedication ceremony, a visible symbol of just 
how determined the Lincoln Memorial Commission was to obscure Lincoln’s views on 
slavery and emancipation. The black press took notice, however. One African American 
newspaper, the Chicago Defender, wrote that “[t]he venomous snake of segregation 
reared its head at this dedication. At a memorial to the Great Emancipator!” A small 
number of seats were available to “distinguished Colored ticket holders” in a “Jim Crow 
section of seats” at the very back.264 
                                                
263 "Harding Dedicates Lincoln Memorial; Blue and Gray Join," New York Times, May 31, 1922; 
"2,000,000 to Hear Lincoln Addresses," Washington Post, May 29, 1922. 
264 J. Le Count Chestnut, "Mock Ideal of Lincoln at Memorial," Chicago Defender, June 10, 1922. Chestnut 
also noted that these seating arrangements were made by Lt. Col. Sherill of North Carolina, the same 
  117 
Those who could not be physically present in Washington D.C. for the ceremony 
could listen via radio. The Navy Department broadcast the speeches of President Harding 
and Chief Justice Taft to U.S. cities and “to the farthest stations of the world.”265 “It is 
officially estimated that fully 2,000,000 Americans will hear distinctly the great program 
of the Lincoln memorial,” Colonel John Temple Graves, resident commissioner of the 
Lincoln Memorial Commission, confidently asserted. Graves also declared that the 
dedication would be “the greatest and most thrilling memorial ever staged in the capital 
of the country which is the capital of the world.”266 The press also noted the monument’s 
placement within the city. “[T]he Lincoln memorial occupies a very remarkable place in 
its relation to the Capitol and the Washington monument,” observed the Washington 
Post. “Many have said that this site seems to have been destined for the Lincoln 
Memorial, situated as it is in the midst of Potomac park, on the axis of the Mall, with the 
Capitol two miles distant and the Washington monument intervening, and with parkways 
and drives radiating to the various parts of the city.”267 It was almost as if Providence had 
saved this location from previous development so that a temple could be erected to honor 
Lincoln, the Savior of the Union. 
The dedication ceremony consisted of speeches by Taft, Harding, and Dr. Robert 
R. Morton, the “principal of the Tuskegee Institute.”268 Those listening via radio, 
however, would have heard only the speeches from Taft and Harding; Robert Morton’s 
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address was excluded from radio coverage of the event.269 In his speech, Morton invoked 
Lincoln’s status as a national martyr and argued that the best way the nation could repay 
their debt to the fallen president was by “establish[ing] in fact what his death established 
in principle—that a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all 
men are created equal can endure and prosper and serve mankind.” In this obvious 
recitation of Gettysburg Address, Morton appropriated Lincoln’s most famous words for 
his own rhetorical purposes, even though he most certainly knew how Taft and Harding 
would dispute his argument. Morton concluded: 
As we gather on this consecrated spot, [Lincoln’s] spirit must rejoice that 
sectional rancors and racial antagonisms are softening more and more into mutual 
understanding and effective cooperation. And I like to think that here to-day, 
while we dedicate this symbol of our gratitude that the Nation is dedicated anew 
by its own determined will to fulfill to the last letter the task imposed upon it by 
the martyred dead, that here it firmly resolves that the humblest citizen, of 
whatever color or creed, shall enjoy that equal opportunity and unhampered 
freedom for which the immortal Lincoln gave the last full measure of devotion.270 
Here Morton made every attempt to use this occasion of civic ritual to dedicate Lincoln’s 
shrine not just to his status as Savior of the Union, but to call the nation people to also 
commit themselves to ensuring that all citizens had access to the “equal opportunity and 
unhampered freedom” for which Lincoln sacrificed his life. 
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Chief Justice Taft spoke next, drawing an explicit comparison between Lincoln 
and Jesus Christ and further cementing this monument as a sacred site of U.S. civil 
religion. Lincoln had shown “patience under grievous disappointment,” suffered “agony 
of spirit in the burden he had to carry . . . [and] the abuse and ridicule of which he was the 
subject.” All of these qualities formed “the story of a passion,” much like the Passion of 
the Christ. “The influence he still wields, one may say with all reverence, has a Christ-
like character,” Taft continued. “It has spread to the four quarters of the globe.”271 Much 
like the gospel of Christ that was carried out from Jerusalem to all nations, so also was 
Lincoln’s fame. Taft then spoke as chairman of the commission, describing the planning 
and building process of the Memorial and then presenting it to President Harding as “the 
culmination of the highest art of which America is capable, and therefore fit to 
commemorate a people’s love for the Nation’s savior and its greatest leader.” To 
conclude, Taft commented on why this particular spot was significant for this shrine 
dedicated to Lincoln’s memory: 
Here on the banks of the Potomac, the boundary between the two sections whose 
conflict made the burden, passion, and triumph of his life, it is peculiarly 
appropriate that it should stand. Visible in its great beauty from the Capitol, 
whose great dome typifies the Union which he saved; seen in all its grandeur from 
Arlington, where lie the nation’s honored dead who fell in the conflict, Union and 
Confederate alike, it marks the restoration of the brotherly love of the two 
sections in this memorial of one who is as dear to the hearts of the South as to 
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those of the North. . . . Here is a shrine at which all can worship, here an altar 
upon which the supreme sacrifice was made in the cause of liberty, here a sacred 
religious refuge in which those who love country and love God can find 
inspiration and repose.272 
It is difficult to imagine a more pointed description of a site of U.S. civil religion. This 
was to be a national shrine, a sacred altar, a religious refuge that would inspire acts of 
worship, reflection, comfort, and inspiration, a memorial dedicated to the Savior of the 
Union. 
The final speaker, President Warren G. Harding, was the most explicit about 
rejecting Lincoln’s status as the Great Emancipator. “The supreme chapter in history is 
not emancipation,” he stated bluntly.  
The simple truth is that Lincoln, recognizing an established order, would have 
compromised with the slavery that existed, if he could have halted its extension. 
Hating human slavery as he did, he doubtless believed in its ultimate abolition 
through the developing conscience of the American people, but he would have 
been the last man in the Republic to resort to arms to effect its abolition. 
Emancipation was a means to a great end—maintained union and nationality. 
Here was the great purpose, here the towering hope, here the supreme faith.273  
Harding then quoted from Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address (where Lincoln quoted 
himself) to further support his argument: “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to 
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interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no 
lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Harding then explained that 
Lincoln “recognized the conflicting viewpoints, differing policies, and controverted 
questions” concerning slavery. And yet, Harding argued, Lincoln proclaimed “deliberate 
public opinion as the supreme power of civilization, easily to be written into law when 
conviction should command.” There was a lesson in this for the present, the president 
argued. “It ought to be a tonic to the waning confidence of those of to-day who grow 
impatient that emphasized minority views are not hurried into the majority expressions of 
the Republic. Deliberate public opinion never fails.”274 In this passage, Harding invoked 
Lincoln’s memory and even his own rhetoric to argue that the “minority views” on civil 
rights in 1922 should not grow impatient, but simply wait for U.S. public opinion to 
support racial progress. Of course, in Harding’s view, this change would (and should) 
never happen. 
To close, Harding stated that the Lincoln Memorial was “less for Abraham 
Lincoln than those of us to-day, and for those who follow after,” to learn from his 
example and find inspiration in his memory. “Fifty-seven years ago this people gave from 
their ranks, sprung from their own fiber, this plain man, holding their common ideals. 
They gave him first to service of the Nation in the hour of peril, then to their Pantheon of 
Fame. With them and by them he is enshrined and exalted forever. To-day, American 
gratitude, love, and appreciation, give to Abraham Lincoln this lone white temple, a 
pantheon for him alone.”275 
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The speeches by Taft and Harding offer insight into what this particular place 
would come to represent in U.S. political culture and public memory. Physically 
embodying two of the three branches of U.S. government, the chief executive and the 
chief justice presided over the dedication ceremony as chief priests of U.S. civil religion 
and used their rhetoric in place to interpret the Lincoln Memorial’s symbolism for the 
nation and the world, to forward this place-as-rhetoric. Because presidential rhetoric 
carries symbolic weight virtually unmatched in U.S. political culture, another presidential 
declaration in place—Truman’s speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947—would be 
required before the Lincoln Memorial could be (re)dedicated as a site for civil rights 
activism. Yet Truman’s civil rights declaration would not have been possible apart from 
Marian Anderson’s 1939 concert on Easter Sunday. Although Truman never mentioned 
Anderson in his address, the NAACP saw the June 29, 1947, as a direct continuation of 
Anderson’s strategic deployment of Lincoln’s memory eight years earlier. 
 
“In This Great Auditorium Under the Sky, All of Us are Free”: Marian Anderson’s 
Concert at the Lincoln Memorial 
After the Lincoln Memorial’s dedication in 1922, U.S. politicians began the 
tradition of holding ceremonies at the site every year on Lincoln’s Birthday and 
“reaffirmed the primacy of Savior over Emancipator.”276 African American leaders 
contested this view. In 1926, 2,000 black citizens gathered at the Memorial for a religious 
service, and Bishop E. D. W. Jones told the audience, “the immortality of the great 
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emancipator lay not in his preservation of the Union, but in his giving freedom to the 
negroes of America.”277 Although these previous marches and rallies deployed Lincoln’s 
symbolic status as the Great Emancipator for their purposes, it was not until Marian 
Anderson’s 1939 concert that the Lincoln Memorial became linked inextricably with civil 
rights protests in the United States. “By invoking and reinterpreting a national icon,” 
writes Sandage, “black protestors explored the ambiguities and possibilities of American 
society in the mid-twentieth century. Their protests at the Lincoln Memorial were 
repeated, standardized rituals that evolved from experience and ultimately constituted a 
formidable politics of memory.”278 
In January 1939, the Daughters of the American Revolution banned world-
renowned singer Marian Anderson from performing at Constitution Hall.279 At the time, 
Anderson was one of the most revered singers in the world, having performed for 
President and Mrs. Roosevelt in the United States and in many other countries abroad. As 
Anderson’s booking manager searched for other options that might accommodate a large 
crowd, Lulu Childers, the director of music at Howard University, suggested the idea of 
an outdoor concert.280 Walter White and the NAACP Board of Directors enthusiastically 
supported this plan. In a formal resolution dated March 13, 1939, the board wrote, “It 
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would be far better for Miss Anderson to sing out-of-doors, for example, at the Lincoln 
Memorial erected to commemorate the memory of Abraham Lincoln, the Great 
Emancipator, or not to sing in Washington at all until democracy can surmount the color 
line in the nation’s capitol.”281 In a personal letter to Anderson, White recommended the 
Lincoln Memorial “because of the peculiar appropriateness of that place under the 
present circumstances.”282 Yet as historian Raymond Arsenault observes, “the choice of 
the Lincoln Memorial as the backdrop for the Anderson recital was a calculated gamble. 
The organizers could not be certain how the American public would respond to the 
juxtaposition of a black concert singer and a white Republican president from Illinois.”283 
Indeed, just seventeen years after the Lincoln Memorial dedication ceremonies in 1922, 
Marian Anderson’s presence would symbolically shift the meaning of the Lincoln 
Memorial from a site that honored Lincoln as Savior of the Union to an explicit 
recognition of Lincoln the Great Emancipator.  
The NAACP secured permission from Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior 
and the former president of the Chicago branch of the NAACP, to use the Lincoln 
Memorial for Anderson’s concert—the first time an artist had ever sung at the national 
                                                
281 “Resolution Passed by the Board of Directors of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, March 13, 1939, found in Walter White correspondence, including Marian Anderson 
Lincoln Memorial concert, Mar 02, 1939 – Mar 17, 1939, Folder: 001469-019-0686, Papers of the 
NAACP, Part 02: 1919-1939, Personal Correspondence of Selected NAACP ProQuest History Vault, 
accessed July 2015, http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001469-019-0686. 
282 Walter White to Marian Anderson, March 24, 1939, Walter White correspondence, including Marian 
Anderson Lincoln Memorial concert, Mar 02, 1939 – Mar 17, 1939, Folder: 001469-019-0686, Papers of 
the NAACP, Part 02: 1919-1939, Personal Correspondence of Selected NAACP ProQuest History Vault, 
accessed July 2015, http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001469-019-0686. 
283 Arsenault, The Sound of Freedom: Marian Anderson, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Concert that 
Changed America, 148. 
  125 
shrine.284 The Interior Department predicted that a crowd of 50,000 would hear Anderson 
sing on Easter Sunday; after the event, the U.S. Capitol Park Police put the number at 
75,000. The concert was broadcast down the National Mall through large speakers and 
over the NBC Blue radio network.285 A staff writer for the Washington Post observed that 
the gathering “was one of the largest assemblages Washington had seen since Lindbergh 
came back from Paris in ’27, a gaily-dressed Easter throng that stretched from the 
Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument Hill, and sent its northern flank as far as 
Constitution Avenue.”286 The timing of the concert was not coincidental. Where Taft and 
Harding had underscored Lincoln’s symbolic status as a national sacrifice that bridged 
the gulf between North and South, this Easter Sunday concert suggested that Lincoln 
instead had died to atone for the nation’s sin of slavery. Here, at the temple dedicated to 
Lincoln’s memory, Marian Anderson, whose voice Maestro Arturo Toscanini described 
as heard “once in a hundred years,” would honor the Great Emancipator with her 
talent.287 For the assembled audience, this moment provided an opportunity to reassess 
what Lincoln meant in U.S. public memory and, by extension, (re)dedicate themselves to 
securing liberty and justice for all. 
Secretary Ickes introduced Marian Anderson to the crowd himself, and took the 
opportunity to make a public statement on race relations in the United States. “In this 
great auditorium under the sky, all of us are free,” he began. This opening comment 
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subtly implied that although all were free under the sky—and thus, under God—the same 
could not be said for man-made buildings, such as Constitution Hall. Ickes then praised 
Lincoln for “[restoring] freedom to those from whom we had disregardfully taken it. In 
carrying out this task, Abraham Lincoln laid down his life, and it is as appropriate as it is 
fortunate that today we stand reverently and humbly at the base of this memorial to the 
Great Emancipator while glorious tribute is rendered to his memory by a daughter of the 
race from which he struck the chains of slavery.”288 Here Ickes was explicit about what 
Lincoln’s death accomplished. Nowhere did the Secretary reference Lincoln as Savior of 
the Union. Instead, he was the “Great Emancipator” who “laid down his life” to “restore 
freedom to those from whom we had disregardfully taken it.”  
Marian Anderson appeared on the steps after Ickes and sang a short program, 
including “America,” “La Favorita,” “Ave Maria,” and four spirituals: “Gospel Train,” 
“Trampin’,” “My Soul is Anchored in the Lord,” and “Nobody Knows the Trouble I’ve 
Seen.” In total, the concert lasted forty-five minutes. “When she had finished,” wrote a 
Washington Post correspondent, “a thunderous burst of applause broke out around her, 
and continued to roll up from the far reaches of the crowd for several minutes.”289 In a 
strikingly accurate editorial published almost two weeks after the concert, the Chicago 
Defender predicted that “[w]hen, on Easter Sunday, Marian Anderson lifted her 
matchless contralto voice on the steps of the Grecian Temple to the great emancipator—
Abraham Lincoln—a new chapter was added to America’s social history. A chapter that 
outlines broadly a new social transition—the passing of the cold, intransigent, intolerant 
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cast and the emergence of a new, progressively democratic group.”290 Eight years later, 
on June 29, 1947, President Harry S. Truman would join the ranks of this new order and 
begin the process of enacting civil rights legislation that would forever change race 
relations in the United States. 
 
Planning and Writing Truman’s Address to the NAACP 
To audiences at home and abroad, the Lincoln Memorial offered a space where 
Truman could link his civil rights program to his larger Cold War foreign policy and 
argue that equality of all peoples, regardless of race, was a central plank of his domestic 
and international agenda. Although Truman was not the first U.S. president to speak from 
the steps of this sacred location, his June 29, 1947, address rejected the reading of the 
Lincoln Memorial that Taft and Harding advocated in 1922 and instead reaffirmed 
Marian Anderson’s strategic deployment of the Lincoln Memorial in 1939. As the 
previous sections demonstrated, Truman’s address to the NAACP was notable not simply 
because of what he said, but precisely because he, a son of the South, was speaking on 
behalf of the organization at a site originally designed to promote national unity—and 
silence Lincoln’s stance on slavery and emancipation. Archival materials from the 
Truman Library and the papers of the NAACP reveal how the NAACP and the Truman 
Administration understood the rhetorical significance of this particular occasion and how 
the NAACP executive secretary and the Truman White House staff worked to link the 
president’s speech to the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial (including 
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previous rhetorical action in this place) and to connect the current civil rights crisis at 
home to the United States’ foreign policy. 
 
Staging Presidential Presence in Place: Walter White and the NAACP 
On April 1, 1947, NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White sent a letter to 
Matthew Connelly, secretary to the President. White had met with the president the 
previous September as a spokesman for the National Emergency Committee Against 
Mob Violence.291 In his message to Connelly, White explained that there were “several 
pressing matters which I would like very much to discuss with the President at his earliest 
convenience. Would you be good enough to arrange an appointment for me and let me 
know as soon as possible when I may come down.”292 On April 7, Connelly wired back 
and told White he had an appointment for Wednesday, April 9, at 11:30 am.293 It was at 
this meeting that White would invite Truman to speak to the 38th Annual Conference of 
the NAACP on June 29, 1947. In his autobiography, White described the encounter: 
Although I knew it was unnecessary to do so, I reminded the President of how 
acts of discrimination against minorities were being used abroad to discredit the 
United States and convince the people of the world that Americans were incurably 
addicted to bigotry. A forthright and unequivocal statement by the President was 
necessary, I urged, to let the people of the world know that while Americans 
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frequently failed to live up to their declarations of democracy, we were constantly 
at work to narrow the margin between our protestations of freedom and our 
practice of them.294 
White’s description of his meeting with Truman is invaluable, because it suggests that the 
president and other White House officials saw the NAACP speech as an important 
component not just of their domestic civil rights agenda, but as a key element of the 
president’s developing foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. According to 
White's autobiography, Truman told White to send him a list of the items he thought the 
president should emphasize in his speech. “We both laughed,” recalled White, “as I told 
him that if he included even one half of the things I thought he ought to say, the Southern 
Democrats would probably want to run him out of the country.”295 
On April 11, two days after White’s meeting with Truman, the NAACP executive 
secretary wrote to the president, thanking him for his initial agreement to speak at the 
closing session in June: 
My dear Mr. President: I was doubly delighted on Wednesday – first, to see you 
looking so well despite the strain of national and World affairs during this trying 
period and second, that you tentatively agreed to speak at the closing session of 
our Annual Conference at the Lincoln Memorial on Sunday, June 29th. . . . This 
will be one of the greatest occasions in the history of the Association and one in 
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which your address will have not only nation-wide but World-wide 
significance.296 
White’s last comment reflects his argument that Truman’s speech would not only support 
the NAACP’s mission, but would also align with the president’s Cold War foreign 
policy. That same day, White also wrote to David K. Niles, the administrative assistant to 
President Truman, to provide an overview of the event. A tentative program listed several 
items of note, including ten minutes of singing by none other than Marian Anderson, a 
brief address by U.S. Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR), and a ten-minute speech by Mrs. 
Eleanor Roosevelt. White also explained that the NAACP intended to have “a 
distinguished platform party. Invitations will be sent to members of the Cabinet, the 
United States Supreme Court, to the Ambassadors to the United States, to a selected list 
of members of the Congress,” and individuals associated with the NAACP. 
“Arrangements will also be made to have the ceremony photographed for newsreels and 
possibly to have the entire occasion televised.”297 This particular emphasis on who would 
attend the event and the NAACP’s plans to have images and live coverage of the event 
circulated to a broader audience underscore the importance not just of Truman’s physical 
presence at the event, but the symbolic significance of where the event would be placed.  
The NAACP’s plan to strategically align its thirty-eighth annual conference with 
Marian Anderson’s 1939 concert was evident from the very beginning. The same day that 
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White followed up with Truman, he also penned a note to Oscar L. Chapman, now the 
Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior under Harold Ickes, on April 11. In it, 
White enclosed a formal letter of application for the NAACP’s use of the Lincoln 
Memorial on June 29.298 White also added his “very warm personal thanks for your very 
helpful suggestions,” a comment that seems to imply that he had discussed the request 
with Chapman prior to meeting Truman.299 On April 28, David Niles called Oscar 
Chapman to let him know that Truman had agreed to speak at the NAACP event. 
Chapman then wrote to Arthur Demaray, Director of the National Park Service: “Will 
you please reserve the Lincoln Memorial for this date and have acknowledgements to the 
attached letters prepared for my signatures approving the use of the Memorial for this 
occasion.”300 Thus, it seems that Truman’s agreement to speak at the closing session 
helped to secure the monument for the NAACP’s usage. 
On May 16, the NAACP announced that the final session of their 38th Annual 
Conference would be held at the Lincoln Memorial on the afternoon of June 29. In the 
press release, the organization explicitly connected the upcoming “huge outdoor meeting 
in front of the Lincoln Memorial” with Marian Anderson’s concert eight years earlier:  
The site will be the same as that used by Marian Anderson in April, 1940 [sic], 
when she sang to 75,000 people after being refused the use of Constitution Hall, 
owned by the D.A.R. Permission to use it has been secured by the NAACP from 
the Department of the Interior and plans are being arranged with the National 
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Capital Parks. In addition to several nationally-known speakers, there will be a 
distinguished Negro soloist, a chorus and a band.301  
Truman’s participation in the event was not made public until June 3. The NAACP 
followed up with its own announcement, noting that Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator 
Wayne Morse (R-OR), and Walter White would join the president on the speaker’s 
platform. “It is expected that an audience as large as that which heard Marion [sic] 
Anderson at the historic 1939 Easter Sunday concert, will again fill the Lincoln 
Memorial,” the press release read. “The President’s speech, which will be broadcast over 
several major networks, is being eagerly anticipated in domestic as well as international 
circles, since it is expected that Mr. Truman will make a major declaration of government 
policy on racial tensions both at home and abroad.”302 
 Although the NAACP anticipated at least 100,000 people in attendance at the 
Lincoln Memorial gathering, the organization also planned for a much broader audience 
in the United States and around the world. In a letter sent to radio stations around the 
country, the NAACP asked local managers to broadcast the June 29 event. “It is 
estimated that at least 100,000 persons will be present to join in re-dedicating America to 
the principles of democracy irrespective of race which in turn will give part of the answer 
to those who attack democracy because of racial discrimination,” the letter read. “We are 
                                                
301 Press Release, “Lincoln Memorial Meeting to Close NAACP Conference,” May 16, 1947, found in 
Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 
001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual 
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302 Press Release, “Pres. Truman to Speak at NAACP 38th Conference,” May 30, 1947, found Annual 
Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-
0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, 
Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, 
http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000. 
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informing you of this program with the hope that the entire program or at least part of it 
may be carried by your station. Will you be good enough to inform us if this is 
possible.”303 In a June 6 press release, the NAACP described Truman’s address as the 
“[f]ocal point of the gigantic meeting” and stated that the president would “deliver a 
major declaration of government policy on racial tensions.” The meeting would be 
broadcast around the country to “NAACP branches in practically every section of the 
United States . . . . These meetings, with an expected 4 to 5 hundred thousand persons 
attending, will be joined to form one gigantic mass meeting linked together by radio. All 
of the major networks will broadcast the President’s speech and parts of the meeting.”304 
This event was not limited to those who were physically present at the Lincoln Memorial. 
Instead, the NAACP and the Truman Administration saw this occasion as one in which 
the U.S. public and people in other nations would listen to the president deliver a bold 
statement on race relations in the United States. 
Walter White underscored this global aspect in a press conference, stating that the 
NAACP would “meet in the fitting shadow of the Abraham Lincoln monument to 
rededicate all of its resources and energies to the people of all nations who fought and are 
still fighting to secure the rights of all men.”305 In a press release issued a week later, on 
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June 13, the NAACP noted that “[w]ith public sentiment, not only in the United States 
but in many other parts of the globe as well, aroused against the barbaric American 
institution of lynching, unprecedented attention will be focused upon the NAACP’s 38th 
annual convention. Intense official and diplomatic interest has already been indicated in 
President Truman’s speech to the convention’s closing session.” Truman’s address would 
be broadcast on the four major radio networks (CBS, NBC, ABC, and Mutual), and the 
U.S. Department of State made arrangements to send the program by short wave radio 
around the globe.306 In a column for the Chicago Defender published June 14, Walter 
White told readers that President Truman would “state the position of America to the 
world on the so-called race question both at home and abroad.”307  
Prominent black newspapers of the day also underscored the relationship between 
Truman’s speech on civil rights and his broader Cold War foreign policy. The New York 
Amsterdam News predicted that the June 29, 1947, event would be the “largest rally of 
American citizens ever staged anywhere in the nation’s history” and even went so far as 
to designate it a “march-on-Washington.” However, the newspaper noted that the purpose 
of this march was  
not to badger the President but rather to give him an opportunity to deliver what 
should be the most important, the most significant, and the most courageous 
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speech on a major problem of his career. In his fight for democracy and human 
liberty in far-off Greece, Hungary, Turkey, Italy, France, Korea, China, and 
elsewhere[,] Mr. Truman certainly cannot afford to ignore the crimes against 
democracy and humanity being committed against the nation’s 13,000,000 Negro 
citizens, and the limitation which has been placed upon the freedom, liberty, and 
self-respect of the American Negro by the immoral laws, customs and practices of 
some of the states of the American Union.308 
The Pittsburgh Courier commented on plans to broadcast Truman’s speech around the 
country and explained that “this will bring all of these folks, who cannot come to 
Washington in person, all together in spirit, drawn into a common bond by this 
excellently arranged broadcast.”309 This event was to be, in the words of one radio 
audience member who would later write to President Truman, “a very good church 
service.”310 
 
Writing Truman’s Address to the NAACP 
As the NAACP publicized the president’s upcoming speech at the closing session 
of their annual conference, the White House speechwriting staff worked behind the 
scenes to formulate Truman’s remarks. The speechwriting files at the Truman Library 
reveal a substantial internal dialogue not just about what Truman would say, but how this 
                                                
308 "Await U.S. Policy on Racial Tensions," New York Amsterdam News, June 14, 1947. 
309 Johnson, "So the President Speaks!," Pittsburgh Courier, June 28, 1947. 
310 Mable A. Jamison to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing 
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particular occasion would function within the president’s larger domestic civil rights 
initiatives and his larger Cold War foreign policy. 
An undated, untitled memo found in the Longhand Notes file for President 
Truman’s speeches offers a helpful articulation of the Truman Administration’s view of 
its public statements on civil rights. The memo lists twenty-one instances in which 
Truman discussed his support for civil rights. Because this memo is contained in the 
folder specifically dedicated to “April – June 1947,” it is probable that it was written or 
circulated in preparation for Truman’s speech to the NAACP. The introduction and 
conclusion to the memo are particularly insightful. 
In his messages to Congress and in public statements and speeches, President 
Truman has always strongly advocated and reaffirmed his views regarding 
minorities. His belief that our land can make no greater contribution to this 
troubled world than to establish brotherhood as the rule of life among all citizens 
of every religion, race or national origin, runs like a thread through his public 
papers and this principle has been reiterated on the following occasions. 
The memo then listed out twenty-one instances between January 1945 and February 1947 
when Truman affirmed these principles. “President Truman’s philosophy is best summed 
up in his recent order creating the President’s Committee on Civil Rights,” the memo 
concluded, a committee tasked with compiling “a written report, designed to strengthen 
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the inadequate civil rights statutes in order to make our Constitution and Bill of Rights a 
reality.”311 
Throughout the speechwriting process, it is clear that the Truman Administration 
wanted to coordinate the president’s address to the NAACP with the views and later 
recommendations of the PCCR, who would submit their final report, To Secure These 
Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, to the president in 
October 1947. Two staff members of the PCCR, executive director Robert K. Carr and 
director of research Milton D. Stewart, wrote the first version of Truman’s speech.312 
This initial draft was “a strong statement that emphasized urgency in acting on civil rights 
problems and the PCCR’s role in advising the president.”313 Although this first draft 
would be revised by White House staff members (including George Elsey, Clark Clifford, 
and David Niles), Carr and Milton articulated important policy positions that carried over 
into the final version of Truman’s speech to the NAACP.314 Of particular note is a 
passage describing United States as a symbol to the rest of the world: 
It is sad, but true, that we do not need to look halfway around the world for an 
opportunity to better our civil rights record. In our own city of Washington, our 
national capital, there is much to be done. It is beyond argument that a nation 
which believes in civil liberty, must practice what it preaches in its own capital. 
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38, Folder: 1945-1953 Pres. Speeches – Longhand Notes, April-June 1947, Truman Papers, Harry S. 
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313 Pauley, "Harry Truman and the NAACP: A Case Study in Presidential Persuasion on Civil Rights," 223. 
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We must make this city a living symbol of American freedom and equality both to 
our own people and to the outside world.315 
Although this exact passage was removed during the editing process by White House 
speechwriters, its emphasis on improving civil rights at home so that the nation could 
become a “living symbol” to the rest of the world revealed the Truman Administration’s 
understanding of the United States as a metaphorical and literal place of refuge for the 
rest of the world at the dawn of the Cold War. 
The White House speechwriters also emphasized the symbolic significance of the 
Lincoln Memorial in relation to Truman’s foreign policy. In a June 16, 1947, memo to 
Matthew J. Connelly, appointments secretary to the President, administrative assistant 
David K. Niles noted the significance of the speech’s physical setting.316 He noted that 
the introduction of the speech, which was to last only a “half-minute to a minute,” should 
mention the “significance of meeting on the grounds of Lincoln memorial. ‘He died to 
make men free.’ His problem: One Nation. Our problem: One world. The problem of 
freedom in the modern world; our goal, to maintain the greatest possible freedom for the 
individual, while perfecting through the UN a system of international security.”317 Niles’ 
suggestion is particularly interesting because he focused primarily on the linkages 
between Lincoln’s status as Great Emancipator and the current world crisis. Although 
one can read his mention of the nation’s goal of “maintain[ing] the greatest possible 
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freedom for the individual” as support for domestic civil rights initiatives, the rest of 
Niles’ memo privileged U.S. foreign policy over the current state of race relations at 
home. “I suggest that the body of the speech should be devoted to our policy in the 
government of dependent areas, a problem which as long been an interest of this 
organization,” wrote Niles. “However, the recent events in North and South Carolina318 
will make it difficult to avoid reference to civil rights, regardless of the fact that the 
matter is under study by a Presidential Committee. Accordingly, I am suggesting that the 
closing paragraph of the speech, not to exceed one minute, should be devoted to civil 
rights.”319 Obviously, the president did not follow Niles’ advice on this point. In fact, 
according to a hastily scribbled note in the files, Truman had a mixed response to Niles’ 
memo: “some good; some not so good.”320 
These internal memos leading up to Truman’s speech to the NAACP reveal that 
the White House carefully considered the domestic and foreign policy implications of the 
president’s address on June 29, 1947. If anything, these advisors focused more on the 
international implications of this rhetorical occasion. But as the analysis below will 
demonstrate, both President Truman and the other speakers at the closing session 
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continually emphasized that the United States needed to first take steps to “put our own 
house in order” if the nation were to provide moral leadership to the rest of the world.321 
 
June 29, 1947 
As part of a meticulously planned public relations campaign, President Truman’s 
speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, followed speeches by Republican Senator 
Wayne Morse of Oregon, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, and an introduction of the president by 
Walter White. As White outlined in a memo to David K. Niles, the program would run 
“56 minutes with an allowance of 4 minutes for applause, etc. By adhering strictly to this 
schedule it is our hope that we shall be able to get the entire one-hour program broadcast 
by all of the networks.”322 Because Truman’s audience included both those who were 
physically present at the Lincoln Memorial and those listening via radio within the 
United States and around the world, it is important to consider what these individuals saw 
and heard prior to the president’s speech. A brief analysis of the speeches of Senator 
Morse, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Mr. White reveals the import not only of Truman’s address, 
but how his rhetoric built on these earlier remarks and how the immediate and extended 
audience would have understood the president’s speech within this larger contextual 
frame.  
The closing program began with an invocation by the Reverend Stephen Gill 
Spottswood, pastor of the John Wesley AME Church, and a vocal performance by New 
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York singer Carol Brice of “Star Spangled Banner” and “Ride On King Jesus.”323 
Although earlier NAACP planning documents indicated that Marian Anderson would 
perform at the event, it seems as if this changed during the planning process, most likely 
due to Anderson’s illness during the spring and summer of 1947.324 According to the 
president’s daily schedule, Eleanor Roosevelt lunched with Truman at the White House 
before driving to the Lincoln Memorial with the president.325 Truman and Mrs. Roosevelt 
arrived at the event at 4:00 pm, just as an introductory musical program concluded, and 
took their seats moments before the Rev. Spottswood’s prayer. 
 Senator Morse, an outspoken advocate for civil rights, delivered the first formal 
address of the afternoon. The U.S. senator began his speech, entitled “Making 
Democracy Work,” by noting the significance of the location, what he described as “one 
of the cathedrals of American democracy”:  
It is fitting that we should gather at this great national shrine of human rights and 
rededicate ourselves to the principle that there shall be no discrimination in our 
democracy because of race, color, sex or creed. Would that every American could 
come frequently to this memorial spot on the banks of the Potomac and renew his 
faith in the principles of individual liberty and of representative government 
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which are epitomized in the spirit of the great emancipator who, seemingly alive 
but in the silence of stone, looks down upon us. 
Morse’s emphasis on the physical setting of this event is quite important, for his remarks 
set the stage for what was to come. Because the majority of the audience was not 
physically present in front of the Lincoln Memorial, Morse’s introductory comments 
reminded the U.S. public why this particular location was significant and reinforced the 
symbolic reappropriation of this place as a site for civil rights activism. This was a “great 
national shrine of human rights,” a sacred space where “every American” should come to 
“renew his faith in the principles of individual liberty . . . epitomized in the spirit of the 
great emancipator” who presided over the event. Morse acknowledged that there were 
“wide gaps between the universal truths of man’s responsibilities to man, so simply stated 
in the teachings of Lincoln carved into the granite walls of this memorial, and our 
practices as a people one toward another.” There was, he said, “much to be done if we are 
to make democracy work in carrying out its full potentialities for human happiness 
through self-government.” He juxtaposed bigotry with democracy, intolerance with the 
Declaration of Independence, discrimination with the Emancipation Proclamation, and 
lynch law with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In essence, Morse argued that civil 
rights reform was a requirement if democracy was, in fact, going to work.326 In this direct 
and unapologetic assessment of the current state of race relations within the United 
                                                
326 “Making Democracy Work,” Senator Wayne Morse, June 29, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, 
including discrimination and segregation in housing, Jun 24, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-
0126, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, 
Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, 
http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000. 
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States, Morse diagnosed the problem while also arguing that there was a way forward—
and that none other than Abraham Lincoln would provide inspiration for the days ahead. 
 Eleanor Roosevelt spoke after Senator Morse.327 The former first lady’s presence 
at this particular event was notable for several reasons. First, Mrs. Roosevelt had been an 
outspoken advocate for civil rights during her husband’s administration and famously 
resigned from the Daughters of the American Revolution after they refused to allow 
Marian Anderson to sing in Constitution Hall in 1939. Following FDR’s death in April 
1945, Truman nominated Eleanor Roosevelt as a U.S. Representative to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on December 21, 1945.328 Just over a year later, on 
January 27, 1947, Mrs. Roosevelt was unanimously selected as the chair of the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission, the group that authored the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.329 When Mrs. Roosevelt spoke at the Lincoln Memorial on June 29, 1947, 
she was in the midst of drafting language for this bill, and thus her remarks reflected her 
belief that principles of equality and liberty needed to be extended to all peoples, 
including African American citizens of the United States. “Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out 
that she was currently working, with other United Nations delegates, on writing an 
international bill of rights for all people,” reported the Pittsburgh Courier. The paper 
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explained that Mrs. Roosevelt referenced the bill’s opening words: “All men are 
brothers.” She then continued:  
If all men are brothers we must try to build a world in which all men can live as 
brothers. . . . All the world watches what we do here in the United States. We are 
leaders of spiritual thought . . . so on us there rests the responsibility for showing 
that in our land democracy really works. . . . We can not live with the blood of 
lynching in our land . . . . We must first of all examine ourselves. We must see 
that we do the things that are in our Bill of Rights. 
Mrs. Roosevelt’s remarks foreshadowed the Cold War foreign policy argument President 
Truman would make later in the program. The eyes of the world were on the nation, she 
argued, and thus the United States had a moral responsibility to demonstrate “that in our 
land democracy really works. . . . We must first of all examine ourselves.” In her 
conclusion, Mrs. Roosevelt stated, “We can proudly lead the nations of the world to 
peace . . . but only if we make democracy work here at home.” Only by turning the focus 
inward could the nation lead on the world stage. According to the Pittsburgh Courier’s 
report, the “former First Lady of the land . . . received the most enthusiastic ovation of 
any speaker on the program.”330 
After Mrs. Roosevelt’s remarks, NAACP executive secretary Walter White strode 
to the podium to introduce the president. White began by locating his audience in time 
and place, and acknowledged the national and global audience gathered around their 
radios: “There are 100,000 people here today at the feet of Abraham Lincoln in 
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Washington. I am told that between thirty and forty million other Americans may be 
listening to the radio at this hour. Countless others listen overseas via short-wave 
broadcast. We are gathered together because of our deep concern for human rights.” 
These remarks reveal, yet again, that the afternoon’s speakers understood their audience 
to extend far beyond those assembled on the National Mall. Instead, this event had 
national and global implications, with U.S. citizens tuning in from around the country and 
individuals around the world watching to see how the United States would make 
democracy work within its own borders. White then recounted a brief history of the 
NAACP, noting that racial progress had been made in the United States, but that there 
was still much to do. “The NAACP came into being 38 years ago because decent 
Americans just could not take the evils of mob violence and racial bigotry. We carry on 
today because we just can’t take the gouging out of the eyes of a Negro war veteran by a 
South Carolina policeman who was speedily set free.” Here White alluded to the beating 
and blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodward, the U.S. veteran he told Truman about in their 
Oval Office meeting just nine months earlier. The incident was widely known not just in 
African American circles, but around the world as an example of the racial bigotry so 
prevalent in the United States.331 
White then addressed members of the platform, specifically foreign ambassadors 
to the United States. White’s public acknowledgement of these platform guests 
communicated the domestic and foreign policy implications of this event while also 
insuring that the audience—both those assembled at the steps of the Lincoln Memorial 
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and those listening via radio—understood that representatives from around the world 
were in physical attendance. 
Today there sit among the special guests upon the platform ambassadors from 
many of the nations of the earth. We ask you, gentlemen, to tell your countrymen 
that although the stories of lynching and denial of justice to Americans because of 
race, creed, or national origin are tragically true, those outrages do not accurately 
represent the majority of American citizens. We confess to our shame that ours is 
not yet a perfect democracy. We have grievous faults. But this great assemblage 
of American citizens and the presence of the President of the United States, of 
Mrs. Roosevelt and of the distinguished Republican Senator from Oregon attest 
that a determined an incessant attack is being made upon our racial shortcomings. 
We are resolved to make our nation truly a “government of the people, by the 
people and for the people.” 
White’s mention of foreign ambassadors was not simply a rhetorical gesture; recall that 
the NAACP executive secretary specifically invited these individuals to attend the event. 
As White mentioned this group of international ambassadors and witnesses, he 
underscored the symbolic importance of their presence at this event and also reminded 
his larger audience listening via radio that the world literally was watching as the 
President of the United States articulated his plan for civil rights reform. Even as White 
acknowledged the abysmal state of race relations, he asked these individuals to “tell your 
countrymen . . . . [that] these outrages do not accurately represent the majority of 
American citizens” and underscored the symbolic significance of those who were in 
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attendance. The physical “presence” of Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, Senator Morse, and the 
“great assemblage of American citizens” was evidence that the U.S. government and the 
wider U.S. public was committed to addressing “our racial shortcomings.” If the country 
could guarantee that “no man is denied any right of citizenship because he is dark of skin 
or worships his God in a different place or was born elsewhere, then democracy can 
never be destroyed.” Here White argued that U.S. democracy would continue to flourish 
if, and only if, the nation could translate its cherished ideals from theory to practical 
application. “To this high objective we today rededicate our every energy,” White 
concluded. “We welcome this struggle whose outcome will help to determine the future 
of mankind, every citizen who believes that the Bill of Rights means what it says. Ladies 
and Gentlemen: The President of the United States.”332 
 
Truman’s Address at the Lincoln Memorial 
When Truman delivered the keynote address to the NAACP’s thirty-eighth annual 
conference, his physical presence before this audience in this particular location at this 
historical/temporal moment was profoundly rhetorical. Before he ever opened his mouth, 
the fact that this president, a man who described himself as the descendant of 
Confederates, dared to challenge the institutionalized doxa of white supremacy and Jim 
Crow while standing in the literal and symbolic shadow of Abraham Lincoln spoke 
volumes. In what follows, I examine how Truman defined his presidential authority and 
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ethos, constituted his audience as a nation of citizens responsible for extending the rights 
of citizenship to “all Americans,” and constructed this historical/temporal moment as a 
turning point in U.S. civil rights. My analysis focuses specifically on the language 
Truman used to constitute his rhetorical authority, define this occasion both as a specific 
moment in U.S. history and a kairotic opportunity to change the national conversation on 
race, and rededicate this national monument as a site symbolizing racial equality. 
Ultimately, this analysis reveals how Truman used deictic indicators first to situate his 
audience in place and time before extending these relational, spatial, and temporal 
metaphors beyond the immediate physical situation and onto the international stage as he 
set forth his vision for the metaphorical place the United States would occupy at the dawn 
of the Cold War. 
The president began by acknowledging the other guests on the platform, 
particularly NAACP chairman Walter White, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Morse, 
and other “distinguished guests.” He then expressed his pleasure in attending this event, 
stating: “I am happy to be present at the closing session of the 38th Annual Conference of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The occasion of 
meeting with you here at the Lincoln Memorial affords me the opportunity to 
congratulate the association upon its effective work for the improvement of our 
democratic processes.”333 In these opening remarks, Truman hinted at what made this 
moment so extraordinary. As the first president to address the NAACP in person, 
Truman’s presence before this particular audience underscored his support for the 
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organization’s civil rights agenda. The New York Amsterdam News later observed, “[n]o 
occasion in the affairs of the United States is of more importance than when and where 
the president is the speaker,” and “by appearing in person and making forthright 
declarations on the burning question of race prejudice . . . [Truman] made a notable 
contribution to the fight for democracy and decency in this country.”334 The rhetorical 
significance of Truman’s attendance was compounded by his physical location “here at 
the Lincoln Memorial.” By speaking to this audience in this place, Truman suggested 
that he would align himself not just with the NAACP, but also with the organization’s 
strategic deployment of this national shrine. In so doing, Truman countered Harding’s 
earlier dedication of the Lincoln Memorial and instead reaffirmed Lincoln’s status as the 
“Great Emancipator.” Put another way, Truman’s presidential rhetoric in place lent 
institutional authority to the NAACP’s symbolic adaptation of this place-as-rhetoric. 
When Truman underscored the fact that he was “here” to reaffirm freedom and equality 
for “all Americans,” this deictic reference helped his audience, those assembled on the 
National Mall and those listening to the radio, to envision the scene. 
The president then declared the overall purpose for this address: “I should like to 
talk to you briefly about civil rights and human freedom.” In language very similar to the 
way President Roosevelt would tell his audience that he wanted to converse with them at 
the beginning of his “Fireside Chats,” Truman described his address as an opportunity to 
“talk” with the nation about the ideals and values that defined the country and, by 
extension, the principles of democracy. Employing the presidential “I,” Truman 
reinforced his executive authority to define the bounds of “civil rights and human 
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freedom” and characterize this particular moment in U.S. history. “It is my deep 
conviction that we have reached a turning point in the long history of our country’s 
efforts to guarantee freedom and equality to all our citizens.” Notice how Truman’s use 
of pronouns in this passage quickly assigned agency to the rest of the audience. Speaking 
both as President of the United States and as a fellow citizen, Truman transferred his own 
view (“my deep conviction”) of civil rights to the rest of his audience when he argued 
that “we have reached a turning point” or a kairotic moment within “the long history of 
our country’s efforts to guarantee freedom and equality to all our citizens.” In the span of 
one sentence, Truman shifted the temporal view of race relations in the United States 
from one of gradual progress (“long history”) to a definitive moment requiring an 
immediate response (“turning point”). And yet, it was precisely because 1947 was 
situated within this “long history”—a history that had taken far too long, Truman 
suggested—that this particular moment could now be understood as kairotic. But 
Truman’s use of “turning point” had more than temporal implications. The phrase also 
implies deliberate bodily movement, a shift in direction in a particular place, turning 
away from something and moving toward something else. In this instance, Truman 
argued that this moment required the nation to reject the idea that racial progress would 
happen over time (a view that Harding had advocated at the Lincoln Memorial’s 
dedication in 1922) and instead take specific steps to “guarantee freedom and equality to 
all our citizens.” 
Having defined this moment as a critical juncture in U.S. race relations, the 
president gestured toward “[r]ecent events in the United States and abroad [that] have 
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made us realize that it is more important today than ever before to insure that all 
Americans enjoy these rights.” In this sentence, Truman used temporal and spatial 
metaphors to describe the current domestic and international situation. The president’s 
references to time reinforced the chronos/kairos dimensions of this moment in U.S. 
history. “Recent events”— temporally proximate and also physically near—brought 
about this change in perspective: “today” it was more important than “ever before” to 
extend “these rights”—the “freedom and equality” Truman had mentioned in the 
previous sentence—to “all Americans.” Although “today” referred to June 29, 1947 (a 
distinct moment within the nation’s history), “today” now also suggested a larger 
temporal frame for this moment in time, a kairotic occasion that required communal 
reflection and deliberate action.  
These “recent events” also had material implications for the audience’s daily 
existence “in the United States” and for the nation’s broader relationship with the rest of 
the world (“abroad”). Truman did not elaborate the specifics of these recent events, but 
instead invited his audience to supply their own evidence. Although the “recent events in 
the United States” of mob violence, police brutality, and lynching in the United States 
would have been all too familiar to the African American members of Truman’s 
audience, they also were widely reported throughout the nation and around the world as 
evidence that the United States did not adhere to the democratic ideals it espoused. These 
“recent events” also applied to international developments in the post-World War II 
world, most notably the failing economies in Greece and Turkey. Recall that just three 
months earlier, in his “Truman Doctrine” pronouncement of March 12, 1947, the 
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president had pledged that the United States would provide military and economic aid to 
help European democracies withstand the tide of Soviet communism. Thus, in pointing 
his audience toward the “recent events” at home and abroad, Truman gestured toward his 
later argument that the nation should become a beacon of democratic values to the rest of 
the world.  
By the time Truman reached the two-minute mark of his address, he had 
underscored the significance of this particular occasion and his presidential presence in 
place, defined the urgency of this particular moment, and linked the United States’ racial 
progress to a larger Cold War foreign policy narrative. After laying this contextual 
groundwork for his immediate and extended audience, the president delivered what was 
perhaps the most striking line of his address—one that Truman added himself during the 
speechwriting process.335 In an extension of the previous sentence (“…it is more 
important today than ever before to insure that all Americans enjoy these rights”), 
Truman specified who was included in the category of “all Americans”: “When I say all 
Americans[,] I mean all Americans.”336 Truman’s delivery of this particular line was 
forceful and determined, and the president put particular emphasis on the second half of 
the sentence: “I mean all Americans.” To an audience accustomed to identifying vocal 
cadences over the radio, this shift would have been quite obvious. The implicit argument 
here was that although any U.S. citizen could identify himself/herself as an “American,” 
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this title offered nothing but an empty signifier to non-whites. For millions of black 
Americans, many of whom had fought for their country during World War II, the rights 
and privileges guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution were non-existent. Significant as well 
is how Truman’s use of the presidential “I” lent executive authority to his statement. 
Where his predecessor refused to support congressional anti-lynching legislation because 
he feared losing the support of Southern Democrats, Truman employed his presidential 
ethos to underscore the dichotomy between what the government proclaimed in principle 
and what it actually meant. The qualifier “all” suggested more than total inclusion; it also 
subtly linked Truman’s declaration with the emancipatory connotations of “all”—a 
phrase Lincoln used to describe the reach of his Emancipation Proclamation that “all 
persons held as slaves . . . shall be . . . forever free.”337 
After defining who could claim the title of “American,” Truman suggested that 
the “civil rights laws written in the early years of our Republic,” although precious, were 
not enough. These original laws were designed “to protect the citizen against any possible 
tyrannical act by the new government in this country,” the president explained. “But we 
cannot be content with a civil liberties program which emphasizes only the need of 
protection against the possibility of tyranny by the Government. We cannot stop there.” 
Here Truman continued his description of U.S. history as a chronological timeline 
interrupted by the urgency of this particular moment. The “civil rights laws” of the past 
were just that—legislative initiatives developed in response to previous historical 
exigencies but incapable of solving the pressing needs of the present. If the nation 
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continued to rely on these relics of the past, any historical progress would “stop”—a 
spatial and temporal metaphor that implied stagnation and even backward momentum. 
Instead, Truman argued that the United States “must keep moving forward, with new 
concepts of civil rights to safeguard our heritage. The extension of civil rights today 
means, not protection of the people against the Government, but protection of the people 
by the Government.” It was only through active, thoughtful, deliberate action that the 
nation would “safeguard our heritage” and keep the promise of democracy alive “today.” 
Truman emphasized that “[w]e”—both he and the rest of his audience—“must make the 
Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities of all 
Americans. And again I mean all Americans.” Truman’s implicit argument here was that 
many government officials, particularly those in the south, were the primary cause of 
racial violence and disenfranchisement. The president directly challenged the status quo 
of Jim Crow and state’s rights, arguing that securing civil rights for “all Americans” 
necessitated a federal response to those who threatened the rights of “all Americans”—
even if that meant government officials themselves.  
Truman continued to underscore the urgency of this moment in U.S. history and 
stated in no uncertain terms that racial discrimination was inexcusable. 
Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stand 
between millions of our citizens and their birthright. There is no justifiable reason 
for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or color. We must not 
tolerate such limitations on the freedom of any of our people and on their 
enjoyment of basic rights which every citizen in a truly democratic society must 
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possess. 
In this passage, Truman used spatial and temporal metaphors to characterize the issue of 
racial discrimination in the United States. Having already established that previous civil 
rights laws were not enough to ensure racial justice for “all Americans,” the president 
argued that today’s “immediate task”—one shared by all U.S. citizens—was to “remove” 
the “barriers” and “limitations” that stood between “millions of our citizens and their 
birthright.” In an earlier draft, this last sentence read “millions of our citizens and their 
heritage.” But in a draft edited the day before Truman’s address to the NAACP, an 
unidentified individual replaced “heritage” with “birthright,” a switch that further 
underscored Truman’s claim that simply relying on the country’s supposed historical 
commitment to extending democratic liberties was not enough.338 Moreover, Truman’s 
usage of “barriers” and “limitations” offered a mental picture of a concrete roadblock 
preventing one from moving forward to their intended destination. This metaphor 
suggested that the current state of civil rights in the United States was not only a 
roadblock for African American citizens, but for the entire nation. If millions of U.S. 
citizens could not access their constitutionally-guaranteed rights, how could the rest of 
the nation expect to achieve theirs? 
It is also important to note Truman’s frequent usage of “our” in this passage. This 
inclusive collective pronoun suggested that the task of extending basic civil rights to 
racial minorities belonged to the entire nation, not just the president; it was a moral 
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responsibility to be shared by all. At the same time, “our” described the individuals who 
currently did not experience the “basic rights which every citizen in a truly democratic 
society must possess.” Thus, “our citizens” and “our people” worked to describe blacks 
and other racial minorities as full-fledged citizens who were already part of the nation but 
were being treated as outsiders. If these individuals were living and working as fellow 
members of the nation, why were they not treated as such? In the final sentence of this 
particular passage, Truman’s larger Cold War foreign policy argument came to the 
forefront; if “[w]e” tolerated discrimination against “any of our people,” how could the 
United States claim that it was the paramount example of “a truly democratic society”? 
But Truman went beyond generalities and specified what rights “all Americans” 
should be able to access. “Every man should have the right to a decent home, the right to 
an education, the right to adequate medical care, the right to a worthwhile job, the right to 
an equal share in making the public decisions through the ballot, and the fight to a fair 
trial in a fair court.” It is notable that the president described these concrete rights for 
equal housing, access to education and medical care, employment, universal suffrage, and 
the right to a fair trial as fundamental to U.S. citizenship, particularly because these 
issues were the source of rampant racial discrimination in both the North and the South in 
1947 (and still today). The Truman Administration archival files even betray a certain 
level of discomfort with this statement during the speechwriting process. In a “3rd Draft” 
of the speech contained in the files of George Elsey, an unidentified author (presumably 
Elsey himself) wrote in the margin of this particular passage, “These are more than civil 
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rights.”339 And yet, Truman was insistent that the federal government take action to 
ensure that “these rights—on equal terms—are enjoyed by every citizen. To these 
principles I pledge my full and continued support.” 
But although these rights should be “enjoyed by every citizen,” Truman directly 
acknowledged this was not the case for African Americans. “Many of our people still 
suffer the indignity of insult, the harrowing fear of intimidation, and, I regret to say, the 
threat of physical injury and mob violence. [The] prejudice and intolerance in which 
these evils are rooted still exist.” It is rhetorically significant that Truman characterized 
what many in the South considered social norms as inherently “evil.” As President of the 
United States, Truman’s description of the current state of civil rights in explicitly moral 
terms had long-lasting implications. Where previous U.S. presidents (most notably FDR) 
had refused to take a stand against anti-lynching legislation and other civil rights 
initiatives, Truman called these actions what they were—morally repugnant and evil. 
Worse yet, the president continued, was that “[t]he conscience of our Nation, and the 
legal machinery which enforces it, have not yet secured to each citizen full freedom from 
fear.” Not only did African Americans experience the threat of physical violence and 
intimidation on a daily basis; the country’s “legal machinery” stood idly by as these evils 
were perpetuated. Additionally, Truman’s final description of “freedom from fear” was 
an obvious reference to FDR’s 1941 State of the Union Address, one that the audience 
would be well aware of not just because of the historical proximity between 1941 and 
1947, but also because of Norman Rockwell’s iconic paintings depicting FDR’s “Four 
Freedoms.” These four images were printed on the cover of the Saturday Evening Post in 
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February and March of 1943, circulated widely as war bond posters, and came to 
represent basic human rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens.340 Thus, when Truman argued that 
state and local governments had denied millions of citizens “full freedom from fear,” he 
acknowledged that these images of U.S. democracy popularized by Rockwell and 
espoused by the U.S. government were unidentifiable to black U.S. citizens. 
Characterizing the situation in moral terms, Truman appealed to the nation’s 
conscience to emphasize the urgency of the moment. “We cannot wait another decade or 
another generation to remedy these evils. We must work, as never before, to cure them 
now.” This was a direct attack on Southern Democrats who argued that racial prejudice 
was a lingering symptom of the Civil War, one that would require time and gradual 
progress. Having already enumerated specific injustices faced by African American 
citizens, the president then extended the urgency beyond national borders and linked civil 
rights progress in the United States to his Cold War foreign policy: 
The aftermath of war and the desire to keep faith with our Nation’s historic 
principles make the need a pressing one. The support of desperate populations of 
battle-ravaged countries must be won for the free way of life. We must have 
them as allies in our continuing struggle for the peaceful solution of the world’s 
problems. Freedom is not an easy lesson to teach, nor an easy cause to sell, to 
peoples beset by every kind of privation. They may surrender to the false security 
offered so temptingly by totalitarian regimes unless we can prove the superiority 
of democracy. 
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The moral view of domestic race relations was now a tactical move within Truman’s 
Cold War foreign policy. The president’s deictic indicators quickly elevated the United 
States to a position of moral and political authority on this metaphorical chessboard. The 
“desperate populations of battle-ravaged countries” looked to the United States for 
leadership to solve “the world’s problems.” If the United States failed to prove the 
“superiority of democracy” to “peoples beset by every kind of privation,” the nation 
would fall short of continuing “our Nation’s historic principles.” How was the United 
States to convince the rest of the world that democracy was the best choice in this post-
war world?  
The answer, argued Truman, was to deal directly with the issue of civil rights at 
home. The most persuasive case for U.S. democracy, Truman argued, was to show the 
rest of the world “practical evidence that we have been able to put our own house in 
order.” Describing the nation as a house evoked what Merrill D. Peterson has called “one 
of the most famous utterances in American history,” namely, Lincoln’s warning that “[a] 
house divided against itself cannot stand.”341 Although this phrase was originally from 
the New Testament, Lincoln used it to compare the United States to a house divided 
between North and South, half slave and half free.342 When the president compared the 
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nation’s current state as a house in need of (re)order, he invoked not only the memory of 
Abraham Lincoln, but also used the reference to specify the “version” of Lincoln he 
wished to summon. To an audience assembled at the base of a national shrine to the slain 
president, Truman insisted that a national commitment to democratic principles would 
transcend sectional divisions or racial prejudice so that the rest of the world could see 
firsthand the merits of democracy. 
To those who may have missed his indirect reference to Lincoln or who, like 
Warren G. Harding, argued that Lincoln was primarily concerned with unification and 
would have ceded to popular opinion on the question of slavery, Truman was explicit: 
[W]e can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice and 
discrimination. There is much that State and local governments can do in 
providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we cannot, any longer, await 
the growth of a will to action in the slowest State or the most backward 
community. Our National Government must show the way. 
This was a direct attack on the South. Although the president stated that local 
governments were capable of taking steps to eradicate racial prejudice, he did not say 
they actually acted on this ability. In fact, one way to read Truman’s statement is to 
contrast what “State and local governments can do” with what “we,” the president and 
the rest of the U.S. public, “cannot” do: wait for these regional entities to act. Because 
local governments refused to exercise their state sovereignty to take action against racial 
violence and lynch law, the nation could not afford to wait. Truman’s use of “any 
longer,” a phrase he inserted himself during the speechwriting process, further 
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underscored the urgency of the moment.343 In other words, the nation had waited, and 
black citizens were beaten, tortured, and murdered as a result. Now, Truman declared, it 
was the federal government’s responsibility to lead the nation forward, regardless of 
states and/or communities who refused to enact change. 
Truman acknowledged that this would be a “difficult and complex undertaking,” 
one that would require executive action and federal oversight. Noting that the 
government would require “better tools to do the job,” Truman then employed the 
presidential “I” to establish his executive authority in providing these tools. One of the 
first steps in this process was the President’s Commission on Civil Rights: “I appointed 
an Advisory Committee on Civil Rights last December. Its members, fifteen 
distinguished private citizens, have been surveying our civil rights difficulties and needs 
for several months. I am confident that the product of their work will be a sensible and 
vigorous program for action by all of us.” Notice the various pronouns operating in these 
three sentences and how they assign certain duties to the audience. First, Truman used “I” 
to describe the actions he took as president and the expectations he had for the PCCR’s 
report. He then described the committee members as “distinguished private citizens,” 
emphasizing that this survey of “our civil rights difficulties”—difficulties the entire 
nation shared and suffered from—was a joint effort of the federal government and 
everyday citizens. Truman then shifted back to his presidential “I” to express his 
confidence that the committee’s work would provide “a sensible and vigorous program 
for action by all of us.” In other words, he used his rhetorical authority as president to 
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lend credibility to the committee’s report—even before it was issued—and remind his 
audience that these findings would require all citizens, not just government officials or 
elected politicians, to act. The president also advocated that the country should “advance 
civil rights wherever it lies within our power,” urging the U.S. Congress to extend “basic 
civil rights to the people of [U.S. territories] Guam and American Samoa,” a step that 
Truman predicted would provide further “evidence to the rest of the world of our 
confidence in the ability of all men to build free institutions.”  
As he moved toward the conclusion of his address, the president returned to his 
use of spatial and temporal metaphors in order to underscore the present moment as a 
kairotic one. To do this, he first acknowledged that “[t]he way ahead is not easy,” a 
phrase that suggested forward movement from a particular spatio-temporal from one 
point and toward another. To get there, Truman said, “[w]e shall need all the wisdom, 
imagination and courage we can muster.” And yet, this decisive action was not optional. 
“We must and shall guarantee the civil rights of all our citizens,” the president continued. 
“Never before has the need been so urgent for skillful and vigorous action to bring us 
closer to our ideal. We can reach our goal.” Depicting this moment as a singularly 
opportune one, Truman contrasted June 29, 1947, with earlier historical markers, arguing 
“[n]ever before” had the need for deliberate federal action been greater. These steps, 
although difficult, would push the nation forward toward “our ideal” of ensuring that the 
rights guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill 
of Rights were accessible to “all Americans.” Acknowledging that the “way ahead” 
toward racial justice would not be easy, Truman argued, “we can reach that goal.” These 
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spatial and temporal metaphors described the nation’s gradual movement toward ensuring 
freedom and equality for “all Americans” even as they identified an attainable goal—one 
that “we,” Truman and the rest of his audience, would reach together. To inspire this 
“way ahead,” the president asked his audience to look backward in time. “When past 
difficulties faced our Nation, we met the challenge with inspiring charters of human 
rights—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the 
Emancipation Proclamation.” The majority of Truman’s audience would have 
immediately recognized the first three documents as sacred texts of U.S. democracy. 
What, however, is to be made of the fourth document on the list—the Emancipation 
Proclamation, a text that Lincoln authored but appeared nowhere on the national shrine 
behind him? 
Truman’s inclusion of this particular document achieved at least four rhetorical 
purposes. First, it subtly rejected Harding’s assessment in 1922 that “the supreme chapter 
in history is not emancipation” and instead reaffirmed the NAACP’s strategic 
deployment of the Lincoln Memorial as a site for civil rights activism.344 Second, it 
suggested that the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights 
were not simply foundational texts but “charters of human rights”—rights that extended 
to “all Americans.” Third, when Truman added the Emancipation Proclamation to this 
list, he extended the reach of Lincoln’s initial proclamation from a relatively small 
geographical region to the entire nation and the global stage—a move that reinforced 
Lincoln’s status as the Great Emancipator even as it expanded the connotations of “all” to 
“all classes and conditions of mankind.” Fourth, it propelled the audience toward a new 
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international vision of human rights. In identifying the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a modern-day appropriation of these earlier documents, Truman asserted that 
this document would be “a great landmark in man’s long search for freedom since its 
members consist of such distinguished citizens of the world as Mrs. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.” The president’s audience would have heard Mrs. Roosevelt speak just 
moments before about her work on this initiative. Thus, when Truman pointed his 
audience to Mrs. Roosevelt’s physical presence on the dais next to him, he linked his 
rhetorical authority to this outspoken proponent of civil rights. 
Connecting the “inspired charters” produced by “past difficulties” with the 
present moment, Truman held up these sacred texts as a metaphorical North Star. “With 
these noble charters to guide us, and with faith in our hearts, we shall make our land a 
happier home for our people, a symbol of hope for all men, and a rock of security in a 
troubled world.” Here Truman extended his argument for civil rights from the local to the 
global. If the nation put “our own house in order,” it would then be able to become a 
“happier home” for all its citizens, regardless of race. “Home” suggested not only 
comfort, but also described a place where one could be at ease and at rest—a dwelling 
place. And if the United States offered a safe harbor for “all Americans,” the nation could 
then provide an example to other nations seeking a democratic way of life. These spatial 
and relational images elevated the nation to the global stage as “a symbol of hope” and “a 
rock of security” in a “troubled world” threatened by Soviet communism.  
In the final moments of his speech, Truman concluded by linking Abraham 
Lincoln’s memory and the symbolic status of this particular location when he confidently 
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asserted, “Abraham Lincoln understood so well the ideal which you and I seek today.” 
To Truman’s immediate audience, it would have been impossible to listen to these words 
and not also see the current president’s body dwarfed by the giant statue of the Great 
Emancipator behind him. Even to those assembled several blocks (or miles) down the 
National Mall or those listening via radio, it would have been difficult to forget the 
symbolic significance of Truman’s physical location. Thus, when Truman concluded his 
speech with a quote from Lincoln himself, it was as if the martyred sixteenth president 
was speaking instead of Truman. Two presidential bodies—one living, the other carved 
in stone—proclaimed to the nation and the world that the United States had a moral duty 
to extend freedom and democracy not just to its own citizens but to all people. “As this 
conference closes,” Truman continued, “we would do well to keep in mind his words, 
when he said, “if it shall please the Divine Being who determines the destinies of nations, 
we shall remain a united people, and we will, humbly seeking the Divine Guidance, make 
their prolonged national existence a source of new benefits to themselves and their 
successors, and to all classes and conditions of mankind.”345 In this little-remembered 
passage from a speech to a small group of Lutheran pastors in 1862, Lincoln argued that 
the nation would best express its unity by extending “new benefits” to “all classes and 
conditions of mankind.” At first glance, this particular passage seems like a conciliatory 
way to conclude remarks that Truman knew would, at the very least, make Northern 
politicians nervous and Southern Democrats angry. Indeed, here Lincoln stressed his 
desire that the nation would “remain a united people,” a statement that reflected the 
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“Savior of the Union” image Southern Democrats cherished. However, the larger context 
of Lincoln’s words is important and reveals yet again how Truman used this particular 
occasion not just to advance his civil rights agenda but also articulate his Cold War 
foreign policy. 
Prior to the passage that Truman quoted, Lincoln thanked his guests for “their 
assurances of the sympathy and support . . . in an important crisis which involves, in my 
judgment, not only the civil and religious liberties of our own dear land, but in a large 
degree the civil and religious liberties of mankind in many countries and through many 
ages.” Here Lincoln argued that the Civil War directly affected “not only the civil and 
religious liberties” within the United States, but also the rights and liberties of citizens in 
other countries around the world. This was the same argument Truman would make 
eighty-five years later. Lincoln continued, “You well know, gentlemen, and the world 
knows, how reluctantly I accepted this issue of battle forced upon me, on my advent to 
this place, by the internal enemies of this country.” Although Lincoln referred 
specifically to the sectional divide between the North and the South, and the resulting 
Civil War, Truman would express similar sentiments about his unexpected ascendance to 
the presidency and the actions he took to combat racial prejudice and lynch law during 
his tenure as chief executive. Indeed, even the day before he delivered this address to the 
NAACP, Truman wrote to his sister, Mary Jane, that he wished he “didn’t have to make 
it . . . . Mamma won’t like what I say because I wind up quoting old Abe. But I believe 
what I say and I’m hopeful we may implement it.”346 In many ways, Truman was quite 
                                                
346 Harry S. Truman to Mary Truman, June 28, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-Presidential File, 
Harry S. Truman Library, accessed December 17, 2015, 
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reluctant to address these civil rights issues because of his personal history and his own 
inexcusable racial prejudice. And yet, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Truman 
advocated for civil rights because of his allegiance to the Union transcended any 
sectional affiliation. As president, Truman believed it was his job to ensure that all 
citizens, regardless of race or religion, enjoyed the liberties guaranteed to them in the 
U.S. Constitution. Anything less would be a direct violation of his oath of office. 
Thus, when Truman told his audience that they would do well to “keep in mind 
[Lincoln’s] words,” he was not merely reminding his audience that the slain president 
wanted to unify the country, although he did. Instead, Truman was suggesting that the 
task the U.S. public faced in 1947, although difficult and even uncomfortable, was one 
that could redeem the nation’s past sins of slavery and racial injustice. Truman channeled 
Lincoln’s hope for a “united people,” calling his audience to transcend sectional 
differences between North and South (as he had) and rededicate themselves to the 
democratic values first set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and even the Emancipation Proclamation. Relying on 
Lincoln’s argument as evidence for his own, Truman suggested that the nation’s 
“prolonged national existence” in a postwar world required a specific response: extending 
civil rights and human freedom at home and abroad. Yet again, Truman invoked the 
emancipatory connotations of “all,” yet pushed them even further. Not only did “all 
Americans” deserve the rights laid out in the nation’s “inspiring charters of human 
rights,” but these liberties should be extended to “all classes and conditions of mankind” 
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around the globe. Concluding his speech with this quote from the nation’s sixteenth 
president, Truman reaffirmed Lincoln’s symbolic status as the “Great Emancipator” even 
as he directed his audience to the visual and material elements of the speech situation to 
support his argument for extending civil rights to “all Americans”—and the rest of the 
world. 
 
The Public Response 
The public response to Truman’s speech was immediate, and the varied reactions 
to his address reveal not only the symbolic significance of Truman’s decision to speak at 
the Lincoln Memorial but also a nation sharply divided over the issue of race. In this final 
section, I consider responses in three categories: 1) personal reflections from individuals 
who attended the event and/or were affiliated with the NAACP or the PCCR; 2) mediated 
coverage of the event; and 3) letters U.S. citizens wrote to Truman following his speech 
found at the Truman Library archives. 
 
Personal Reflections 
In their July 11, 1947, press release following the event, the NAACP declared that 
Truman’s speech at the Lincoln Memorial “would produce far reaching effects of a 
beneficial nature in domestic race relations as well as some in sections of international 
relations. The President’s speech, which closed the 38th Annual Conference of the 
NAACP, was broadcast over four major networks and by short wave to every section of 
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the globe where American influence was being maintained.”347 In a private letter to the 
president dated July 9, Walter White told Truman that the organization had “been 
swamped with telegrams, letters, telephone calls and other expressions of enthusiastic 
approval of the speech which you made at [the] Lincoln Memorial on June 29th and of 
the occasion generally. As I told you then, it was the most forthright pronouncement any 
American president has yet made on this issue.”348 In his autobiographical account 
published just a year later, White compared Truman’s speech to Abraham Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address. Although he “did not believe that Truman’s speech possessed the 
literary quality of Lincoln’s speech,” White observed that “in some respects it had been a 
more courageous one in its specific condemnation of evils based upon race prejudice 
which had too long disgraced America, and its call for immediate action against them.” 
According to White’s account, when Truman returned to his seat he asked what the 
NAACP executive secretary thought of the speech. “When I told him how excellent I 
believed it to be,” White recalled, “he assured me, ‘I said what I did because I mean 
every word of it—and I’m going to prove that I do mean it.’”349 
Channing Tobias, a prominent black leader and one of the fourteen members of 
the PCCR, also wrote to Truman to express his enthusiasm: “Never before in the history 
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of our country has any president been quite as explicit as you were in challenging the 
nation to a single standard of citizenship for all Americans,” he wrote. Tobias told 
Truman that he was “encouraged as I have never been before, to believe that this is an 
ideal possible of achievement and I want you to know that your spirit and your spoken 
word have been the chief influence that has brought this outlook of optimism to the tenth 
of the nation with which I happen to be identified.”350 
Just three days after the speech, Eleanor Roosevelt made the event the subject of 
her “My Day” newspaper article, the widely syndicated column that Mrs. Roosevelt 
wrote six days a week from 1935 to 1962.351 Because millions of U.S. citizens read her 
daily column, the former First Lady’s emphasis on the place of the event further 
amplified Truman’s presidential presence there while reaffirming the Lincoln Memorial’s 
symbolic status in national life. 
I looked out over the sea of faces below us and thought how significant this 
meeting before the Lincoln Memorial must be to most of the people there. Lincoln 
said that there should be no more slaves in our country, but he did not want to 
give people a freedom that meant nothing or that carried with it the bitterness of 
inferiority. Now, some 80 years later, we were gathered here to try really to 
achieve the ends which he envisioned but could not fully accomplish. President 
Truman spoke words for the Government, in the presence of his chief justice and 
his attorney general, which should give hope that tangible strides toward the 
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351 “My Day, Key Events,” American Experience, PBS.org, accessed December 30, 2015, 
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fulfillment of Lincoln’s vision can now be taken. I was very proud that these 
words were being spoken. It made me feel that our country would be stronger 
because they were fearlessly spoken. The sun made the top of the Washington 
Monument glisten before us, and somehow it seemed as tho years of our history 
lay between the two monuments. And in my heart I said a prayer that this meeting 
might be the symbol that we really would lead the world in justice and 
brotherhood, and by so doing make it possible for peace to grow in men’s hearts 
and justice to exist between man and man.352 
What is particularly fascinating about Eleanor Roosevelt’s description is how she 
provided her readers with an eyewitness account to the event. Even if her audience 
missed the speech via radio broadcast or had not seen actual pictures of the event, the 
former First Lady’s column offered a clear description of where the event was, why this 
particular location was rhetorically significant, and how the president’s text interacted 
with and built upon the Lincoln Memorial’s status in U.S. political culture. 
 
Mediated Coverage of Truman’s Address 
Several prominent newspapers published photos of Truman’s speech at the 
Lincoln Memorial, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the New York 
Amsterdam News, and the Atlanta Daily World.353 Several newspapers also published the 
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complete text of Truman’s address so the U.S. public could refer back to the speech 
themselves.354 Others simply published portions of the address or included brief 
quotations in their analyses of the event. Many of these press reports referenced the 
location of Truman’s address, although some of these mentions may simply have been to 
locate the event in time and place. However, other newspapers commented explicitly on 
the symbolic significance of Truman’s rhetoric in place.  
For example, The Christian Science Monitor noted the scene/setting of the 
president’s address, writing, “Few are the Americans, we think, who will find fault with 
the ideals of human rights and freedom to which President Truman pledged himself the 
other day as he stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and addressed a great throng, 
with the Washington Monument and its mirrored reflection beyond forming a symbolic 
setting such as few cities of the world can provide.”355 An article in the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch specifically noted the significance of the speech location. “President Truman 
chose an excellent place and occasion for his assertion of the importance of ‘positive 
safeguards for civil rights.’ He spoke in the shadow of the marble memorial to his great 
predecessor, whose Emancipation Proclamation first gave the very first of civil rights—
freedom—to many thousands of Americans.”356 The Chicago Defender, a prominent 
African American newspaper, was explicit about the significance of Truman’s placement:  
“[Truman] stood in the shadow of that great liberator, Abraham Lincoln, at the 
Lincoln Memorial and delivered a second emancipation speech to the throngs 
                                                
354 "Text of Talk by Truman to NAACP; "President Truman's Speech to NAACP on Human Rights; "'U.S. 
Must Lead Anti-Hate Drive': Complete Text of Truman's Speech." 
355 "Not What, But How," Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1947. 
356 "Mr. Truman on Civil Rights," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 30, 1947. 
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who had come to hear him. He was flanked by diplomats from our sister nations 
and other internationally known dignitaries. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Senator 
Wayne Morris [sic], Republican of Oregon, shared the platform and spotlight with 
Mr. Truman. Throughout the world, his liberation speech was carried by short 
wave and four major networks in America brought it to the ears of millions here 
at home.”357 
And the Atlanta Daily World suggested that the Lincoln Memorial offered a location for 
reaffirmation of national values, noting that Truman’s address, “broadcast over all major 
networks to the nation, was made from the grounds of Lincoln Memorial where 
thousands assembled for a spiritual re-dedication of America to the ideals and principals 
[sic] upon which the United States was founded.”358 
Other news reports focused on the rhetorical circulation of the president’s speech 
both in the United States and around the world. The New York Amsterdam News declared 
Truman’s address “one of the most far-reaching addresses against race prejudice ever 
propounded by a President of these United States. . . . which was broadcast over the four 
major radio networks, and short-waved by the State Department to foreign countries—to 
an estimated unseen audience of nearly fifty million.”359 The Atlanta Daily World 
reported that, “[a]ccording to reliable observers, the foreign press devoted a good deal of 
editorial space to the Chief Executive’s discussion of civil rights. It was considered 
significant that the short-wave transmission of Mr. Truman’s speech was made through 
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direct State Department request.” Moreover, the article noted, the “fact that many 
Southern newspapers devoted part of their editorial pages to the speech was considered 
one of the more immediate benefits.”360 The New York Amsterdam News emphasized the 
various ways Truman’s speech reached the U.S. public, writing that citizens “[n]o one 
who heard his speech at the Lincoln Memorial, or over the radio, or who has read it in the 
newspapers” would forget the president’s bold stand.361 
Still others remarked how important it was that the President of the United States, 
himself a former Southerner, was the one delivering this message to the U.S. public. In a 
July 4, 1947, editorial, the Kansas City Call, a nationally prominent black newspaper 
headquartered less than ten miles from Harry Truman’s home in Independence, declared 
the president’s speech to be “the most forthright speech on race relations ever made by a 
President in modern times.” The paper also made note of Truman’s decision to address 
the NAACP in person, writing, “There was a time when it would have been considered 
‘too radical’ for the chief executive of the land to appear before a gathering dedicated to 
fight for equal rights for Negro citizens.” But while “[o]ther presidents have sent 
messages of greeting to the association . . . Truman is the first to appear in person.” To 
conclude, the paper opined: 
                                                
360 "Benefits Seen from Truman Rights Speech: Southern Press Comments with Favor on Talk," Atlanta 
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When Truman went to Washington, he forgot the customs and habits of Missouri 
and became a true representative of democratic governmnt [sic]. In his speech at 
the Lincoln Memorial Sunday, he stated in words similar to those used for years 
by the Negro press and the N.A.A.C.P. that the United States must make 
democracy work at home before it can preach it abroad.”362 
In another telling account, the Los Angeles Sentinel declared that “[i]n telling the world 
that it is high time for the national government to step in and show the way to guarantee 
basic civil rights to all citizens regardless of race or color . . . the President lashed out at 
that firmly knit band of southern Democrats which has long held the whip-hand over the 
policies and practices of the Democratic party.” The editorial continued,  
It is indeed heartwarming when these words come not from the Negro Press or 
Negro spokesmen alone, but when they are uttered by the highest elective [sic] 
official in the country. Having thus openly and courageously defied the rabid 
reactionaries in his own party, Mr. Truman is in an excellent position to push 
through the present session . . . the anti-lynching bill, FEPC and the anti-poll tax 
bill, all of which, as he so clearly implies, are sorely needed if American 
democracy is to be accepted throughout the world as good coin.363 
But perhaps the most candid assessment of Truman’s speech to the NAACP came 
from the Pittsburgh Courier almost two weeks after the event. In an editorial entitled 
“Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman,” the paper called the president’s address "remarkably 
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sincere and forceful . . . not only highly praiseworthy but invited comparison with his 
predecessor who enjoyed to far greater degree the affection of colored Americans.” After 
this indirect reference to FDR, the paper made its comparison explicit: 
The NAACP was never able to get Mr. Roosevelt on its conference platform at 
any time during his occupancy of the White House, although he did send a routine 
message to each annual conference as a President does to all gatherings of 
national importance. We cannot recall when the gentleman who now sleeps at 
Hyde Park made such a forthright statement against racial discrimination, mob 
violence, color prejudice and in favor of “freedom and equality to all our 
citizens,” except on the occasion in the autumn of 1933 when two white men were 
mobbed and killed at San Jose, Calif. . . . Here we have a President saying that a 
revolution in American mores must be worked here and now, and this is the more 
remarkable when one considers Mr. Truman's origin and antecedents as 
contrasted with those of Mr. Roosevelt. 
In this remarkable statement, the Pittsburgh Courier went so far as to state openly that 
Truman “in speech and action where colored Americans are concerned he is looming, on 
the record, to greater stature than his predecessor” and deserved “high praise for his 
sincerity and forthrightness after a long era of double-talk and political expediency.”364 
In addition to widespread newspaper coverage of Truman’s address to the 
NAACP, Universal International Newsreel also featured a one and a half minute clip of 
Truman’s speech in their June 30, 1947, newsreel broadcast circulated around the 
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country.365 This report, entitled “Truman Asks Equality for All Americans,” featured 
powerful images of Truman standing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, his body 
dwarfed by the large statue of the former president behind him. The voice-over reported 
that 10,000 individuals gathered at the “memorial to the Great Emancipator in 
Washington” listened as “President Truman strongly advocate[d] freedom and equality 
for all United States citizens.” The camera angle included footage of Truman behind the 
podium with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt directly to the president’s left. These images, 
coupled with live footage of Truman’s declaration that “all Americans” should enjoy the 
rights of citizenship, visually emphasized the importance of Truman’s location. 
Moreover, this coupling of text and image invited viewers to interpret the president’s 
definitive statement, “When I say all Americans, I mean all Americans,” in relation to 
Abraham Lincoln’s status as the “Great Emancipator” and previous rhetoric in this place. 
These newspaper reports and newsreel coverage of Truman’s speech to the 
NAACP on June 29, 1947, reinforce the rhetorical significance not just of the Lincoln 
Memorial, but the inherent symbolism of President Truman’s presidential presence in that 
place. These accounts also suggest that Truman’s audience saw his speech as both a 
presidential directive for domestic policy and as a clear articulation of the United States’ 
foreign policy at the dawn of the Cold War. These themes were also reflected in the mail 
U.S. citizens sent to Truman after his address, the subject of the final analysis section of 
this chapter. 
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Citizen Letters 
Many ordinary citizens wrote letters to the president following his June 29, 1947, 
speech to the NAACP. These responses are particularly insightful because they provide 
first-person accounts of audience reactions to Truman’s speech and also reflect civic 
attitudes of the day. Because the Truman Library did not keep all letters received 
following this speech, I do not make the claim that these are representative of U.S. public 
opinion or even a representative sampling of Truman’s audience. However, they do offer 
important insights in thinking about how Truman linked his political authority to 
advancing civil rights on the domestic front and also setting up the United States as an 
example of democratic liberty for the rest of the world. 
Several citizens made Truman’s political authority and sectional affiliation the 
focus of their remarks, with some even commenting on their own Southern affiliation. 
Elinore Cowan Stone of Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, wrote to Truman immediately after 
his speech. Although she confessed that she believed “writing my President a letter is just 
spilling words into the air,” she told him that she “felt that you had hit the nail on the 
head when you said that if we did not put our own race situation in order – or words to 
that effect – we could not hope to make the rest of the world believe that our democracy 
was honest.” She then explained that, “[i]n case it makes any difference, I do not belong 
to the ‘colored’ race. As a matter of fact, my mother, whose ancestors were slave-owners 
in Virginia, would probably turn over in her grave if she knew that her daughter was 
sponsoring the idea that Negro citizens should have an even break.” And yet, explained 
Cowan Stone, “I very much hope that you will stand behind what you said to-night as 
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courageously as you have stood behind some of your other convictions in the past 
weeks.”366 Abmond Maxwell also referenced his Southern upbringing in his letter to the 
president, and yet noted that “[w]ithout any qualification, [Truman’s address to the 
NAACP] thrilled me more than any speech of any president I have heard. I am white, 
born, reared and educated in Georgia, but the things you said are the chief reasons I am 
glad to be an American. Those faults in our country you humbly acknowledged, and the 
high ideals the people and yourself are dedicated, give the strongest, frankest, clearest, 
and most [undecipherable] statement to our Foreign policy that I have heard.”367 
But for others, Truman’s stance on civil rights was a violation of his Southern 
ancestry—and their own political freedom. L.H. Moore from Norfolk, Virginia, wrote, 
“Your speech disgusted me a Democrat Missouri born.”368 Otis Chandler of Birmingham, 
Alabama, made the point succinctly: “In the south I don’t like what you are doing with 
the Negroes you won’t get any where.”369 Catherine J. Moroney of Washington, D.C., 
wrote: “Will you consider the feelings of the American people and stop trying to solve 
the world’s problems. The speech you gave for the NAACP is your opinion. But why has 
the President a right to force his opinion and choice of race on the masses of people. You, 
Mrs. Roosevelt and fellow travelers are entitled to associate or work with all the Negroes 
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you want to, but there are many Americans that do not want to. Will you please 
remember this is a free country. And let us be free. And not forced. You are only the 
President, not all of the American people.”370 
Another prominent theme in these letters is the clear understanding many citizens 
had of the relationship between civil rights at home and the United States’ role abroad. 
Thomas L. Cowan from Brooklyn, New York, told the president that he had listened to 
his “magnificent and eloquent address delivered against intolerance at the Lincoln 
Memorial” and was confident that “millions of Americans, in all parts of the Country 
applauded your vigorous attacks against this cancer that affects the body politic, and will 
support every move to eradicate it.” Mr. Cowan told Truman that his speech 
demonstrated a “bold but immortal stand” and “America through you and with you in the 
vanguard will lead the world out of the nightmare of promises unkept, into the daylight of 
the Four Freedoms with Liberty and Justice for all.”371 
Bishop Buford F. Gordon of Charlotte, North Carolina, sent a telegram 
congratulating the president on his “address at the Lincoln Memorial today. It was 
prophetic and expressed the convictions of all people interested in the fulfillment of a 
vigilant exemplary democracy.”372 Dr. Evalyn Lowes Davis of Los Angeles, California, 
wrote, “I believe in every statement you made, and do admire your courage in giving to 
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the world the true democratic law as expressed in our Constitution.”373 Andrew G. 
Freeman of Freeman, Ohio, told the president that his speech “should meet with the 
approval of All Americans. It certainly does with mine. Americans may disagree on how 
to secure civil rights for all, but we should all present a united front in matters affecting 
the implementation of democratic principles and the effect such action has in our 
relationships with nations all over the world.”374 Louise M. Spoerri of Santa Monica, 
California, expressed similar sentiments when she told Truman that if things remained as 
they were in the United States, “I do not blame those nations across the water for pointing 
their fingers at us in derision as they do when we speak of democracy. . . . If things go on 
as they have been most of the people who are fine and true and just will be ashamed of 
being white people and ashamed of what we stand for and do not enforce.”375 
Other citizens described the newfound pride and ownership they felt upon hearing 
Truman’s speech. Percival Sills of Rockaway Beach, New York, wrote to “His 
Excellency Harry S. Truman” to tell him that he was “electrified by your words.” “Surely 
a Government which has the power to transport its citizens in far-off lands in the 
country’s defense when danger threatens is not impotent to grant these same citizens the 
necessary protection when danger to liberty threatens here at home.” In language 
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strikingly similar to John F. Kennedy’s declaration sixteen years later in West Berlin, Mr. 
Sills remarked:  
In ancient days the expression “Civis Romanus sum” meant a great deal. I, as a 
naturalized citizen and U.S. soldier in World War I, want to be able to lift up head 
high and say with pride, when the occasion warrants it: “I am an American 
citizen,” something I have been unable to say until now because so many wrongs 
and injustices were committed against the individual and these with impunity and 
without a word of protest from those charged with the enforcement of the 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States.376 
For Sherman Briscoe of Washington, D.C., Truman’s speech convinced him “for the first 
time that I had a full share in the American way of life.” Mr. Briscoe also predicted that 
“white Americans, too, must have felt better after hearing your talk. For they realized that 
at last their country was ready to take a responsible attitude in the mater of racial 
relations.”377 
Several letters, both those in support of the president’s speech and those 
adamantly opposed to his proposals, commented that Truman’s remarks had cost him 
votes in the 1948 presidential election. Lowell C. Frost wrote the president to offer 
“hearty commendation of your speech at the Lincoln Memorial last night. . . . That 
speech (as you knew it would) lost for you many votes. But I believe that its sincerity and 
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forthrightness gave to you a firm foundation and the staunch support of many more 
friends who feel as you do about the essential unity of the American people.”378 An 
attorney from Chicago, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., told the president that “[t]here is no better 
person than yourself to impress the facts of life on the citizens of our country. There are 
too many of us today who do not yet realize that we cannot longer drift along letting 
things take care of themselves.” Although the president’s speech would “probably be 
criticized in many quarters,” Mr. Gibson said that he was “writing to let you know that 
there are many who heartily agree with you in this and other issues.”379 
Those who disapproved of Truman’s address were much more direct—and nasty. 
Cecil H. Piatt from Tucson, Arizona, wrote: “Your idiotic speech to NAACP means only 
you approve negro social equality. I for one am ready to fight from now on. If you are 
willing to face war at home keep on this track. Cecil H. Piatt Yesterday, Today, Forever 
Ku Klux Klan.”380 Louis F. Lawler of San Diego, California, wrote: “I have just read the 
newspaper account of your speech to the National Society for the Advancement of the 
Colored Race. Scratch one Democratic vote for ’48.”381 Mrs. J.M. McCreary of Wichita 
Falls, Texas, wrote, “I agree with you for the Negro’s rights but was so glad to notice you 
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did not use the word equality with the races as Mrs. Roosevelt so much wants and that I 
know Mrs. Truman was not for.”382 
Although the majority of these public opinion letters were written to thank 
President Truman for his courageous remarks, several were particularly degrading. I 
quote two of them below, not to privilege this perspective in any way, but because I 
believe these letters offer an important insight into the daily realities black citizens faced. 
These letters also reveal just what Truman was up against as he sought to make civil 
rights a reality for “all Americans.” 
Sherman Riley, Sr. of Lufkin, Texas, was, to put it mildly, livid. “Referring to 
your talk at the Lincoln Memorial regarding ‘racial prejudice.’ Of course, anyone knows 
your words were uttered for one purpose – to try to secure the nigger votes.” Mr. Lufkin 
continued,  
But will you tell me why such a speech was necessary, why stir up this question, 
it only leads the nigger to believe he is equal to the white man, which any 
schoolboy knows is not true, and it gives the nigger a license to become insulting 
and overbearing, and the words and deeds of nigger loving Mrs. Roosevelt is 
already manifesting itself in the actions of the Southern nigger, while previously 
there was no strife, no trouble, between niggers and whites. Such speeches as 
yours only tends [sic] to make the race question become a thousand times more 
serious and dangerous. . . . I have the first person yet to meet who has any good 
word for this woman [Eleanor Roosevelt], who wants to attend to everyone else’s 
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affairs, but her own. She is the laughing stock of the country, and from your 
speech it is apparent she now has you ‘roped in.’”383 
Riley’s letter expresses not only his deep hatred for African American citizens, but his 
belief (shared by many other Southerners) that that any political support for racial equity 
made the issue “a thousand times more dangerous.” This particular missive also 
demonstrates why Truman’s presidential presence before the NAACP at the Lincoln 
Memorial was so radical—and offensive to Southerners. In publically declaring his 
support for the NAACP and extending civil rights to “all Americans,” Truman deflated 
white supremacist hopes that this “son of a unreconstructed rebel mother” would carry on 
the status quo.384 
In another particularly offensive missive, Rufus R. Todd from Opelika, Alabama, 
wrote to Truman:  
I have just returned from the theater where I heard your speech on equality of the 
races. Never have I heard a silence so elequont [sic] from both the white audience, 
and the colored in the balcony finally from the colored balcony there arose a 
murmer [sic] of despair, of rage, and fear, on the street as I left the theater I heard 
a young negro say ‘Yankees are the worst enemys [sic] a pore [sic] niggers got if 
they would have these white folks down here alone we would get along a lot 
better.’ . . . I feel a deep sympathy for them, but knowing their good points I 
understand also their weaknesses and short comings that so unfit them for full 
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equality with white people . . . You must consider that it was but a few short 
generations ago that the negroes was [sic] brought from the Jungles, so the race as 
a whole can not be judged by a few of the most intelligent ones, as thinking 
people we must accept the negro for what he is[,] not what we would like him to 
be. . . . I’m afraid your speech gave the confirdence [sic] of the people of the 
south a severe jolt.”385 
Indeed, Truman’s speech to the NAACP, and his major domestic initiatives on civil 
rights gave the South more than a “severe jolt.” 
Despite these examples of overt racism and pure hatred for African American 
citizens, Truman’s address to the NAACP had far-reaching implications at home and 
abroad. In one of the most rhetorically potent missives from the archive, Dorothy W. 
Chance of Memphis, Tennessee, explained why the president’s speech was so significant 
to her—and for the entire nation. 
It is only a couple of months now since I was in Japan with the American Red 
Cross. I am an American Negro. It was often difficult to answer interrogating 
Japanese who wanted to know more about our democracy and why we as Negroes 
who “are Americans too” are segregated and discriminated against. I listened to 
many of our soldiers try to explain to them the stages of American History, of 
Negro slavery, its abolition and the progress of the race that is being made today. 
But always they were as able as we to point to phrases in the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the Constitution of the United States of America – “the liberty 
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and justice to all” phrases. It was not simple to try to explain American 
democracy in the light of all the questions they asked us. Your speech today 
brought more faith and hope than all the speeches I’ve ever heard anywhere. My 
prayers are for you that your words will not fall on deaf ears of those who are able 
to help make civil rights a realization for all people, and that all Americans will 
always be worthy of equal civil rights.386 
For Mrs. Chance, and millions of African American citizens, the president’s speech to the 
NAACP on June 29, 1947, offered at least a hope that the United States of America 
would take steps to secure the rights and liberties guaranteed in the nation’s foundational 




Harry S. Truman’s address to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, reveals the 
transformative potential of presidential presence in place. Speaking from the steps of the 
Lincoln Memorial, Truman activated the symbolic resonances of Lincoln’s political 
legacy and the memories embedded in this particular location while linking his own 
ethos—as expressed through his rhetorical authority as president of the United States and 
his personal history with race relations—to the NAACP. Although he spoke from within 
the United States, Truman’s rhetoric in place transcended his immediate location and 
circulated around the globe as a powerful argument at the dawn of the Cold War. Keenly 
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aware of the inconsistencies between “our protestations of freedom and our practice of 
them,” the president used this occasion to tell the nation and the world that the United 
States would “get its own house in order” to prove to the world that U.S. democracy was, 
in fact, superior to Soviet communism.387 
Truman’s speech at the Lincoln Memorial also lent institutional authority to the 
NAACP’s strategic adaption of the site as a locus for civil rights activism. Building on 
the symbolism and shared public memory of Marian Anderson’s 1939 Easter Sunday 
concert, the president’s physical presence in this place and before this audience solidified 
once and for all the Lincoln Memorial as a commonplace symbolizing the United States’ 
commitment to extending the rights and liberties laid out in the U.S. Constitution to “all 
Americans.”388 After Truman, other U.S. presidents returned here to honor Lincoln’s 
memory as the Great Emancipator and to call for advances in civil rights. Of course, the 
March on Washington and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech on August 28, 1963, offered the most powerful invocation of Lincoln’s memory 
and the place-as-rhetoric of the Lincoln Memorial. Yet the very choice of the Lincoln 
Memorial as the site for King’s address suggests that earlier rhetorical work in this 
place—such as Anderson’s 1939 concert and Truman’s 1947 address to the NAACP—
made it a particularly persuasive rhetorical resource.  
Of particular note is Lyndon B. Johnson’s frequent return to the Lincoln 
Memorial during his civil rights campaign. In December 1963, just one month after John 
F. Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson spoke at a candlelight vigil at the Lincoln 
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Memorial. Four weeks earlier, in an Address to a Joint Session of Congress on November 
27, Johnson had argued that the best way to honor Kennedy’s memory was to ensure “the 
earliest possible passage of a civil rights bill for which he fought so long.”389 Johnson 
continued this argument in his ceremonial remarks at the Lincoln Memorial, reassuring 
his audience that they had been “bent in sorrow, but not in purpose. We buried Abraham 
Lincoln and John Kennedy, but we did not bury their dreams or their visions. They are 
our dreams and our visions for today.”390 Less than two months later, Johnson used the 
occasion of Lincoln’s 155th birthday to reaffirm the United States’ moral obligation to 
carry out “the new birth of freedom that [Lincoln] promised” for “[t]his is the unfinished 
work to which we, the living, must dedicate ourselves.”391 Three years later, in 1967, 
Johnson returned to the national shrine and described Abraham Lincoln as “the ‘Great 
Emancipator’—of black and white alike.”392 And in 1968, Johnson spoke at a ceremony 
commemorating Lincoln’s 159th birthday, telling his audience that “[a]cross the world, 
whenever men have sought to breath free and stand tall—they have looked to Lincoln.” 
Johnson went on to describe how Lincoln’s legacy extended beyond the United States 
and across the globe: “On five continents, in shacks and huts and slums, and in drawing 
rooms as well—if men sought dignity, there was a picture of Abraham Lincoln tacked on 
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the wall. Those pictures in the places where men dream of freedom give us a true 
perspective of America’s role in the world over the last 100 years.” Like Truman, 
Johnson held up Lincoln’s memory as an inspiration to millions seeking freedom—a 
description particularly poignant in 1968, twenty years into the Cold War. Like Truman, 
Johnson also insisted that the U.S. public look inward, not simply outward, and consider 
how the “revolutionary American dream of human dignity and quality for all” was 
enacted at home. In his conclusion, Johnson noted the symbolic significance of his 
location—and the previous rhetorical action that happened in this place: 
These marble steps in recent years have borne eloquent witness to responsible 
dissent. A hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation, a vast convocation 
of peoples have met here peacefully and dramatically to call upon all of us to 
honor our commitment to human rights for all of us. Today, we rededicate 
ourselves at this place to Lincoln’s cause, the cause of full equality.393 
Here, in this place, Johnson called his audience yet again to rededicate themselves to 
Lincoln’s vision for “full equality” for all citizens—a vision that Truman had first 
articulated from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and one that Johnson was determined 
to carry out.  
William Leuchtenburg argues that Truman’s civil rights agenda “proved to be the 
end of the Solid South, at least of a South solid for the Democrats,” writing that although 
it was Lyndon Johnson who “pushed through far-reaching civil rights legislation . . . 
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Truman is the one who opened the fissure that would never be mended.”394 Through his 
rhetoric in place on June 29, 1947, Truman constituted the Lincoln Memorial as a Cold 
War commonplace, a place of return for future civil rights activists and U.S. presidents to 
deploy as a material means of persuasion. But what was even more remarkable about 
Truman’s address to the NAACP is that he, a son of the South, was speaking on behalf of 
the organization at a site originally designed to promote national unity—and silence 
Lincoln’s stance on slavery and emancipation. It is precisely because of these inherent 
tensions that Truman’s speech was so remarkable—and rhetorically significant. Only 
Truman could speak in this place, on this occasion, about this issue. Only Truman could 
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Chapter Four: Kennedy in Berlin 
 
 
On June 26, 1963, John F. Kennedy delivered his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” 
declaration before a capacity crowd in front of City Hall in West Berlin. Kennedy’s 
argument was simple: those who thought communism was a peaceful system of 
government and “the wave of the future” should come to Berlin and see for themselves. 
Speaking as the representative of the United States, Kennedy told his audience that the 
American people took “the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even 
from a distance, the story of the last 18 years,” namely that of Soviet occupation of 
Eastern Europe following World War II. The U.S. public stood with the West Berliners, 
Kennedy stated, even from across the Atlantic Ocean. Although separated by a great 
distance, the president said that Americans saw themselves as resolute allies of West 
Berlin, a “defended island of freedom” on the “front lines” of the Cold War.395 
The city of West Berlin, perhaps more than any other geographical location 
during the Cold War, provided a physical and metaphorical symbol of the ideological 
struggle between democracy and communism. In what was often a symbolic struggle of 
words, the dividing line between East and West Berlin was a tangible instantiation of the 
verbal and psychological clash between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a 
government report assessing the political and military background of Berlin from 1945 to 
1965, U.S. Air Force military historian Royce E. Eckwright noted that, unlike other Cold 
War military conflicts in Vietnam or Korea, “it was only in Berlin that the world’s two 
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great nuclear powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—met like flint and steel in 
a tinder box. Berlin was the only geographical point in the world where military forces 
and political commitments of the United States and the Soviet Union were locked 
continuously in a direct confrontation.”396 This reality became even more apparent in 
1961, when East German leader Walter Ulbricht (under the direction of Soviet premier 
Nikita Khrushchev) erected the Berlin Wall just after midnight on August 13. In a report 
issued just days after the Berlin Wall went up, the U.S. State Department was explicit 
about Berlin’s symbolic status not only for the United States, but the entire Western 
world: 
West Berlin is a lighthouse of freedom in a dark totalitarian sea. It demonstrates 
the material superiorities of a free society which allows and encourages individual 
initiative. More important, it is a shining model of political, intellectual, and 
spiritual freedom in which individual liberties are assured and the people choose 
those who govern them. . . . All peoples throughout the globe who enjoy or aspire 
to freedom, including the captive peoples of the Communist empires, have a vital 
interest in the preservation of freedom—of self-determination—in West Berlin. In 
defending Free Berlin we defend not only Bonn, Paris, London, Oslo, Ottawa, 
Washington, Kansas City, Boise, but, in fact, every citizen in the North Atlantic 
community. Equally we defend New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Lagos, Tunis, 
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Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and every other city and village and people 
who wish to be free.397 
The city of West Berlin was a testing ground, the fulcrum on which U.S. Cold War 
foreign policy rested. Moreover, the German capital quickly became the hottest spot of 
the Cold War during Kennedy’s presidency—a place that Khrushchev described as “the 
most dangerous place in the world” during the 1961 Vienna Summit.398  
Kennedy’s decision to visit West Berlin in June 1963 was inherently symbolic. As 
the first U.S. president to travel to the besieged city since Truman’s visit in 1945, his 
presidential presence in this besieged city offered tangible proof of his commitment to 
defending West Berliners from Soviet encroachment. To fully understand the rhetorical 
significance of speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, it is essential to consider first the 
rhetorical history of Berlin itself and how—and why—this city dominated much of 
Kennedy’s foreign policy rhetoric in 1961 and 1962. I then turn to the archival record to 
demonstrate the White House’s goals for Kennedy’s trip to Europe in 1963 and, 
specifically, their view of the president’s visit to West Berlin. These materials reveal that 
the president, his White House advisors, and West German officials saw Kennedy’s 
physical presence in Berlin as a rhetorical act in itself and carefully planned the events of 
June 26 to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to West Berlin and present Kennedy 
as a strong and confident leader of the Western Alliance. After this historical and 
contextual background, I conduct a close reading of Kennedy’s speech at the Rudolph 
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Wilde Platz in West Berlin. Through my analysis, I show how the president drew on his 
physical location—the city of West Berlin—as tangible proof of the failures of 
communism even as he challenged his audience to look beyond their physical situation to 
a more hopeful future. I conclude this chapter by considering the public reaction to 
Kennedy’s speech in West Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States and 
describe how this case study extends our understanding of presidential rhetoric in place. 
 
Berlin as a Cold War Commonplace 
The very existence of West Berlin was a result of Allied negotiations at the end of 
World War II. In 1944, the Allies agreed to divide Germany and “Greater Berlin” 
following the conclusion of World War II into three zones controlled by the United 
States, Great Britain, and Russia.399 At the Yalta conference in February 1945, the Allies 
agreed to add France as a governing entity. Germany was divided into four zones. The 
city of Berlin, located 110 miles inside Soviet territory, was also partitioned into four 
zones. The United States, Great Britain, and France controlled areas on the west side of 
the city, and the Soviet Union occupied the eastern zone. In July 1945, the Big Three 
powers met for the Potsdam conference just fifteen miles outside of Berlin.400 Historian 
Michael Neiberg notes the symbolic importance of holding this meeting in Berlin, the 
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city where Hitler once paraded through the streets to millions of Berliners at the height of 
World War II. “Not only would it drive home to the Germans the cold reality of their 
defeat,” Neiberg writes, “but it would underscore the magnitude of the Soviet 
contribution to that defeat. . . . The Germans of 1945—above all, those in the capital—
would know the totality of their defeat, which would be symbolized by their former 
enemies determining Germany’s future not in a luxurious Paris or a distant Alaska, but in 
an occupied and shattered Berlin.”401 The day before the conference began, Truman took 
a driving tour of the decimated city with Secretary of State George Byrnes and Admiral 
William D. Leahy, motoring down the same roads that were filled with Berliners 
cheering Hitler at the height of Nazi power and that John F. Kennedy would visit 
eighteen years later.402 At the conference, the Big Three explicitly recognized Berlin as 
the capital city of Germany, yet failed to determine the access rights for U.S., British, and 
French troops to Berlin.403 
On June 24, 1948, Soviet troops halted road and rail traffic between the Western 
occupation zones and Berlin, in effect cutting off the Western sections—and 2.5 million 
people—from food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. On June 26, the U.S. military 
commander in Berlin, General Lucius Clay, ordered the first flight shipments from 
Wiesbaden Air Base to the German capital. Two days later, President Truman ordered a 
full-scale military operation to supply the necessary food and fuel to keep the city alive. 
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Just three weeks after the airlift began, Washington Post reporter John G. Norris 
interviewed military chiefs on the situation in Berlin. “Berlin has become the symbol of 
American determination,” he wrote. “The fact that the odds are against us makes victory 
in the ‘cold’ war all the more important. Firmness when our position is weak will have 
greater effect on western Europe than if it were strong.”404 From June 1948 to September 
1949, the U.S.-British airlift transported more than two million tons of food, coal, and 
other supplies to the city of Berlin.405 To the U.S. public and the Western world, Berlin 
quickly became a Cold War symbol of the struggle between democracy and communism. 
Berlin’s symbolic status in the U.S. national imaginary would be solidified 
permanently by John F. Kennedy’s declaration on June 26, 1963—the fifteenth 
anniversary of the beginning of the Berlin Airlift—that he, too, was a Berliner. But the 
president saw Berlin has critical to U.S. Cold War foreign policy even as a U.S. senator 
and presidential candidate. During a March 1960 campaign stop in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, then-Senator John F. Kennedy delivered a speech entitled, “Our Stake in 
Berlin.” In this speech, Kennedy articulated West Berlin’s importance to the United 
States, noting particularly its physical proximity to Soviet-controlled East Germany, the 
rest of Eastern Europe, and the USSR. He described West Berlin was “a small island of 
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free men in the midst of communist territory,” one sustained by “the courage and vitality 
of its people” and “reinforced by our own determination that Berlin shall—and must—
remain free.”406 Moreover, Kennedy argued,  
the spirit of a free city in the midst of despotism and alien rule . . . [serves] as a 
beacon to inspire all the enslaved countries of Eastern Europe with the hope of 
eventual freedom. And Berlin is more than a symbol of personal liberty. It is a 
living contradiction of the Soviet dogma that only a communist society can bring 
material prosperity.407  
Later on in the speech, Kennedy reasserted West Berlin’s status as a symbol during the 
Cold War struggle between democracy and communism. “Berlin is important as a 
symbol—as perhaps the chief symbol of the free world’s determination not to yield to 
Russian threats and Russian pressure.” But Kennedy did not stop there; instead, he linked 
U.S. interests to Berlin’s fate, arguing that “[t]he protection of the freedom of Berlin is 
the surest protection of our own freedom.” In fact, he said, for much of the world Berlin 
was “the touchstone of American determination—the measure of our dedication to 
freedom. It is this belief which makes the cause of Berlin the cause of free men 
everywhere.”408 It is significant that from the very beginning, Kennedy described West 
Berlin as a living, breathing representation of the ideological clash between U.S. 
democracy and Soviet communism. In language rife with spatial metaphors, the 
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presidential candidate set forth the city as a metaphorical and literal commonplace—a 
“touchstone of American determination” that was both material and symbolic. 
Just over a year later, as the White House prepared for the new president’s trip to 
Europe to meet with French president Charles de Gaulle and Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev in June 1961, National Security Council consultant Henry Kissinger 
suggested that Kennedy should consider a personal visit to West Berlin before or after his 
meeting in Paris with de Gaulle.409 In a memo to the president dated April 5, 1961, 
Kissinger suggested that the physical presence of the president in West Berlin would 
have an important persuasive effect. “One of the difficulties is how we can bring home to 
the Soviets our determination to maintain our rights in Berlin,” he wrote. “Words may not 
be enough. Representatives may be ignored. . . . Thus it may be worthwhile to consider 
whether it may not be wise to stake the President’s prestige deliberately to the freedom of 
Berlin. The forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle may provide such an opportunity.” 
The advantages of such a visit, Kissinger noted, were “obvious: (1) It would signify as 
nothing else our commitment to the freedom of Berlin. (2) It would be a tremendous 
boost for the morale of the population of Berlin. (3) It would make a profound impact in 
public opinion in the Federal Republic.”410 Kissinger’s memo emphasized that because 
“[w]ords alone may not be enough,” physically going to Berlin would “signify as nothing 
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else” the United States’ commitment to the city. Although the president would not go to 
West Berlin until two years later, the physical presence of U.S. officials in the city 
quickly became a key rhetorical strategy in the months that followed. 
As much as Berlin symbolized U.S. commitment to protecting and defending 
democracy during the Cold War, it was also the issue over which Kennedy and 
Khrushchev came to verbal blows at the Vienna Summit. In June 1961, the U.S. president 
and the Soviet premier met to discuss a variety of subjects related to U.S.-Soviet 
relations, including Cuba, Laos, a ban on nuclear testing, and German reunification.411 
But it was the issue of Berlin that caused the greatest disagreement between the two 
leaders, a rift that would continue throughout the summer of 1961 and led to 
Khrushchev’s order to build the Berlin Wall in August. Reemphasizing demands he first 
made in 1958, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he intended to sign a peace treaty with East 
Germany that would permanently establish the division between East and West Germany 
and cut off all Western access to areas inside the East German zone—including the city 
of West Berlin.412 When Kennedy stated emphatically that the United States would not 
abandon its commitment to West Berlin and denounced Khrushchev’s attempt to “disturb 
the balance of power” in Europe, Khrushchev was incensed.413 In their final meeting, the 
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president attempted to smooth things over by telling Khrushchev that he “would not 
present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest”—the United 
States’ long-standing commitment to Berlin—and again emphasized “the difference 
between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin.”414 The Soviet leader replied 
that if the United States maintained its right of access to West Berlin following the signed 
peace treaty (thus violating East German borders), “force would be met by force.”415 
Kennedy responded by telling Khrushchev that his statements left him no other option 
but to tell British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that the Soviet Union gave him a 
choice between “accepting the Soviet action on Berlin or having a face-to-face 
confrontation.”416 Khrushchev then put the option in Kennedy’s hands: “I want peace,” 
he said, slamming his hand down on the table. “But if you want war, that is your 
problem.” The meeting ended with Khrushchev telling Kennedy, “War will take place 
only if the U.S. imposes it on the U.S.S.R. It is up to the U.S. to decide whether there will 
be war or peace.”417  
Suddenly, Berlin was no longer just a political problem; it was personal. Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk later wrote that “Kennedy was very upset” and “wasn’t prepared for 
the brutality of Khrushchev’s presentation. . . . Khrushchev was trying to act like a bully 
to this young President of the United States.”418 By Kennedy’s own assessment, the 
Soviet premier “just beat the hell out of me. . . . I’ve got a terrible problem. If he thinks 
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I’m inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove those ideas we won’t get anywhere 
with him. So we have to act.”419 The Soviets gave the U.S. delegation an aide-memoire 
that demanded a German settlement within six months. The Berlin Crisis had begun.420  
On July 25, Kennedy delivered a televised address to an audience of 50 million 
viewers to outline the official U.S. policy on West Berlin.421 The president had delivered 
earlier reports to the U.S. public on his meeting with Khrushchev in a June 6 televised 
speech422 and a June 28 press conference423, but this speech was designed, in the words of 
speechwriter Ted Sorenson, to “explain the nature of the Berlin issue, our rights, 
obligations and objectives from which we will not back down an inch” and “make clear 
our intent to defend Berlin at all costs.”424 In the address, Kennedy summarized the 
developments since his return from meeting with Khrushchev and reiterated Berlin’s 
importance to U.S. foreign policy. The Soviet premier’s intention to sign a treaty with the 
East German government and dissolve previous Allied agreements over the governance 
of Berlin would “end, through a stroke of a pen, first our legal rights to be in West 
Berlin—and secondly our ability to make good on our commitment to the two million 
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free people of that city. That we cannot permit.” Although the “immediate threat to free 
men is in West Berlin,” Kennedy argued that “that isolated outpost is not an isolated 
problem. . . . We face a challenge in our own hemisphere, and indeed wherever else the 
freedom of human beings is at stake.”425 The Soviet challenge to U.S. rights in West 
Berlin was not limited to the German capital. Instead, it represented a physical and 
metaphorical outpost of freedom surrounded by totalitarianism. 
The president then referred his audience to a map of divided Germany and the 
physical placement of Berlin within the East German zone so that they could visualize the 
geopolitical situation. “This map makes very [clear] the problem that we face,” he said. 
After orienting his audience to the map and what it represented, the president quickly 
explained the significance of West Berlin to his audience: 
For West Berlin lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by 
Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a 
showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even 
more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, 
an escape hatch for refugees. West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now 
become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will, a 
focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 
1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.426 
In this passage, the president described the city in language that was both literal and 
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symbolic. West Berlin was situated physically “inside East Germany,” encircled by 
Soviet troops, and a place where East Germans could find freedom from communist rule. 
But it was also a “showcase of liberty,” a “symbol,” “an island of freedom in a 
communist sea,” “a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain,” and “the great testing place 
of Western courage and will.” These characterizations of West Berlin reinforced the 
city’s status as a geographic location behind enemy lines and a metaphorical 
representation of the ideological war being waged between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
The president then outlined the specific steps he intended to take, which included 
an increase in defense spending, active duty military personnel in West Berlin and overall 
reserves, and the retention of tanks, airplanes, and ships scheduled for retirement. 
Kennedy noted that these actions would require national sacrifice, acknowledging that 
“many American families will bear the burden of these requests,” but the president 
reminded his audience that “these are the burdens which must be borne if freedom is to 
be defended—Americans have willingly borne them before—and they will not flinch 
from the task now.” He also directly refuted Khrushchev’s charge that the United States 
would decide if there would be war or peace, putting the blame squarely on the Soviet 
Union: “The source of world trouble and tension is Moscow, not Berlin. And if war 
begins, it will have begun in Moscow and not Berlin.” To conclude, the president 
reemphasized West Berlin’s symbolic significance to the United States during the Cold 
War, pledging that “[t]he solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace 
will not be broken in time of danger. If we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where 
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will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved in 
collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing.” Again, the president 
described West Berlin as the testing ground for U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet 
Union. In his view, what happened in West Berlin would determine the fate of all other 
nations seeking freedom. “To sum it all up,” Kennedy said, “we seek peace—but we shall 
not surrender.”427 
The speech was hailed by the West and sharply criticized by the Soviet Union. 
Over seventy percent of U.S. respondents polled said they were willing to go to war to 
protect West Berlin.428 The day after the address, West German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer wrote to Kennedy, thanking him for his July 25 speech. “It is good to know 
that in times such as these the United States assume the leadership in the NATO alliance, 
in the conflict between the free world and the Communist world.”429 According to U.S. 
diplomat John McCloy, who met with Khrushchev just after the president’s address, the 
Soviet premier said that the United States had just declared “preliminary war” on the 
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Soviet Union.430 In McCloy’s estimation, the situation was “not yet ripe for any 
negotiation proffers by us but too dangerous to permit it to drift into a condition where 
cramped time could well lead to unfortunate action.”431 Khrushchev later wrote to 
Kennedy that his speech was “belligerent.”432 In their analysis of Kennedy’s July 25 
speech, Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos suggest, “The July 25 address 
was successful in convincing Khrushchev of Kennedy's willingness to employ the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal in defense of Berlin, but the cost was a dramatic increase in superpower 
tensions and an avowed policy of escalation.” In fact, they argue that “[a]lthough 
Khrushchev bridled over the tough talk, his chief response was to authorize the 
construction of the Berlin Wall.”433 
Just after midnight on August 13, 1961, the Soviet Union closed the border 
between West and East Berlin. Later that morning, East German soldiers drilled holes for 
concrete pillars and strung barbed wire across the border. The Berlin Wall began to take 
shape, physically dividing the city.434 Kennedy confidante Ken O’Donnell later wrote 
that the president saw the wall 
as the turning point that would lead to the end of the Berlin crisis. He said to me, 
“Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin? 
There wouldn’t be any need of a wall if he occupied the whole city. This is his 
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way out of his predicament. It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a 
lot better than a war.”435 
But for eight days after the wall went up, Kennedy said not a word about Berlin in 
public.436 On August 16, three days after the wall went up, 300,000 West Berliners 
protested in front of the City Hall of West Berlin holding signs that read “Betrayed by the 
West” and “The West is Doing a Second Munich.”437 Willy Brandt, the current mayor of 
West Berlin who would become chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969, 
addressed the angry crowd and acknowledged their frustration. “Without them [the 
Americans], the tanks would have rolled on . . . [But] Berlin expects more than words. It 
expects political action.”438 
The president dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and General Lucius 
Clay—the beloved U.S. commander of the Berlin airlift twelve years earlier—to West 
Berlin as his envoys. In remarks at the Tempelhof Airport just after his arrival on August 
19, Johnson hailed West Berlin as a “fortress of the free” and “home of the brave,” 
clearly echoing the famous words from the United States’ national anthem.439 Later that 
afternoon, in an address to the West German Parliament, Johnson said, “To the survival 
and to the creative future of this city we Americans have pledged, in effect, what our 
ancestors pledged in forming the United States: ‘Our lives, our fortunes and our sacred 
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honor.’”440 But according to New York Times correspondent Syndey Gruson, “[t]he Vice 
President said nothing essentially new. That did not seem to matter. The West Berliners 
wanted the words said at this time in their city and, above all, they wanted his presence as 
a tangible expression of the link that sustains them.”441 West German mayor Willy Brandt 
echoed similar sentiments years later, writing, “The fact that the vice president was there 
in West Berlin . . . was a most effective way of counteracting this feeling of uncertainty 
which was spreading during these days following August 13.”442 
Over the coming months, the Kennedy Administration continued to support West 
Berlin publically, sending U.S. troops to stand guard at the West Berlin border and 
“Checkpoint Charlie.” In February 1962, Kennedy’s brother and attorney general Robert 
Kennedy traveled to West Berlin with his wife, Ethel. He spoke to a crowd of 150,000 
gathered in front of City Hall; another 100,000 lined the streets to greet him.443 In his 
speech, the attorney general stated that the U.S. public identified with West Berliners as 
family. “You are our brothers,” he said, and equated a military attack on West Berlin with 
one on American soil.444 “[A]n attack on West Berlin is an attack on Chicago, New York, 
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Paris, London,” he said, a statement which reportedly garnered the loudest cheers from 
the crowd.445 The New York Times explained that RFK’s “visit was a symbol of the 
United States’ commitment to West Berlin, an especially powerful symbol because he is 
the President’s brother. Such symbols are important to the West Berliners in their mood 
of apprehension about the Communist threat.”446 For West Berliners (and the watching 
world), the physical presence of U.S. officials in the besieged city offered physical proof 
of the United States’ commitment to defending West Berlin from the threat of 
communism. This commitment, however, was crystalized by President Kennedy’s visit to 
West Berlin on June 26, 1963. 
 
“To See and Be Seen”: Planning Kennedy’s Trip to West Berlin 
Although the White House announced President Kennedy’s trip to Germany at the 
beginning of 1963, the president’s visit to West Berlin was not on the official itinerary. In 
fact, whether or not Kennedy would go to Berlin generated much discussion and debate 
within the administration, and these internal dialogues provide important insights into 
how and why the president and his staff ultimately decided that a visit to West Berlin was 
an important foreign policy move. These exchanges also underscore Berlin’s symbolic 
status as a bastion of democracy during the Cold War and demonstrate the persuasive 
power of presidential presence in place. Ultimately, Kennedy’s visit to West Germany—
                                                                                                                                            
But nothing will be able to prevent us from continuing to build up West Berlin economically and culturally. 
I know from my talks with the Attorney General that in these spheres too we can depend on the 
understanding and help of our American friends.” Konrad Adenauer to John F. Kennedy, February 23, 
1962 (rec’d 4/11/62), found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, 
Countries, Germany: General, 1962: January-April, accessed February 2016, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-116b-009.aspx. 
445 Robert F. Kennedy as quoted in "Berlin Salutes Robert Kennedy: He Vows Support." 
446 "Berlin Salutes Robert Kennedy: He Vows Support." 
  210 
and particularly Berlin—was designed to “give the President an opportunity to see—and 
be seen by—as many Germans as possible.”447 
 
The Question: To Go or Not to Go 	
In January, the U.S. State Department hinted through back channels that the 
president would welcome an invitation to visit the Federal Republic of Germany later that 
year. This visit, officials noted, would correspond with Kennedy’s trip to Rome to meet 
with the Pope. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer quickly issued an official invitation to 
President Kennedy on January 18, telling the president that “it would constitute an honor 
and a very great pleasure, indeed, to welcome you, the President of the leading power of 
the free world.”448 Kennedy replied the next day, telling the chancellor that he was 
“delighted to have this opportunity to go to Germany and look forward to the opportunity 
it will give me for further personal exchanges with you. . . . I will be in touch again as 
plans for my trip to Bonn and Rome further crystallize.”449 The White House announced 
Kennedy’s intention to visit West Germany immediately, and the New York Times 
reported that U.S. officials in Washington expected West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt to 
invite the president to visit the city soon after hearing the announcement. “With the 
situation in Berlin now quiet, most sources here felt that Mr. Kennedy would accept such 
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an invitation, even only for a visit of a few hours,” correspondent Max Frankel noted.450 
But the question was far from decided. 
Just after the White House announced the president’s trip to West Germany, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a telegram to E. Allan Lightner, chief of the U.S. 
Berlin Mission, cautioning that it was “difficult at this time [to] make any definite 
decision” over whether the president would visit the city during his European tour later 
that year.451 Two weeks later, Lightner summarized a personal meeting he had with 
Brandt and also offered his thoughts on a possible presidential visit to the city. A 
Kennedy trip to West Berlin “would have positive effect of underscoring Western 
solidarity re: Berlin and basic Western policy objectives,” Brandt reportedly asserted. 
Both men were careful to note, however, that the relative quiet in West Berlin made it 
difficult to claim “that Berlin morale urgently needed a boost such as President’s visit 
would certainly provide. However, Berliners would be greatly encouraged by, and 
appreciative of, this personal manifestation of President’s support for their cause.” But 
Brandt also cautioned that if the president decided not to visit the city, West Berliners 
would “draw unfavorable comparison with recent Khrushchev visits East Berlin, as well 
as broader and unwarranted political conclusions.”452 Here Lightner emphasized what 
would become a key deciding factor in planning the president’s trip to Europe: how 
Kennedy could counteract Khrushchev’s multiple visits to East Berlin as Soviet premier. 
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This comparison between Khrushchev and Kennedy continued within private 
discussions between U.S. and West German officials and in the West German press. On 
March 5, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, Robert McGill, reported that 
German officials frequently cited personal visits by Khrushchev to East Berlin as 
warranting a response from the West. If the Soviet premier had gone to East Germany 
multiple times, the logic went, shouldn’t the President of the United States make a similar 
symbolic trip? According to McGill’s report, Socialist Democratic Party vice chairman 
Herbert Wehner was emphatic that it was “of utmost importance that [the president] also 
visit Berlin” and  
thought it a mistake to show undue restraint about seeking to influence German 
policy in the Atlantic-Community sense. Khrushchev had used his visit to Pankow 
in an open attempt to influence German policy. De Gaulle’s tour of Germany had 
been used to influence German policy. The President, in Wehner’s opinion, 
should present himself to the Germans as the leader of the nation wielding the real 
power in the Alliance. It should be demonstrated “who is cook and who is waiter” 
(wer ist Koch und wer ist Kellner).453 
According to this report, Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin would not only offer a symbolic 
rebuttal to Khrushchev’s multiple visits to East Berlin; it would affirm his leadership role 
in the Western Alliance and remind West Germans (and the rest of the world) that the 
United States was committed to a free Berlin. 
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On March 6, however, these internal debates became the subject of public 
discussion when the New York Times published an article stating that Kennedy had told 
West German officials that he would not visit Berlin after all. “Officials here believe that 
President Kennedy’s decision to skip Berlin is based on a desire not to make a political 
‘demonstration’ that might needlessly increase tension in that divided city and possibly 
impede constructive discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union,” the 
paper reported.454 This story quickly circulated in the West German press, and Lightner 
sent off a telegram to the Secretary of State a day later, informing him that the “Mission 
intends to say in reply to queries that as far as mission is informed no decision has been 
made on President’s travel plans.”455 Curiously, there is no record of any response from 
the White House or the State Department in the archives, only evidence that U.S. officials 
in Bonn and Berlin were trying to control the story as they waited for an official word 
from Washington. Although one cannot be sure, perhaps the Kennedy Administration 
leaked this report in order to gauge public opinion from the Soviets and the West German 
press. 
Regardless of the original source, the March 6 Times story spurred a flurry of 
editorials in the West German press, snippets of which were quickly forwarded to the 
Secretary of State. According to one report from the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service dated March 14, the German paper Bild Zeitung declared that a visit by President 
Kennedy to Berlin would “demonstrate to the Kremlin that the Americans will act in 
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Berlin with the same determination they showed in Cuba” and even implied that such a 
trip would counteract former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s “flirtation with 
Moscow.” Moreover, the report continued, West Berlin papers warned of  
serious repercussions if the President leaves Berlin out of his itinerary, adding that 
a most convincing argument of US advocates of the Berlin visit is the fact that 
Khrushchev visited East Berlin six times; the last time was in 1963. At that time 
the political situation was calm, given as little attention as today. However, no one 
spoke about provocation in connection with the visit by the Kremlin Chief. . . . Is 
it not understandable that the US president should visit the city for whose freedom 
his country and the West is on guard. The papers ask.”456 
This particular excerpt provides powerful evidence of why Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin 
was so important at this particular moment and perhaps even suggests how this trip 
offered the president not just a foreign policy stop but also a personal vindication after his 
1961 meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. 
After the March 6 story in the New York Times, officials at the State Department 
wrote several memos articulating the foreign policy goals for President Kennedy’s trip to 
the Federal Republic of Germany. In a March 14 memorandum to Bundy, State 
Department official William Brubeck emphasized that the first objective of Kennedy’s 
trip to West Germany “should be to bring about a demonstration of popular support for 
the President personally—a support which exists without question—and for US-German 
relations in the Atlantic framework.” Furthermore, Brubeck stressed: “He must visit 
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Berlin. . . .We should make it clear from the outset that it is the President’s intention to go 
to West Berlin.”457 Six days later, on March 20, L.J. Legere, assistant to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, passed along a State Department memorandum to Bundy’s 
deputy at the NSC, Carl Kaysen. This memo, Legere noted, was “from an office in State 
which will appreciate respect for its anonymity. If you want an official Departmental 
position, signed Rusk, I have a suspicion you will wait quite a while for a waffle.” 
However, Legere told Kaysen that, regardless of the source, this one-pager offered “some 
argumentation in support of the strongly recommended Berlin visit.”458 
Entitled “Reasons Why President Should Visit Berlin,” the memo listed eleven 
bullet points in support of a presidential trip to the German capital. The “[b]est reason” 
for a visit, the memo began, was articulated by West German mayor Willy Brandt in a 
letter to President Kennedy on March 12: “[Y]our visit to outpost of freedom would 
become demonstration of unity of Western community that could not be overlooked 
anywhere in world. Joint welcome by three Western garrisons in addition to certain 
turnout of entire population would also help make quite clear that when facing common 
dangers, Western interdependence is fact there.” This first (and best) reason emphasized 
by the State Department would become an overarching theme for Kennedy’s entire visit: 
reaffirm the United States’ support for West Berlin. The State Department memorandum 
also noted that Kennedy’s visit to the city would provide “a tremendous boost to morale 
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of West Berliners as well as to East Berliners and East and West Germans.” This 
emphasis on boosting public morale went beyond a simple foreign policy statement; by 
going to West Berlin personally, the president would offer tangible proof of his own 
commitment to the city—and those who desperately wished to be free. The confidential 
document also emphasized Khrushchev’s frequent trips to East Berlin as impetus for 
Kennedy’s own presence in the city:  
Khrushchev has visited East Berlin several times, as recently as January. No US 
President has visited Berlin since Truman went to Potsdam. This makes it appear 
that Soviets are much more interested in Berlin than is US. As Marguerite Higgins 
[a longtime foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune] said, “If 
Kennedy does not show his face in the free part of Berlin after Khrushchev had 
himself praised in the enslaved part of Berlin – what will the world, and 
particularly the Kremlin, think of Western determination.”459  
This last point not only emphasized the president’s visit to West Berlin as a symbolic 
countermove to Khrushchev’s multiple stops in East Berlin, but it also suggested that 
Kennedy’s reputation as a world leader was at stake. To a president who was humiliated 
over the Berlin question less than two years earlier, a visit to West Berlin offered a 
chance to reinstate his foreign policy credentials and prove to West Berliners, the U.S. 
public, and the rest of the world who was boss. 
The very next day, on March 21 in a presidential press conference, a reporter 
asked Kennedy if he would visit Berlin on his upcoming trip to Europe. “I would hope 
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that when I go to Germany that I would go to Berlin,” the president responded.460 Perhaps 
the timing was coincidental; perhaps not. But the West German response was immediate. 
The U.S. Embassy in Bonn sent a telegram to Rusk noting that West German news 
“[r]eports that President Kennedy would visit Berlin during forthcoming European tour 
received top attention [in] many Friday papers. . . . Reports stated visit would be greeted 
with ‘enthusiasm’ because Berliners feel President is strongest defender of their 
independence, and that personal observation will strengthen his conviction that 
compromises should not be considered in Berlin negotiations.”461 With the public now 
aware of the president’s decision to visit West Berlin, the White House started planning 
Kennedy’s tour of the city in earnest. 
 
The Symbolic Goals for Kennedy’s Visit to West Berlin 	
The archives reveal three predominant goals for Kennedy’s visit to Berlin: (1) 
reaffirm U.S. commitment to maintaining and defending a free West Berlin; (2) offer a 
psychological boost to West Berliners and even those East Germans living on the other 
side of the wall; and (3) demonstrate Kennedy’s status as world leader and use his 
physical presence in West Berlin as a symbolic antidote to Khrushchev’s frequent visits 
to East Germany. These goals reveal the rhetorical potential of presidential presence in 
place and demonstrate how the White House saw Kennedy’s trip as distinctly rhetorical 
move. 
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The first goal of Kennedy’s visit was to reassure West Berliners (and the rest of 
the world) that the United States was committed to defending their city from Soviet 
encroachment, and U.S. officials saw the president’s physical presence in the city as a 
powerful testament to this fact. As the White House and State Department considered 
whether or not Kennedy would travel to West Berlin, Edward R. Murrow, the director of 
the United States Information Agency (USIA), expressed his belief that the president 
should wait to travel to West Berlin. “The time may come when a Presidential visit will 
be necessary to sustain morale in Berlin or underscore our negotiating position,” Murrow 
wrote to Bundy. “We should hold this weapon in reserve until we need it.”462 This 
observation—from the United States’ propaganda chief—is particularly insightful, for it 
emphasizes the persuasive power the White House attributed to the president’s presence 
in place. Four months later, Murrow’s deputy Thomas C. Sorenson (the brother of 
Kennedy speechwriter Ted Sorenson) wrote that the goal of the president’s trip was “[t]o 
foster a better and more sympathetic understanding of U.S. policy regarding Europe. It 
needs to be done now; the President is the only one who can do it, and he can do it more 
effectively in Europe than here.”463 Although the president had sent the Vice President 
and the Attorney General to West Berlin in 1961 and 1962, nothing could replace the 
symbolic power of Kennedy’s own visit to the besieged city. In the final days leading up 
to the president’s European tour, State Department official George R. Ball reminded 
                                                
462 Memorandum, Edward R. Morrow to McGeorge Bundy, February 13, 1963, National Security Files, 
Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 
of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 
463 Thomas C. Sorenson to McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum on Reasons for the President’s Trip to 
Europe,” June 14, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President’s Trip: 
Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (2 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 
  219 
Kennedy in a personal memo, “We should never forget that the United States is the leader 
of the Atlantic world and that the great mass of Europeans look to America—and 
specifically to you, as President—for guidance and direction.” Ball told Kennedy that he 
should make “a special effort” to identify with the German people because they were 
“closest to the firing line. Berlin is a Soviet hostage, and the German people know that 
their only defense is the American strength and commitment.”464 
A second major goal for Kennedy’s visit to the city was to provide the president 
with a “representative impression of the Berlin setting and spirit” and use his physical 
presence in place to provide a “psychological lift” to West Berliners.465 The U.S. Berlin 
Mission and the White House structured the president’s day around events that would 
enable the largest number of people to see him in the flesh. One State Department official 
noted that “it would be desirable for him to spend as much of the day as possible driving 
around West Berlin by automobile in order to be seen by the maximum number of West 
Berliners throughout the city and to see for himself the actual situation in West Berlin, 
including of course the Wall.”466 In a telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk dated 
May 1, the U.S. Berlin Mission underscored the symbolic aspects of Kennedy’s trip both 
for West Berlin citizens and the rest of the watching world: 
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While US-Berlin solidarity [is] already well known, its reaffirmation in 
impressive and personalized form on June 26 seems likely to produce 
advantageous political impression internationally and to give Berliners themselves 
helpful (albeit at moment not essential) psychological lift. Therefore, we 
especially interested in maximum (preferably record) public attendance. While 
there little doubt Berliners will wish turn out in record numbers to see, hear and 
cheer president, it necessary [that a] program be arranged to make it possible for 
them to do so.467 
Kennedy’s physical presence in Berlin would reaffirm his commitment to the city—and 
all it symbolized—in a particularly “impressive and personal form,” one that the U.S. 
Berlin Mission hoped would boost public morale and provide a “psychological lift.” 
What no one could have anticipated, however, was that the president’s “Ich bin ein 
Berliner” declaration would accomplish this better than any public rally or planned event. 
Finally, Kennedy’s trip offered the opportunity to create a symbolic antidote to 
Khrushchev’s many visits to East Berlin and, more importantly, a chance for the 
president to reassert himself as the leader of the Western alliance. The U.S. Berlin 
Mission emphasized the “Symbolic and Qualitative Aspects” of the president’s trip, 
noting, “Careful attention should be given certain qualitative aspects of President’s 
Program, such as appearances at important symbolic sites and participation in significant 
representative actions.”468 Chief among these “sites” would be Kennedy’s visit to the 
Berlin Wall. During the White House advance trip in May, West Berlin mayor Willy 
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Brandt expressed his opposition to a presidential stop because he felt it underscored 
Ulbricht’s victory over West Berlin. But White House officials overruled him, stating that  
from public relations viewpoint in US, it [is] necessary [that the] president visit 
Checkpoint Charlie. This site has been and could become again focal point of 
direct confrontation between Soviet and US forces requiring important decisions 
by [the] President. Failure of President [to] visit checkpoint could elicit criticism 
from American correspondents detrimental to objective of achieving maximum 
worldwide impact of presidential visit.469 
The White House’s insistence that Kennedy stop at Checkpoint Charlie suggests that they 
saw the president’s presence in this particular location—and the visual images of him at 
the East-West border—as an important part of his visit. Moreover, the archives suggest 
that the Kennedy Administration was attuned to what Khrushchev had done during his 
own visits to East Berlin. If the Soviet premier made the border crossing a stop on his 
itinerary, so too would the president. 
These three rhetorical goals were further emphasized in the official briefing book 
prepared for White House staff prior to the trip. In an introductory memo for the German 
portion of the trip, the narrative argued that although “officially labeled an ‘informal 
working visit’, the President’s trip to West Germany and Berlin will have many of the 
trappings of a state visit and can be expected to attract more public attention and interest 
than any previous visit by a foreign statesman to modern Germany.” The memorandum 
noted that this would be first visit of a U.S. president to Berlin since 1945 and only the 
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third presidential tour of post-war Germany. Additionally, Kennedy’s visit came “at a 
time of change and flux in Western Europe when the role and influence of the American 
President have acquired added significance in German eyes.” According to the official 
White House briefing book, the “broad objectives” for Kennedy’s trip to Germany 
included “furnish[ing] tangible evidence of American good will toward the German 
people,” “underscor[ing] our abiding interest in the welfare, stability and freedom of 
Germany as an integral part of Europe and the Western community,” and “provid[ing] 
graphic emphasis to the continuing American presence in and responsibility for Europe.” 
Moreover, the memorandum stressed the goal of “emphasiz[ing] for the benefit of all 
Germans—both West and East—our continued recognition of the importance of Berlin, 
and our determination to defend and maintain our position there.”470 One way the White 
House planned to communicate these goals was through Kennedy’s rhetoric in West 
Berlin. 
 
The Evolution of Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” Address 	
As the White House worked with the U.S. Berlin Mission to coordinate every 
detail of Kennedy’s stop in West Berlin, the president’s public statements in the city were 
of utmost importance. Of the three major speeches Kennedy would deliver in Berlin on 
June 26, his address outside the West Berlin’s City Hall was intended to reach the largest 
audience. Because U.S. officials wanted to ensure “maximum (preferably record) public 
attendance,”471 they selected this particular spot because it could hold 300,000 people and 
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offered the best location for what the West German government would describe as a 
“public rally.”472 
The goals for President Kennedy’s public statements on June 26 aligned with the 
overall aims of his trip to West Berlin: reaffirm U.S. commitment to West Berlin, boost 
public morale, and underscore Kennedy’s leadership of the Western Alliance. In a May 3 
memorandum, USIA official Morrill Cody noted that a statement by the president “on 
German soil” would be particularly persuasive in reaffirming the United States’ 
leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and “underlin[ing] the sacrifices made by the United 
States for Germany and our other European partners.” Because Germans “continue to feel 
the need for acceptance by their erstwhile enemies and present-day allies” just eighteen 
years after the end of World War II, the memo recommended that the president “should 
welcome the Germans fully into the camp of civilized peoples defending freedom.”473 
West German officials also emphasized that Kennedy’s speech should acknowledge the 
East German citizens living on the other side of the Wall. As one German foreign 
minister told Dean Rusk in a personal meeting in May, the president  
should keep in mind the effect of the President’s words both in West Berlin and in 
the Soviet Zone of Germany. The population in the Soviet Zone will listen very 
attentively and would feel left out if nothing were said by the President significant 
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to their situation. The lines do not have to be too pointed; the people in East 
Germany can read between them.474 
In his speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy would express his personal 
sympathies for the German people on both sides of the Berlin Wall, making specific 
references to the difficulty of “their situation” and pledging his continued support to a 
free West Berlin and the eventual reunification of Germany.  
The U.S. Mission Berlin contributed the first draft for Kennedy’s speech outside 
West Berlin’s City Hall (Rathaus Schöeneberg). Although most of these remarks would 
be rewritten by White House speechwriter Ted Sorenson (and then scrapped by the 
President himself at the actual event), they did set the tone for Kennedy’s approach on 
June 26. Of particular note is their emphasis on Berlin’s symbolic status during the Cold 
War. “The name Berlin has unique significance for Americans and evokes strong and 
vivid associations,” the draft began. “Fate seems to have chosen this city to become in 
many ways a mirror and symbol of our world today, a microcosm reflecting its hopes and 
fears, its progress and its problems, its unity as well as its division.” However, what made 
Berlin “a synonym for the indomitable courage of free men” was its people: “Your stand, 
your accomplishments, and the important role you continue to pay in the persistent quest 
for German reunification in peace and freedom have made you an inspiration to the 
American people and to free men everywhere.”475 
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Kennedy advisor and speechwriter Ted Sorenson took these remarks and crafted 
the president’s speeches for Europe—including Kennedy’s remarks at the Rudolph Wilde 
Platz on June 26 in West Berlin. Sorenson drafted a fine speech—an emotional, stirring 
address that cited historical milestones such as the Berlin Airlift and the 1961 Berlin 
Crisis to remind the audience why West Berlin was so important to the United States. 
Kennedy would also praise the courage of West Berliners, telling that while the “story of 
West Berlin is many stories – valor, danger, honor, determination, unity, and hardship,” it 
was, “above all . . . the story of achievement.” The president would continue, 
From a ruin of rubble you have made a glowing center of free life. This thriving 
city is a major asset to the west – it is the greatest industrial city in all of 
Germany. And it is the future capital of Germany reunited. Meanwhile it is 
protected by our forces – and as long as your freedom requires it, those forces will 
remain. West Berlin is free, and it will stay free. 
Kennedy would go on to acknowledge that “today life in Berlin is hard. It takes courage 
and endurance – on both sides of the Wall. Here in West Berlin, it is not easy to live 
under the shadow of harassment and threat, surrounded by a hostile regime, often cut off 
by the Wall from family and friends.” He would describe the Wall as “not only a political 
problem” but “a human problem” separating family and friends, calling it “not only an 
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offense against history,” but “an offense against humanity.” Then, in what would be 
perhaps his most direct challenge to the Soviet Union, he would predict: “And sooner or 
later it will come down”—a statement that would gesture toward the reunification of 
Germany apart from communist rule. To conclude, the president would reassure West 
Berliners: “You are not merely the object of our admiration – you are partners in the 
common purpose. . . . and I tell you once again that your liberty is ours, and your defense 
our own.”476 These remarks composed by Sorenson constitute the final draft of 
Kennedy’s speech to be delivered on June 26. 
Five days before the president left for Europe, however, he met with his 
interpreter for the trip, Robert H. Lochner, Margaret Plischke, a language instructor at the 
State Department, and McGeorge Bundy.477 It was during this June 18 meeting that 
Kennedy and Bundy brainstormed several phrases for his arrival speech in Berlin and his 
remarks at the Rudolph Wilde Platz. According to Plischke’s account, Kennedy added the 
phrase “I am a Berliner” himself and they met several times to practice the German 
together.478 The Kennedy archives contain just one document referencing this meeting, 
but one that proves that the president’s declaration of “Ich bin ein Berliner” was not 
hastily written up just hours before the speech or delivered extemporaneously. A typed 
                                                
476 Speech Cards, “Remarks at the Berlin Rathaus, June 26,” Papers of John F. Kennedy, President's Office 
Files, Speech Files, Remarks on signing the Golden Book, Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, 26 June 1963, 
accessed January 2016, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-045-026.aspx. 
477 Meeting recorded in the president’s daily schedule for June 18, 1963, Evelyn Lincoln Personal Papers, 
Schedules and Diaries, 1953-1963, Folder: President’s appointments, June 1963, accessed February 2016, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/ELPP-006-007.aspx. See also Daum, Kennedy in Berlin, 
149-151. 
478 For a complete account of Plischke’s meetings with Kennedy, see Margaret H. Plischke, "Teaching the 
Berliner," American Heritage 48, no. 4 (1997): 26-27. According to Daum, Plischke kept the original 
document with Kennedy’s handwritten notation and put it up for sale in January 1978. The West Berlin 
Senate bought it for $8,000, and it remains at the city archives in Berlin, Germany. See Daum, Kennedy in 
Berlin, 151 and notes 160 and 162. 
  227 
document entitled “Berlin” features German phonetic spelling of the following sentences 
in English: “I am proud to be in free Berlin, the city which is a shining symbol, not only 
for Europe but for the whole world. Your courage and your perseverance have made the 
words ‘I am a Berliner’ a proud declaration.” Below the side-by-side translations in 
German and English, the secretarial note reads: “These translations are somewhat literal. 
The German is a very good free translation of what the President wrote on Tuesday, June 
18.”479 Because a copy of this document is found both in the President’s Office Files 
(collected by Evelyn Lincoln, the president’s personal secretary) and the National 
Security Files at the Kennedy Library, it is likely that Mrs. Lincoln typed up the 
handwritten notations after the meeting and sent a copy to Bundy’s office. However, 
these lines never made it into the notecards prepared for the president to use in Berlin. 
This omission explains why numerous White House officials report that Kennedy 
wrote out “Civis Romanus sum [I am a citizen of Rome],” “Ich bin ein Berliner [I am a 
citizen of Berlin],” and “Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen [Let them come to Berlin]” on his 
notecards on the flight from Bonn to Berlin on the morning of June 26. More than likely, 
the president reviewed his prepared remarks and, noticing that they did not contain the 
phrases he and Bundy had written on June 18, decided to write them out himself.480 
“When we were arriving in Berlin,” White House advisor Ken O’Donnell later recalled, 
“he said to me, ‘What was the proud boast of the Romans—Civis Romanus sum? Send 
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Bundy up here. He'll know how to say it in German.’ When Bundy translated the phrase 
into ‘Ich bin ein Berliner,’ the President said, as he wrote it down, ‘Now tell me how to 
say in German, “Let them come to Berlin.”’”481 It makes sense that the president would 
have asked specifically for Bundy, since he was familiar with the June 18 exchange. West 
Berlin mayor Willy Brandt also recalled practicing the phrase with Kennedy just before 
his speech: “My own contribution to the speech was that before he went out—he was at 
my office of the city hall—he tried to get a reasonable pronunciation of the sentence, ‘Ich 
bin ein Berliner.’ Well, it was a moving thing. And he worked hard at it, at the 
pronunciation.”482 
As these archival materials and firsthand accounts demonstrate, the president 
played a crucial role in the development of this speech and personally supplied the “Ich 
bin ein Berliner” declaration. Charting the evolution of this speech from the U.S. Berlin 
Mission’s initial draft, Sorenson’s rewrite, and Kennedy’s own edits reveals the 
important role this speech would play in the White House’s overall goals for the trip. 
Moreover, the president’s description of West Berlin as a “shining symbol” and his 
personal identification with Berliners showcases how the city and its people offered a 
potent rhetorical resource. In his remarks, the president would identify himself with the 
Berliners—and all that the city symbolized—even as he held up Berlin as proof of the 
failures of communism. The place of Kennedy’s speech, therefore, was more than a 
simple backdrop or geographical location; it was a symbolic and literal commonplace of 
evidence, a material means of persuasion. 
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Countdown to Europe 	
As the White House and the State Department finalized plans for Kennedy’s trip 
to Europe and his visit to West Berlin on June 26, the president made two important 
decisions that set the stage for his trip. The first took place in public; the second occurred 
behind closed doors. But both had profound implications for how Kennedy’s trip to 
Europe—and specifically his tour of West Berlin—would be interpreted in the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world. 
On June 10, just thirteen days before he left for Europe, the president delivered an 
important foreign policy speech at American University in Washington, D.C. In his 
remarks, the president laid out a bold new vision for U.S.-Soviet relations and called on 
the West to reconsider its Cold War opposition to the Soviet Union.483 Calling for a 
“genuine peace” between the two countries, Kennedy told his audience that the United 
States needed to “reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a Nation” toward 
the Cold War and outlined his intention to pursue a nuclear test-ban treaty.484 According 
to White House advisors Ken O’Donnell and David Powers, Kennedy called the speech 
“the peace speech” because “it was an appeal for a lasting peace between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, directed at Khrushchev, who had hinted that such a new 
message from the President might help to bring a favorable reaction to Kennedy's 
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proposal for a nuclear atmospheric test ban treaty.”485 The American University speech 
“brought an immediate thaw in our relationship with the Soviets,” and suggested a new 
approach to Cold War foreign policy.486 A significant speech in its own right, many 
believed that the American University speech also offered a glimpse into what Kennedy 
would say during his trip to Europe two weeks later. As Carroll Kilpatrick of the New 
York Times noted, Kennedy’s speech “at the American University . . . was designed as a 
curtain-opener to the European visit, where the President will speak directly to the people 
on America’s commitment to Europe and America’s interest in a united Europe, and 
America’s devotion to peace.”487 
As the president discussed the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union at 
American University and prepared for his European tour, some suggested that he should 
cancel his trip to attend to domestic matters: specifically, racial violence in Birmingham, 
Alabama. In his June 4 syndicated column, influential newspaper columnist Walter 
Lippmann argued that Kennedy should cancel his European trip and focus on domestic 
concerns. “It is hard to see how the President can leave the country until this critical 
legislative battle is won,” Lippmann wrote. “For one thing the legislative battle demands 
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his continuous personal attention. For another, he needs to have mastered the crisis in 
American national life before he can speak with self-confidence on the cause of 
democracy in world affairs.”488 The next day, on June 5, the New York Times editorial 
page made a similar point, writing that it was “unfortunate that [the president] will be 
away in Europe at a crucial stage in the mobilization of national opinion in support of a 
strong [federal] program” on civil rights. “The fatefulness of the debate over civil rights 
makes it a critical time to stay” at home, the paper concluded.489 Kennedy delivered a 
televised message to the nation on civil rights on June 11, outlining his plan for federal 
civil rights legislation.490 Privately, however, the president expressed doubts about 
whether he should go ahead with his European tour.  
In a June 12 memorandum, National Security Council member Frederick D. 
Vreeland wrote to Kennedy, “You asked me last night why you should go to Europe—in 
view of the objections expressed by Mr. Lippmann, the N.Y. Times and others—and 
what you can accomplish in Germany.” Vreeland then offered a two-page memorandum 
outlining the negative results of canceling the trip and the positive arguments for going 
ahead with the tour. If the president decided to stay at home, Vreeland noted, the “public 
and governmental reaction in West Berlin and West Germany would be one of shock, 
disbelief and profound disillusionment” and “would deal a gratuitous blow to our 
relations with the Federal Republic from which we could not soon recover.” In fact, the 
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NSC official noted that because Kennedy’s American University speech was so “well 
received throughout Western Europe,” going forward with the visit to Germany would 
reassure West Berliners of U.S. commitment and resolve while also “increas[ing] the 
latitude you have for achieving an East-West détente, or even an acceptable Berlin 
arrangement.” To conclude, Vreeland emphasized the persuasive power of Kennedy’s 
presence in West Berlin:  
By your presence and statements in West Berlin (where you will get an emotional 
welcome such as you have never experienced) you will provide the Berliners with 
the reassurance they require during a period of protracted cold squeeze, such as 
they are now experiencing, even more than during a hot squeeze, when, after all, 
we demonstrate our policy by deeds rather than words.491 
President Kennedy and the White House went forward with trip as planned. As 
New York Times writer Carroll Kilpatrick explained on June 16, the president believed 
canceling the trip would be “abandon[ing] his role as a leader in a most critical time” and 
White House officials “insist[ed] that it is immensely important for the President to speak 
to and be seen by the people of Italy and Germany at this time.”492 Foreign leaders and 
press outlets also noted the foreign policy implications of Kennedy’s personal visit to 
West Berlin. In May, Mayor Willy Brandt stated, “the West will not let itself be pushed 
out of Berlin” a fact that would “be underlined emphatically by President Kennedy’s visit 
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next month.”493 J. Emlyn Williams of the Christian Science Monitor reported that 
Berliners were eagerly anticipating Kennedy’s visit “not only as still further proof of 
American determination to defend the city against possible Communist threats but also of 
a common bond friendship with the West Berliners.”494 Although Kennedy 
Administration officials—like Vice President Johnson and the president’s brother, 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy—had come to West Berlin as the president’s 
special envoys, the Chicago Tribune noted that West Berliners were waiting “to hear 
from his own lips the guarantees his representatives, who have come here since the 
communist border closure two years ago, have given in his name.”495 According to Wall 
Street Journal reporter Phillip Geyelin, “almost everything the president will do has been 
carefully measured for the impression it will give Europeans of him—as a young and 
vigorous alliance leader, eloquent, understanding, knowledgeable, and resolute.” Noting 
that the White House was adamant that Kennedy get an outside seat on the three-hour 
motorcade tour of West Berlin (instead of being “sandwiched between” German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt in the back of a 
Lincoln-Mercury convertible), Geyelin described Kennedy’s European visit as “a 
diplomatic mission which promises to be much more of a political campaign tour.”496 
As officials in West Berlin prepared to showcase Kennedy’s tour of the city, East 
Germans made arrangements to downplay the president’s visit. According to a Central 
Intelligence Agency report from inside East Berlin, building wardens were to monitor 
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their apartment buildings and new jamming stations were installed to combat live radio 
and television coverage of Kennedy across the Berlin Wall. Party organizations, trade 
unions, and youth organizations planned rallies to prevent people from listening to the 
coverage. Finally, the report noted that “[a]n as yet unidentified ‘very high personality’ 
from Moscow (but in no event Khrushchev) is expected to come to East Berlin. The 
presence of this personage and a visit on his part to the wall are designed to counter the 
propaganda effects of the Kennedy visit.”497 
The media coverage of Kennedy’s trip also ensured that his physical presence in 
Europe and West Berlin would reach a national and international audience. The Los 
Angeles Times reported that “[m]uch of Western Europe will see a seven-hour step-by-
step telecast of his motor tour through [West Berlin] as it is beamed within range of more 
than 25 million television receivers in 12 countries.”498 In the United States, the 
president’s trip would be covered by the three television networks (ABC, CBS, and 
NBC) with “at least 22 special reports varying from 15 minutes to an hour.” The New 
York Times wrote that U.S. public could expect “from one to three special TV reports 
daily in evening hours. Picture coverage will be relayed here by the Telestar II and Relay 
communications satellites and televised the day the events occur.”499 The U.S. Berlin 
Mission noted that every possible effort would be made to accommodate the press during 
the president’s visit. Elevated platforms were built so that Kennedy could look into East 
Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate and Checkpoint Charlie—and so that the president would 
                                                
497 Telegram, Unnamed CIA Source to State Department, May 31, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & 
Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (2 of 2 
folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 
498 "Kennedy Off to Spur European Good Will," Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1963. 
499 Val Adams, "22 TV Shows Set on Kennedy Trip," New York Times, June 17, 1963. 
  235 
“be elevated above the crowd for the benefit of photographers and the Berliners.” 
Arrangements were made for a designated pick-up spot where camera crews could bring 
television footage “for immediate shipment to the United States.” U.S. officials in West 
Berlin also made sure that West Berliners—and their East German neighbors—would see 
and hear as much of the president’s visit as possible. Loudspeakers would be set up in the 
Rudolph Wilde Platz to “carry live coverage of the President’s city tour prior to his 
arrival at the City Hall.”500 
In its final press briefing prior to the president’s departure for Europe, the White 
House underscored Kennedy’s status as a foreign policy leader and emphasized the 
persuasive effect of Kennedy’s physical presence would have in Europe and, specifically, 
West Berlin. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told the press that Kennedy’s 
goal was “to visit a number of places that are important in American foreign policy, or 
else of great personal importance to the President.”501 This visit, Bundy explained, would 
provide “a lot of opportunity for the President to speak directly and not simply to the 
people of Germany, but also to Europeans, standing, as he will be, in the center of 
Europe.” Bundy also emphasized Kennedy’s persona as “the spokesman of American 
policy,” noting, “[t]here is a sense in which only he can make clear the purposes and the 
direction of American policy, the continuity of the American commitment in Europe. He 
will be doing that under what seem to us to be favoring and friendly auspices in 
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Germany.”502 Implicit in these remarks was the White House’s understanding that the 
best way for Kennedy to demonstrate U.S. commitment to West Germany (and the 
overall NATO alliance) was to go there physically. 
The press also inquired about the president’s plans to visit West Berlin, and 
Bundy noted that the president’s stop in the city would be “one of the important elements 
of the trip.” He continued,  
I think those of you who have been there would agree that to see and be seen in 
Berlin is something different from most travels, and that there is a real advantage 
to both parties in knowing whom they have to deal with. The President of the 
United States has been the man who is speaking for the country, whose will and 
determination has been essential to the freedom of Berlin for a long time, and the 
courage and spirit of the Berliners has been equally essential to the policy of the 
West. That confrontation will not only be in the immediate sense a dramatic one, 
but I think in the wider sense a useful one to all concerned.503 
Here Bundy stressed the importance of Kennedy “see[ing] and be[ing] seen” in the city of 
West Berlin. His visit would provide the opportunity to interact with West Berliners 
personally and for them to see him in the flesh. One reporter asked specifically about 
Kennedy’s visit to the Berlin wall: “Is there any particular advantage in the President of 
the United States being seen and seeing or peering over the Wall?” Bundy replied, “I 
can’t imagine the President of the United States going to Berlin without looking at the 
                                                
502 “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 2. 
503 “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 7. 
  237 
wall, which is so large and tragic a fact in that city’s current situation.”504 Although 
Bundy could not have anticipated the full events of the June 26 visit, and the emotional 
impact the wall would have on the president, he accurately predicted that the interaction 
between Kennedy and West Berliners would be “a dramatic one”—an exchange that 
would reverberate throughout the entire Western world and one that numerous presidents 
after Kennedy would try to recreate. 
 
June 26, 1963 
The president’s plane arrived at Berlin’s Tegel Airport at 9:45 am local time.505 
After delivering brief remarks to the crowd assembled to welcome him, Kennedy’s 
motorcade departed for a tour of the city. Waving, cheering crowds lined the motorcade 
route, at times ten to twelve persons deep.506 “Thousands of them tried to touch his 
hand,” reported the Chicago Tribune. “He was showered with flowers and confetti.”507 
White House officials later said it was the largest reception Kennedy ever had.508 “More 
than a million West Berliners gave Mr. Kennedy the greatest spontaneous welcome in the 
memory of the former German capital,” summarized the Christian Science Monitor. “The 
Associated Press quoted old-timers as saying that not even Hitler with his famous 
parades, had brought out the people the way the American President did. The screaming, 
cheering, flag-waving, confetti-tossing welcome exceeded the mammoth reception West 
                                                
504 “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 13. 
505  Final European Itinerary, June 21, 1963, 6, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, 
Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
and Museum. 
506 Laurence Burd and Larry Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy," Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1963. 
507 Burd and Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy." 
508 Burd and Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy." 
  238 
German crowds gave Mr. Kennedy earlier this week.”509 According to a Chicago Tribune 
correspondent stationed in East Berlin, “[t]he more the West Berlin crowd cheered, the 
happier were the faces of the crowd in the east.”510 Although East Berliners did not see 
the president personally, they could watch everything on their television screens.511 The 
president made three stops along the motorcade route before arriving at West Berlin’s 
City Hall. The motorcade first stopped at Congress Hall where Kennedy delivered brief 
remarks to the Trade Union Congress. 
The president then departed for two symbolic stops at various places along the 
Berlin Wall. The first was at the Brandenburg Gate (Brandenburger Tor), a neoclassical 
triumphal arch built on the site of a former city gate in 1791 and “a crossing point 
between East and West Berlin before the Wall went up.” Communist officials draped the 
arches with red cloth and an East German flag “so the President could not see the once 
famed Unter Den Linden boulevard beyond the gate.”512 From a raised platform built 
especially for his visit, Kennedy looked over the Wall into East Berlin and was handed a 
bouquet of flowers thrown over the wall with a note asking that it be given to the 
president.513 As a British military officer oriented him to the scene, Kennedy “looked up 
from the map several times at the scene opposite and shook his head in sad disbelief.”514 
The motorcade then proceeded to Checkpoint Charlie, the crossing point between East 
and West Berlin. Kennedy “walked to within three feet of the white line boundary” as “a 
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dozen East German soldiers watched from their own checkpoint, about 40 yards inside 
the communist sector”515 and “a small group of East Berliners beyond the gate waved and 
cheered him.”516 Kennedy confidant Ken O’Donnell (who was on the trip with the 
president) recalled that Kennedy “was carried away by the courage of the West Berliners, 
and shocked by the sight of the Berlin Wall.”517 White House advisor Arthur M. 
Schlesinger later wrote that Kennedy’s personal encounter with the Berlin Wall “shocked 
and appalled the President, and he was still angry when he came out of the city hall and 
faced the seething crowd in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, compressed into a single excited, 
impassioned mass.”518 
The president’s motorcade departed from Checkpoint Charlie and made its way to 
West Berlin’s City Hall. The Rudolph Wilde Platz was filled to capacity with bodies 
“packed so closely together that those who fainted just slumped or were held in a sort of 
standing position until help came. Many persons had been standing in the square for 
several hours in raincoats because of the threatening skies.”519 Loudspeakers were set up 
to project the president’s speech beyond the plaza, and East Berliners tuned in over 
television to see images of Kennedy parading through the streets. “Young and old, 
mothers with babies, workers in overalls, crippled war veterans and women with tears 
streaming down their faces all looked to the President as the symbol of their freedom,” 
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wrote Washington Post reporter Robert H. Estabrook.520 By the time Kennedy strode to 
the podium in front of the cheering, waving crowd chanting “Ken-Ne-Dy,” his presence 
in West Berlin had already accomplished important rhetorical work. Although he had 
sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to 
reassure West Berliners of the United States’ commitment to defending the city after the 
wall went up in August 1961, the president’s decision to visit the city himself signaled his 
commitment to defending West Berlin—and, by extension, the entire free world—against 
the spread of Soviet communism. What made Kennedy’s speech at the Rudolph Wilde 
Platz remarkable, however, was his personal identification with the people of West Berlin 
and his elevation of the city—and its inhabitants—as an example to the rest of the world. 
This was particularly significant because Kennedy, the President of the United States and 
leader of the Western Alliance, came to the former capital of Nazi Germany and declared 
that “all free men, wherever they may live, [were] citizens of Berlin.”521 In what follows, 
I analyze how Kennedy drew on his physical location—the city of West Berlin—as 
tangible proof of the failures of communism even as he challenged his audience to look 
beyond their physical situation to a more hopeful future. To do this, the president used 
deictic language and visual imagery to shift between the immediate and the imaginary. 
These spatial and temporal shifts repeatedly asked the audience to look at the city of 
Berlin and the historical/temporal moment as a means of evidence even as they elevated 
West Berlin and its inhabitants as inspiration for the future. 
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Kennedy’s Address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin 
The president began by locating himself in relation to the city, his German hosts, 
and U.S. General Lucius Clay, the military commander who oversaw the Berlin Airlift in 
1948: 
I am proud to come to this city as the guest of your distinguished Mayor, who has 
symbolized throughout the world the fighting spirit of West Berlin. And I am 
proud to visit the Federal Republic with your distinguished Chancellor who for 
so many years has committed Germany to democracy and freedom and progress, 
and to come here in the company of my fellow American, General Clay, who has 
been in this city during its great moments of crisis and will come again if ever 
needed.522 
This description set the tone Kennedy would take throughout the rest of the speech; he 
was here as a guest of the German people, to learn from them and identify himself with 
them, rather than speak to them as President of the United States. In his prepared 
remarks, Kennedy had planned to simply nod to “Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Mayor, Citizens of 
Berlin” before narrating significant moments in the history of West Berlin, such as the 
1948 airlift and the building of the wall two years earlier. Through his extended 
references to these three individuals, however, Kennedy credited Willy Brandt (“your 
distinguished Mayor”) and Konrad Adenauer (“your distinguished Chancellor”) for 
ensuring that West Germany and West Berlin remained free. Adding in a reference to 
General Clay, the president subtly nodded to Clay’s leadership of the Berlin Airlift in 
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1948. To West Berliners, Clay was the hero who helped them survive nineteen months in 
a besieged city. The president’s privileging of Brandt, Adenauer, and Clay also 
demonstrated his own understanding of the political climate in West Berlin, a city and 
nation on the verge of political transition as Adenauer retired and Brandt ran for the 
chancellorship.523 Even as Kennedy acknowledged the service these men had rendered to 
West Berliners and the cause of freedom worldwide, he also gestured toward the 
symbolic significance “this city” held “throughout the world.” 
After these introductory remarks, the president fully departed from the script 
Sorenson had prepared and turned instead to the lines he had written a week earlier and 
practiced with McGeorge Bundy on their descent into West Berlin that morning. “Two 
thousand years ago the proudest boast was ‘civis Romanus sum’ [‘I am a citizen of 
Rome’]. Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [‘I 
am a citizen of Berlin’].” In these two sentences, Kennedy advanced arguments that 
would structure the rest of his speech. First, he equated West Berliners with Roman 
citizens two centuries earlier, a parallel construction that elevated his German audience to 
iconic heights. Cicero used the phrase “Civis Romanus sum” in his In Verrem to remind 
his audience of the legal rights Roman citizens enjoyed, and the apostle Paul cited his 
Roman citizenship as grounds for a full and fair trial during his arrest and imprisonment 
in Jerusalem.524 In the Roman era, the coveted status of Roman citizen supplied 
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membership in and protection by the most powerful empire in the world. Not only did the 
citizen enjoy particular legal rights, but it also conferred a certain level of prestige on any 
man lucky enough to be part of the club. Thus, when Kennedy equated Roman 
citizenship with Berlin citizenship, he argued that being a Berliner supplied the most 
cherished identity “in the world of freedom.” To an audience who just eighteen years 
earlier had been members of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler, this was no small shift. 
In fact, recall the USIA’s recommendation that Kennedy use his public statements to 
“welcome the Germans fully into the camp of civilized peoples defending freedom.”525 
By equating his current audience—Berliners—with Roman citizens, the president 
suggested that this tiny landlocked city in the middle of communist-controlled East 
Germany held the same celebrated status as the Roman Empire two centuries earlier.  
The president furthered his identification with Berliners through his sentence 
construction and verb usage in the phrase, “Ich bin ein Berliner”—a statement that 
received much popular press coverage for years after Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin. 
Because German grammatical rules do not require an indefinite article (ein) before the 
verbs sein (to be), bleiben (to remain), and werden (to become), some popular press 
outlets in Germany and the United States (including the New York Times and Newsweek) 
later reported that Kennedy’s audience interpreted this statement as “I am a jelly 
doughnut” because of a cream-filled pastry some called a Berliner.526 However, State 
Department translator Margaret Plischke recalled that including “ein” in the translation 
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was a deliberate decision by the president.527 Although we cannot be sure of the exact 
reason why Kennedy decided to include “ein” in the speech, German historian Andreas 
W. Daum offers this poignant insight: 
Saying ein Berliner is grammatically correct if it is used metaphorically. To take a 
more common parallel example, the sentence “Er ist Schauspieler” (he is an 
actor) is a statement of fact about a man’s profession; the sentence “Er ist ein 
Schauspieler” means the man is putting on an act. Kennedy was not formally 
stating his actual place of residence. He was, rather, metaphorically identifying 
with the citizens of Berlin although not a citizen himself. Kennedy’s declaration 
was a symbolic expression of solidarity with West Berlin, with America’s Berlin. 
It was a rhetorical intensification of a symbolic common identity linking 
Americans and Berliners. Indeed, his visit was to be the highpoint of this special 
relationship.528 
Daum’s observation gives greater weight to Kennedy’s declaration that “[t]oday, in the 
world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [‘I am a citizen of 
Berlin’].” Identification is, as Kenneth Burke observes, the recognition of shared 
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interests, principles, and ideologies between two parties.529 In this particular instance, 
Kennedy aligned himself, the United States, and the “world of freedom” with citizens of 
Berlin and their shared struggle to defend democracy against the spread of Soviet 
communism. Although much of this struggle was metaphorical and ideological in nature, 
the citizens of West Berlin were foot soldiers on the literal front lines of the Cold War. 
Continuing his extemporaneous performance in front of the roaring crowd, the 
president offered a striking narrative of the differences between democracy and 
communism: 
There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they 
don’t, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. 
Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of 
the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and 
elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And 
there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but 
it permits us to make economic progress. Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen. Let 
them come to Berlin.  
In this passage, the president told his audience again and again that the city of Berlin 
itself offered sufficient evidence to refute arguments for appeasement or détente. The 
succession of four separate “There are…” statements offered specific arguments in 
support of (or deference toward) Soviet communism followed by the same response: “Let 
them come to Berlin.” This combination of repetition and parallelism amplified the 
absurdity of an indifferent attitude towards communism even as it revealed one piece of 
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evidence powerful enough to refute all claims in support of communism: 
1. “There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they 
don’t, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist 
world.” 
2. “There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future.” 
3. “And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the 
Communists.” 
4. “And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil 
system, but it permits us to make economic progress.” 
Each of these statements described various approaches to the Cold War ideological 
struggle between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism—and the city offered an 
irrefutable response.  
To those who were confused about the core differences between “the free world 
and the Communist world,” Berlin offered a side-by-side comparison with images of 
vibrant West Berliners cheering Kennedy’s motorcade juxtaposed with red banners 
blocking any view into deserted East Berlin. To those who thought communism was “the 
wave of the future,” Berlin displayed the backward nature of a system that prohibited free 
movement of its citizens. To those who said that “we can work with the Communists,” 
the president countered: “Let them come to Berlin.” This third line was particularly 
striking because Kennedy himself had made a similar argument in his June 10 American 
University speech when he suggested that the U.S. public should “reexamine our attitude 
toward the Soviet Union” and “direct attention to our common interests and to the means 
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by which those differences can be resolved.”530 But Kennedy had come to Berlin, looked 
over the Wall, and seen for himself the realities of living under Communist rule. Finally, 
to those who suggested that communism paved the way for Western economic progress, 
Kennedy argued that one simply had to come to Berlin and witness the bleak existence of 
East German citizens to recognize the incompatibility of Soviet rule and free trade. 
On four separate occasions—the last spoken first in German and then in English—the 
president supplied the city of West Berlin as his most powerful form of evidence. “This 
city” offered physical proof of the stark differences between democracy and communism, 
a contrast made so apparent by the Berlin Wall Kennedy had witnessed personally just 
hours earlier. And yet, Kennedy was not telling his audience something new; he was 
describing their daily existence, a reality they knew all too well. Thus, Kennedy’s 
repetition of “Let them come to Berlin” demonstrated his personal understanding of the 
West Berliners plight even as it reaffirmed West Berlin’s status as the Cold War battle 
line. 
The final thing to note about this passage is how the president used deictic 
language and spatial metaphors to shift his audience between the immediate and the 
imaginary, from what they could see physically to what they could imagine. Each time he 
described those in favor of communism, he employed abstract deictic indicators: “There 
are many people,” “There are some” (repeated twice), and “there are even a few.” These 
identifiers—completely void of specificity or identification—could describe everyone 
and no one all at once. Moreover, they included anyone who harbored any support for or 
indifference toward Soviet communism. To this broad public, regardless of their 
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identification or location, Kennedy had one response: “Let them come to Berlin.” To 
those listening to the president’s speech, the abstract arguments in favor of 
communism—that there was no great issue between democracy and communism, that 
communism was the “wave of the future,” that the United States (and other Western 
powers) could “work with the communists,” and even that communism was economically 
profitable for the West—were challenged directly by concrete evidence: Berlin. Kennedy 
refuted the abstract with the physically real—and what he had experienced personally. 
Kennedy then shifted to his role as the U.S. president and leader of the Western 
Alliance to juxtapose further stark differences between democracy and communism. 
“Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect,” he said, “but we have 
never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us.” In 
this sentence, the president used deictic pronouns to differentiate between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Although “we,” “our,” “them,” and “us” described U.S. 
government officials and citizens, these pronouns also underscored the stark difference 
between “we”—the U.S. government—and the unnamed adversary: the USSR. “We” had 
never done what “they” had: construct a concrete barrier to keep citizens from fleeing for 
a better life. The president continued by addressing Berliners (both those in West and 
East Germany) as a representative of the U.S. public. “I want to say, on behalf of my 
countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far 
distant from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with 
you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years.” In this sentence, Kennedy 
spoke directly to his immediate audience for the first time. Although he made references 
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to “your distinguished mayor” and “your distinguished chancellor” in the opening lines 
of his speech, the president now singled out the U.S. public’s relationship to “you,” the 
West Berliners. The deictic pronoun “you” was a form of direct address, singling out 
each and every member of his audience. Notice, however, that this “you” implicated all 
citizens of Berlin—on both sides of the Wall. Kennedy very specifically defined the 
temporal bounds of Berlin’s symbolic status. In the eighteen years since the end of World 
War II and the division of Berlin and Germany by the Allied powers, the citizens of 
Berlin had participated in a critical narrative. Identification as a citizen of Berlin was not 
limited to those who happened to be on the “right” side of the city when the wall went up 
on August 13. Instead, the entire city—both those who personal liberties in the West and 
those controlled by the East German communist government—played a key role in “in 
the story of the last 18 years.” It was this story, this struggle for democratic freedom that 
the U.S. public was proud to share. Although U.S. citizens were “far distant” from West 
Berliners and separated by continents and the Atlantic Ocean, Kennedy argued that the 
United States and the city of Berlin were linked metaphorically, relationally, and 
ideologically. A shared commitment to individual liberty transcended time and space. 
The president continued his form of direct address by identifying the lived 
experiences of his German audience, again making room for free West Berliners and 
those listening to him in East Berlin.  
I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 18 years that still lives with 
the vitality and the force, and the hope and the determination of the city of West 
Berlin. While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures 
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of the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it, for 
it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense 
against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers 
and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together.  
In this passage, Kennedy held up “the city of West Berlin” as a model democracy 
standing strong against communist oppression. And although the Berlin Wall offered “the 
most obvious and vivid demonstration” of communism’s failures for “all the world to 
see,” the president lamented its effect on Berliners. It was an “offense” not just in abstract 
historical terms, but in the material realities of their daily lived experience, dividing 
families, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, and the entire German people. In naming the 
specific ways the division of East and West Berlin affected German citizens, Kennedy 
demonstrated his personal understanding of and sympathy for his audience on both sides 
of the Wall. A reporter from the Chicago Tribune wrote that the woman next to him 
started to cry at this point in the president’s speech. “The woman in gray beside me began 
to cry when President Kennedy mentioned the wall” and “sobbed into a handkerchief” as 
she “recounted how families have been divided, husbands separated from wives, and 
parents from children.”531 
After acknowledging the very real struggles and sacrifices of Berliners on both 
sides of the Wall, Kennedy held up these examples as evidence of the broader division of 
East and West Germany and, ultimately, the division of the democratic West and 
communist East.  
What is true of this city is true of Germany—real, lasting peace in Europe can 
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never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right 
of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, 
this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free, including the right to 
unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, with good will to all people.  
Here Kennedy referenced the subject of German reunification, the issue that caused a 
permanent wedge between Kennedy and Khrushchev during their 1961 meeting in 
Vienna and one that would not be resolved until 1989. The division of families, 
neighbors, and friends was a poignant reminder not only of the Soviet-imposed division 
of the German people, but the physical and ideological front line of the Cold War. As 
Kennedy moved toward his conclusion, he held up the city of West Berlin as a symbol 
for the rest of the democratic world and reemphasized Berliners’ connection to other 
freedom-loving peoples. “You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part 
of the main,” the president stated. This was a clear reference to John Donne’s meditation, 
“No man is an island, entire of it self, every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the 
main,”532 suggesting that each and every citizen of Berlin was linked to the larger 
Western world. 
However, this metaphor also described the city of West Berlin as “a defended 
island of freedom” standing tall and proud in the midst of a communist sea. Kennedy 
built off this individual and collective identity when he asked his audience to look beyond 
their immediate spatial and temporal present and toward a brighter future: 
So let me ask you, as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today, to the 
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hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your 
country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to 
the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind. 
This passage offered a stylistic counterpart to the “There are some. . . . Let them come to 
Berlin” repetition at the beginning of Kennedy’s address. Where Kennedy had use that 
progression to shift the focus from abstract arguments to the immediate physical 
situation, the president now used deictic references to space and time to extend his 
argument from the local to the global. 
BEYOND     TO 
“dangers of today”    “hopes of tomorrow” 
“freedom merely of this city of Berlin,  “advance of freedom everywhere” 
or your country of Germany” 
 
“beyond the wall”    “to the day of peace with justice” 
 
“beyond yourselves and ourselves”  “to all mankind” 
 
Each grouping or phrase moved beyond the immediate to the imaginary. This stylistic 
device of gradatio suggested a spatial and temporal progression towards the ultimate 
goal: a united city, country, and world free from communism. These four groupings also 
underscored the link between West Berliners’ lived experience and the symbolic work 
their struggle accomplished for the rest of the world. “Lift your eyes” suggested a 
deliberate looking up and beyond from one thing and toward another. Although their 
immediate physical situation offered powerful evidence for the evils of communist rule, 
the president asked his audience to look toward and hope for what they could not see. 
This also reminded the audience of their symbolic status for the rest of the world—and 
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that their struggle was not in vain. In fact, their daily experiences accomplished important 
rhetorical work on the “front lines” of the ideological Cold War. The “dangers of today” 
would be eclipsed by the “hopes of tomorrow.” Attaining freedom for “this city of 
Berlin” and “your country of Germany” would also contribute to the “advance of 
freedom everywhere.” Looking “beyond the wall” and toward “the day of peace with 
justice” encouraged West Berliners to aspire for more than their individual freedom—this 
was a struggle for “all mankind.” 
Kennedy continued this gradual progression from the immediate to the imaginary 
when he said, “Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. 
When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as 
one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful 
globe.” Again, Kennedy proceeded from one to many, specific to broad. This causal 
argument suggested that the limitation of freedom anywhere threatened freedom 
everywhere. But when “all” were free—including the East Berliners watching Kennedy 
on television on the other side of the Wall—West Berliners, U.S. citizens, and all 
freedom-loving nations could anticipate the reunification of Berlin, Germany, and 
Europe. Kennedy predicted that when “that day”—a temporal moment hoped for but not 
seen—finally arrived, “the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact 
that they were in the front lines for almost two decades.” Here Kennedy reminded his 
audience of their status as West Berliners and constituted them as foot soldiers stationed 
on the Cold War “front lines.” 
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In the final sentence of his address, the president returned to his opening 
declaration that the proudest boast in the world of freedom was to be called a citizen of 
Berlin. “All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a 
free man, I take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’” Here Kennedy identified 
himself as a Berliner, a symbolic gesture that far exceeded the president’s earlier claim. 
Here was the President of the United States telling his German audience that he proudly 
identified as one of them. He recognized their sacrifices and shared their hopes for a 
unified city, country, and world. 
The crowd’s immediate reaction was electric. Arthur M. Schlesinger later wrote 
that the crowd “shook itself and rose and roared like an animal. . . . The hysteria spread 
almost visibly through the square. Kennedy was first exhilarated, then disturbed; he felt, 
as he remarked on his return, that if he had said, ‘March to the wall—tear it down,’ his 
listeners would have marched.”533 Speechwriter Ted Sorenson called Kennedy’s speech 
in West Berlin “one of his best, and most remembered—a speech designed to salute the 
citizens of West Berlin for their courage and patience in peacefully maintaining an island 
of freedom amid a sea of Communist military and political power.”534 White House 
advisor Ken O’Donnell later suggested that the president’s personal interaction with West 
Berliners and his own personal encounter the Berlin Wall had a profound effect on his 
address outside West Berlin’s City Hall. 
Kennedy’s fighting speech in Berlin, as magnificent as it was, actually was a 
grave political risk, and he knew it. Such a heated tribute to West Berlin’s 
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resistance to Communism could have undone all of the success of his appeal for 
peace and understanding with the Soviets in his American University speech two 
weeks earlier. But Kennedy could not prevent himself from saying what his heart 
wanted him to say. He was carried away by the courage of the West Berliners, 
and shocked by the sight of the Berlin Wall that he had seen that morning, and he 
had to tell the people how he felt about them.535 
Moved as he was by the West Berliners and his personal encounter with the Wall, 
Kennedy’s extemporaneous performance also caused a bit of a scramble as White House 
advisors tried to backtrack his disparaging remarks about the Soviet Union. As Ted 
Sorenson later recalled, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told him they 
“need[ed] to correct the tenor of the speech, particularly its reference to the West’s 
inability to work with the Communists, weeks before negotiations were to begin in 
Moscow on the nuclear test ban treaty.” To do this, Bundy and Sorenson “inserted new 
material into his afternoon speech to students at the Free University of Berlin, talking 
about the winds of change blowing over the Iron Curtain and the rest of the world.”536 
After a lunch at City Hall and his speech at the Free University, Kennedy made 
one more stop at the U.S. military headquarters in West Berlin before proceeding to the 
airport. “Plans to give the American President a fitting reception were carefully laid, but 
the high-spirited warmth of the crowds was not on the program,” reported the New York 
Times. “As the Presidential plane rose from Tegel Airport Wednesday evening, 
[Chancellor] Adenauer was heard to murmur, ‘The response of the German people—I 
                                                
535 O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy, 360. 
536 Sorenson, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History, 325. 
  256 
was amazed.’”537 Aboard Air Force One en route to Ireland, the president “was glowing 
from his reception,” Sorenson later recalled. “It would make Americans recognize that 
their efforts and risks had been appreciated, he said.” Kennedy also said that he would 
leave a note for his successor “to be opened at the time of some discouragement”: “Go to 
Germany.” As he told Sorenson, “We’ll never have another day like this one as long as 
we live.”538 
 
The Public Response 
Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin was, in the words of the U.S. Ambassador to 
Germany, “an outstanding success.”539 West German mayor Willy Brandt told Kennedy, 
“You will have seen yourself how much this occasion meant to my fellow-citizens and to 
myself and how intense are the feelings of gratitude and of confidence in you that found 
expression during that memorable day.”540 In his memoir years later, Brandt offered this 
further reflection: “The Berliners fêted him as something more than a powerful friend and 
guarantor of their freedom. Their homage contained an element of gratitude towards a 
former enemy who was demonstrating to the Germans that the West's foremost power 
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had made its peace with them—that that they had rejoined the family of nations.”541 The 
day after the president’s visit, U.S. Ambassador to Germany George McGhee wrote to 
Dean Rusk that a “good part of [the] Fed[eral] Rep[ublic of Germany] spent June 26 
watching television of President’s visit to Berlin. Events were rebroadcast and 
summarized on TV and radio and some persons viewed or listened [a] second or even 
third time.”542 In a later telegram to Rusk, McGhee reported that  
more than 7-1/2 million television sets brought [the] personality of [the] president 
and [the] effect of his dynamic expressions of assurance and guarantees of 
freedom into [the] homes of additional millions. Both television channels 
combined to bring live broadcasts of almost [the] entire four-day visit. Many 
persons viewed or listened to repeat broadcasts and summarizations a second or 
even third time. (Statistics on viewers are still being compiled, but exact figures 
will be difficult to ascertain because of problem of estimating large numbers of 
guests who were invited into private homes to watch president’s tour and because 
of thousands more who stood in television salesrooms throughout Federal 
Republic and West Berlin in watching with almost hypnotic fascination.)543 
James H. Polk, the United States Commander in Berlin, wrote to Kennedy: “Words are 
most inadequate to express the impact of your visit to Berlin on June 26th. . . . It was 
impossible for me to anticipate the ovation extended to you by the citizens of Berlin, but 
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it was a tribute which I feel I shall never see duplicated in its warmth and sincerity. Your 
visit has made my job ever so much easier here in this divided city.”544 Martin J. 
Hillenbrand, a State Department official stationed in Berlin, wrote that of all the 
presidential visits to the city Kennedy’s trip “was certainly the most spectacular, and 
perhaps—if spectacular is equivalent to successful—then it was also the most successful 
of presidential visits.”545 
The public response in West Berlin was almost giddy, and news outlets frequently 
cited the president’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” statement as the most important declaration of 
the day. “Women and even men wept as the chief executive of the world’s most powerful 
free nation told them that the proudest thing he could say is ‘I am a Berliner,’” wrote the 
Chicago Tribune. “The effect of his words was electric. He spoke the language Berliners 
understood.”546 In a June 27 telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the U.S. Embassy 
in Bonn reported that the German press  
rejoiced at fact that president had personally identified himself with Berlin. 
President’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ widely headlined. Most of press printed full 
texts of president’s Berlin statements. . . . [and] concluded that if president ever 
had any doubts about Berlin or Berliners, or they about him, all were swept away 
by his reaffirmation of US support for Berlin and acclaim with which he was 
received by people.547 
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The following day, the Embassy made further note of the widespread media coverage of 
Kennedy’s address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz:  “No other quote came to fore . . . more 
often than Berlin statement, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’ This [was] used in headlines of almost 
all Thursday papers,” and the press focused heavily on the “president’s personal 
identification with Berlin.”548 Deutsche Zeitung, a German newspaper in Cologne, wrote 
that “President Kennedy’s symbolic words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ opened a new chapter of 
German-American relations.”549 In the weeks that followed, the full text of Kennedy’s 
“Ich bin ein Berliner” speech was printed for distribution in Berlin schools.550  
Kennedy’s speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz and his physical presence in West 
Berlin were also the subject of press coverage in the United States. “The President’s City 
Hall speech was the emotional high point of a spectacular welcome accorded the 
President by West Berlin. He saluted the city as the front line and shining example of 
humanity’s struggle for freedom,” wrote Arthur J. Olson of the New York Times.551 
Washington Post reporter B. Caroll Kilpatrick focused specifically on the persuasive 
elements of Kennedy’s decision to travel to Europe, noting that some diplomacy could 
only be accomplished in person:  
More than ever, the President is committed to personal diplomacy and to direct 
appeals to people. He entered the White House critical of President Eisenhower’s 
travels, which he thought were primarily grand tours and did little to advance 
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American interests. Today Mr. Kennedy is convinced that his own travels, 
designed for special purposes, do advance the national interest. He believes that 
he can strengthen relationships with foreign officials by conversations with them 
on detailed problems. He believes he can explain and elucidate American policy 
by carefully prepared speeches in their midst.552 
The impression Kennedy made on the German people was already clear, wrote 
Kilpatrick, and the correspondent further predicted “the impression they made on him 
will affect German-American relations, and indeed world politics, for a long 
time.”553According to Robert H. Estabrook of the Washington Post, “the response in 
Berlin was far more than [simple applause], and no one who witnessed it will soon forget 
it. This was the outpouring of a whole people, who have learned something about war 
and the meaning of freedom. Mr. Kennedy was a symbol.”554 
The symbolic significance of Kennedy’s visit was further amplified by Soviet 
premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to visit East Berlin two days after Kennedy’s 
triumphal procession through the streets of West Berlin. According to a Central 
Intelligence Agency report dated June 20, officials in East Berlin “intend[ed] to counter 
the impact of President Kennedy’s 26 June Berlin visit by holding a mass rally for all six 
Soviet cosmonauts in East Berlin. . . . Rumors have been current among East German 
party members that some top Soviet personality—perhaps even Khrushchev—would visit 
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East Berlin at the time of the presidential visit.”555 Although the publically-stated reason 
for the trip was the occasion of East German leader Walter Ulbricht’s seventieth birthday, 
the Western press described the Soviet premier’s visit as a clear countermove to 
Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin.556 As Murrey Mardner of the Washington Post observed, 
“Both leaders, grappling with challenges to their programs on either side of the Berlin 
Wall, are trying to exhibit vitality, cohesion and forward momentum in their own spheres 
of influence.”557  
East German officials asked Western correspondents to report the “triumphal 
drive” of Khrushchev in East Berlin but, as Larry Rue of the Chicago Tribune explained, 
“[t]o those who had witnessed the overwhelming reception of President Kennedy by 
West Berliners Wednesday, Khrushchev’s welcome in East Berlin today did not even 
attain the level of an anti-climax.”558 In a special report from East Berlin, Washington 
Post correspondent Katherine Clark reported that although Khrushchev “did his 
Communist best to match the recent Kennedy visit to West Berlin . . . he failed.” Because 
the “[i]ntensity of Mr. Kennedy’s understanding of Berliner’s emotional feelings over the 
plight of their city surprised many observers and infuriated the East German 
Communists,” the Soviet premier’s visit “was intended to give them a psychological lift. 
But while his arrival pleased Communist [leaders] it obviously did not impress Berliners 
of either East or West.”559 In his remarks to welcome Khrushchev to the city on June 28, 
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East German leader Walter Ulbricht said that the president had attempted to pit “one part 
of the German people against the other part in the interest of American imperialism.”560 
Later in the day, in his speech at East Berlin’s city hall, the Soviet premier compared 
Kennedy’s remarks in West Berlin to his speech at American University two weeks 
earlier: “One would think that the speeches were made by two different Kennedys.”561 
This exchange between Kennedy and Khrushchev reveals how presidential 
rhetoric in place was used as a symbolic weapon during the Cold War. As noted 
previously in this chapter, West Berlin was the only place where U.S.-Soviet forces met 
in direct confrontation. The East-West border was the literal front line of the Cold War, 
and although shots were never fired, Kennedy’s presidential presence in place and his 
speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz declared in no uncertain terms that the United States 
was there to stay. Khrushchev’s trip to East Berlin two days after Kennedy’s visit reflects 
the Soviet angst over the U.S. president’s widespread popularity with West Berliners and, 
more broadly, his position as head of the Western Alliance. Although Kennedy assumed 
this role in 1960, the president’s bruising meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna had 
demonstrated the young chief executive’s lack of foreign policy experience and what 
many saw as an inability to challenge the Soviet Union. As the archival record 
demonstrates, the White House saw Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin as the perfect 
opportunity to reassert the president’s leadership at home and abroad. In fact, this was 
one of the main reasons Kennedy decided to go ahead with his visit when congressional 
leaders and news outlets said he should cancel the European tour. In many ways, then, 
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Khrushchev’s immediate attempt to counteract the president’s triumph in West Berlin 
offers the best evidence that Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin was rhetorically effective. 
During a Cold War being waged with words and images as symbolic weapons, 
Kennedy’s presidential presence in place was a direct assault on the front lines of 
freedom—a battle that Khrushchev could not afford to lose. 
 
Conclusion 
John F. Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin on June 26, 1963, was a powerful symbol 
of U.S. commitment to the city that stood “as a defended island of freedom” whose “life 
was part of the main.”562 To a U.S. public deeply concerned about the spread of 
communism in Western Europe, West Berlin had become a symbolic discursive resource 
of the very real threat the Soviet Union posed to free nations around the world. Through 
his presidential presence and rhetoric in situ, Kennedy constituted West Berlin as a Cold 
War commonplace that was materially real. Being in place allowed Kennedy to see for 
himself the failures of communism and activate West Berlin’s place-as-rhetoric through 
his rhetoric in place. To West Berliners, Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” declaration 
reinforced the United States’ commitment to their city and reaffirmed their status as 
soldiers on the “front lines” of the Cold War.563 As the president held up West Berlin as a 
tangible argument for maintaining U.S. influence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East 
during the Cold War, he crystalized the city as a Cold War commonplace, a site to which 
successive U.S. presidents would return to recommit the United States to supporting the 
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cause of freedom even after the Cold War ended. 
Going to Berlin also offered the president a chance to reassert his foreign policy 
leadership on the world stage, particularly after his failed meeting with Khrushchev in 
Vienna in 1961. Years later, Martin Hillenbrand, the deputy chief of mission in West 
Berlin in 1963, noted how the Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin established a precedent that 
later chief executives found difficult to follow: 
It was absolutely part of the required drill that the high-level visitor go to Berlin 
and repeat the American commitment to the protection of the city. Failure to do 
that would have been an enormous blow to Berlin morale, so it was automatically 
assumed that when Kennedy came to the Federal Republic, a visit to Berlin would 
have to be part of that visit. Every subsequent president has been in exactly the 
same position. The problem that we have faced—parenthetically, I might add 
this—with subsequent presidents was that Kennedy’s visit to both West Germany 
and to Berlin was such a triumphal thing that subsequent presidents have always 
felt somehow or other that they had to duplicate it at least.564 
This reflection emphasizes an important dimension of presidential rhetoric in place: U.S. 
presidents not only harness the symbolic significance of place-as-rhetoric and the 
memories embedded in that location, but they also can invoke previous presidential 
rhetoric in situ for their own persuasive purposes. In this particular example, later U.S. 
presidents went to Berlin to demonstrate not just their support for the city, but to achieve 
a similar level of popularity or widespread appeal. 
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After Kennedy’s 1963 visit, U.S. presidents felt obligated go to Berlin and do as 
Kennedy had done. In 1969, Richard Nixon told West Berliners that it was “a very 
moving occasion . . . to travel through this city and to realize again what Berlin means to 
all the people of the world.”565 Similarly, Jimmy Carter reinforced the city’s symbolic 
status for the West when he compared Berlin to a “city on a hill” during a 1978 visit: 
The Bible says a city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden. What has been true of 
my own land for 3 1/2 centuries is equally true here in Berlin. As a city of human 
freedom, human hope, and human rights, Berlin is a light to the whole world; a 
city on a hill—it cannot be hidden; the eyes of all people are upon you. Was 
immer sei, Berlin bleibt frei. (No matter what happens, Berlin will stay free.)566 
In 1982, Ronald Reagan traveled to the city and spoke in front of the Charlottenburg 
Palace, just five miles from where Kennedy spoke in 1963. In his remarks, Reagan 
reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to the city, declaring that “a[s] long as Berlin 
exists, there can be no doubt about the hope for democracy.” To conclude, Reagan 
channeled Kennedy’s memory directly: “We all remember John Kennedy’s stirring words 
when he visited Berlin. I can only add that we in America and in the West are still 
Berliners, too, and always will be.”567 Five years later, in what perhaps is the most 
famous reappropriation of West Berlin after Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” 
                                                
565 Richard Nixon, “Remarks at the Signing of the Golden Book at the Charlottenburg Palace, West 
Berlin,” February 27, 1969, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2426.  
566 Jimmy Carter, “Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany Remarks at a Wreathlaying Ceremony at the 
Airlift Memorial,” July 15, 1978, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31086. 
567 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to the People of Berlin,” June 11, 1982, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42623. 
  266 
declaration, Reagan spoke in front of the Brandenburg Gate and uttered this well-known 
line: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”568  
Even after the wall fell, however, U.S. presidents continued their pilgrimages to 
Berlin. In 1994, William J. Clinton recounted the United States’ ongoing commitment to 
the city and told the German people that 
in the name of the pilots whose airlift kept Berlin alive, in the name of the sentries 
at Checkpoint Charlie who stood face-to[-]face with enemy tanks, in the name of 
every American President who has come to Berlin, in the name of the American 
forces who will stay in Europe to guard freedom’s future, in all of their names I 
say, Amerika steht an ihrer Seite, jetzt und fur immer. America is on your side, 
now and forever.569 
Less than a year after 9/11, George W. Bush visited Berlin and addressed a special 
session of the German Bundestag, telling his audience that “[t]he history of our time is 
written in the life of Berlin. . . . One American president came here to proudly call 
himself a citizen of Berlin. Another President dared the Soviets to tear down that wall. 
And on a night in November, Berliners took history into their hands and made your city 
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whole.”570 In the remainder of his address, the president argued that the United States and 
Germany should support each other in the War on Terror, just as they did during the Cold 
War. For Bush, speaking in Berlin provided him the opportunity to reactivate the U.S.-
West German alliance so central to U.S. foreign policy against the Soviet Union. 
Barack Obama visited Berlin on two occasions, once during his 2008 presidential 
campaign and once as President of the United States. In 2008, U.S. Senator and 
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama made a major foreign policy speech in 
front of the Victory Column in the Tiergarten in Berlin. Although the Obama campaign 
wanted the senator to speak at the Brandenburg Gate, German chancellor Angela Merkel 
vocalized her opposition to this plan because, in the words of her spokesman, she did not 
want the national landmark to be used “as a campaign backdrop.”571 In his speech, then-
Senator Obama told a crowd of more than 200,000572 Berliners: “I come to Berlin as so 
many of my countrymen have come before. Tonight, I speak to you not as a candidate for 
president, but as a citizen—a proud citizen of the United States, and a fellow citizen of 
the world.” Here Obama suggested that he and the rest of this audience were joined not 
just by their common identification with the city of Berlin, but as citizens of the world. In 
his remarks, Obama also drew an explicit comparison between the setting of his address 
and a post-Cold War foreign policy. “The walls between old allies on either side of the 
Atlantic cannot stand,” he said. “The walls between the countries with the most and those 
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with the least cannot stand. The walls between races and tribes, natives and immigrants, 
Christian and Muslim and Jew cannot stand. These now are the walls we must tear 
down.”573 Again, Obama appropriated earlier themes of U.S. presidential rhetoric—most 
notably, a reference to walls that needed to be torn down—to argue toward a more 
inclusive foreign policy. As New York Times writers Jeff Zeleny and Nicholas Kulish 
observed, “On a perch steeped in history, Mr. Obama said it was time to reprise the spirit 
that conquered communism, and use it to heal divisions and forger closer partnerships to 
deal with nuclear proliferation, global warming, poverty and genocide.”574 
President Obama returned to Berlin in 2013, this time speaking in front of the 
Brandenburg Gate. Throughout his remarks, Obama used the location of his speech—and 
the symbolic associations of previous U.S. presidential rhetoric in this place—to argue 
that “the tests of our time demand the same fighting spirit that defined Berlin a half-
century ago.” Kennedy’s famous words delivered in this city, Obama said, were “timeless 
because they call upon us to care more about things than just our own self-comfort, about 
our own city, about our own country. They demand that we embrace the common 
endeavor of all humanity.” To reinforce the point, Obama (re)appropriated Kennedy’s 
“Ich bin ein Berliner” declaration for his twenty-first century audience when he stated, 
“we are not only citizens of America or Germany, we are also citizens of the world. And 
                                                
573 Barack Obama, “Address in Berlin at the Victory Column in Tiergarten Park,” July 24, 2008, online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77689. 
574 Jeff Zeleny and Nicholas Kulish, "Obama, in Berlin, Calls for Renewal of Ties with Allies," New York 
Times, July 25, 2008. 
  269 
our fates and fortunes are linked like never before.”575 Through his rhetoric in place, 
Obama attempted to bolster U.S. foreign policy abroad by arguing that the United States 
(and the rest of the world) should consider how to achieve Kennedy’s vision in a new era 
of globalization.576 
The day after President Obama’s address, London newspaper The Independent 
offered an analysis that perfectly captured how West Berlin offered U.S. presidents a 
Cold War commonplace, but one that has been less effective after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. 
When John F[.] Kennedy spoke in Berlin half a century ago and uttered the words 
“Ich bin ein Berliner”, he unwittingly set the standard for every US president who 
came after him. Ronald Reagan memorably used his set-piece Berlin speech to 
call on Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall”, something he can never have 
dreamt would happen two years later. Barack Obama—who had drawn ecstatic 
crowds in Berlin as a presidential candidate—clearly felt he had some hard acts to 
follow yesterday. And the welcome was warm. But the response to his offer of 
nuclear reductions was tepid, seeming as it did to reflect another age. Mercifully, 
Berlin no longer exudes a sense of danger, and the Brandenburg Gate no longer 
marks the frontier between freedom and oppression. But that also means that it is 
time for US presidents visiting Berlin to leave the long shadow of JFK’s speech 
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behind.577 
Perhaps, then, the constant return of U.S. presidents to Berlin after Kennedy points to the 
limits of presidential rhetoric in place. For rhetoric in situ to be effective, the speaker 
must access and activate the material and symbolic elements of the speech setting that 
advance their present argument, not just the memories of previous invocations of place. 
Although rhetoric in place will always channel (to some degree) previous rhetorical 
action that happened in that location, it is up to the speaker to select those rhetorical 
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Chapter Five: Reagan at Pointe du Hoc 
 
 
On June 6, 1984, Ronald Reagan spoke in Normandy, France, on the fortieth 
anniversary of D-Day. In his relatively brief remarks, Reagan praised the U.S. Army 
Rangers who scaled the cliffs of France and used the story of D-Day to support the 
West’s ongoing commitment to “protect and defend democracy” in Europe.578 He 
compared the struggles of World War II to the challenges facing European democracies 
in the shadow of Soviet communism, pledging that the United States would stand with 
other nations seeking freedom. For Reagan, this historic occasion offered the opportunity 
to display (epideixis) the lessons of Normandy—duty, heroism, sacrifice, and moral 
clarity—as the underlying value justification for continuing to free Europe from Soviet 
communism in 1984. One of the primary ways the president accomplished this feat was 
by recounting the stories of the men who fought at Pointe du Hoc. Reagan amplified 
these eyewitness accounts579 with visuals of the individuals he described, such as the 
sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who sat on stage with Reagan on the cliffs of Pointe du 
Hoc. These visual images—circulated via live network news coverage, still pictures, and 
the video montages that would follow—brought these remembrances of D-Day home to 
the U.S. public, ushering them into the events of the past and urging support for the 
president’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. In this chapter, I analyze Reagan’s 
speech at Pointe du Hoc as an exemplar of commemoration in place. Drawing on the 
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theoretical principles of deixis, I argue that Reagan used the place of his address to 
anchor his audience in the present moment while also transporting them back to the 
events of D-Day forty years earlier and projecting a specific course for future action. 
Unlike my two earlier case studies, Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc falls most 
explicitly within genres of classical rhetoric—specifically, the epideictic address. 
Understanding how the president’s speech operated within and extended these classical 
rhetorical norms helps uncover why this particular rhetorical act was so powerful. 
As defined by Aristotle, epideictic speech concerns matters of “either praise 
[epainos] or blame [psogos]” and focuses on the present moment.580 “[I]n epideictic the 
present is the most important,” Aristotle explains, “for all speakers praise and blame in 
regard to existing qualities, but they often make use of other things, both reminding [the 
audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future.”581 Epideictic, then, looks 
backward and forward even as it remains in the immediate situation, the temporal 
present.582 In a note to Aristotle’s admonition that “in epideictic the present is the most 
important,” George Kennedy writes, “[p]erhaps meaning the occasion on which the 
speech is being given.”583 This emphasis on occasion underscores the ceremonial or 
ritualistic element of epideictic speech—a particular moment in time the demos 
considered important in national and political life.584 Aristotle’s description of the 
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epideictic audience also reflects the temporal shifts between past, present, and future. 
Where he calls judicial and deliberative audience members judges [krites], he describes 
the epideictic audience as witnesses [theōros]. “The term theōria,” writes Megan Foley, 
“implies not only a vision but a double vision” of times past and times present. “Theōria 
is a seeing-seen, a seen-seeing, a double vision in double time. The vision of the theōros 
is doubled in its temporality, simultaneously progressive and perfect: ‘One is seeing and 
one has seen at the same time.’”585 As these two tenses of theōria suggest, the epideictic 
audience is rooted in the present moment but also looks backward and forward. 
Constituted as theōria by the orator’s epideictic oratory, these witnesses are responsible 
for reflecting on the past and adjusting actions, attitudes, values, and beliefs for the good 
of the present community and for generations to come. But how do speakers remind their 
audiences of the past events and future potentialities? And what are these “other things” 
Aristotle says orators utilize to accomplish these temporal shifts?586 I argue that the 
emphasis on sight within Aristotle’s description of the theōros goes beyond techniques of 
rhetorical vision and instead describes a mechanism by which orators can display 
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(epideixis) people, places, and objects that spark memories of the past and inspire future 
action.587 
At Normandy, Reagan offered a retelling of D-Day rooted in place, and yet 
extended across time, that called his audience to communal reflection and renewal. This 
physical display intensified the rhetorical potency of the president’s speech, for both the 
occasion and the location required a special type of commemoration. I use the term 
commemoration deliberately here, for it connotes something more than simply 
remembering or reflecting. Edward Casey describes it as “intensified remembering” 
communities do together.588 It requires active communal participation in a shared social 
ritual, one that must be by definition situated in place. When communities remember 
together, this sacred act of remembrance “points both backward to the vanished event or 
person and forward (by means of the resolute wish to preserve the memory of the event 
or person, or even to act on it).”589 And when this commemoration occurs in a place of 
national importance and public memory, this intensification multiplies, chaining out into 
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shared networks of meaning and symbolism. Commemoration in place, then, is both 
spatial and temporal. Situated in a particular location, this place provides “the ground and 
resource, the location and scene of the remembering we do in common.”590 With their 
location fully fixed, speakers and audience members can look backward to what 
happened here many years ago and apply the lessons of these events to present and future 
circumstances. 
On June 6, 1984, Reagan spoke to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the 
Allied invasion of France, the date when nearly 175,000 U.S., British, Canadian, Free 
French, Polish, and Norwegian soldiers invaded France by air and sea to take back France 
from Hitler’s Nazi empire.591 Nearly 5,000 men died.592 This place, therefore, was holy 
ground—coastline secured by blood of hundreds of thousands and the death of thousands. 
The occasion carried great significance as well. This was an anniversary, a term that 
connotes a sacred ritual, remembrance, and return. The word comes directly from the 
Latin anniversārius, which is formed from annus (“year”), versus (“turned, a turning”), 
and ārius (“see”). Interestingly enough, the word first referred to the ecclesiastical 
calendar as days “wherein the Martyrdoms or Deaths of Saints were celebrated yearly in 
the Church.”593 In his speech at Pointe du Hoc, the president used active language, vivid 
imagery, and the physical presence of bodies in place to help his audience look back into 
the past and “see” the events of D-Day unfold before their eyes. These visual images and 
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the physical composition of the speech setting amplified Reagan’s spoken text and made 
the story of D-Day literally come alive through a sensory accumulatio. The physical 
display of bodies in place also provided a living link between past and present and an 
inspiration for future action. 
In the analysis that follows, I first consider how U.S. presidents prior to Reagan 
commemorated the anniversary of D-Day to show how Normandy operated as a 
commonplace for Cold War presidential rhetoric. I then discuss how Reagan’s speech to 
the British Parliament in 1982 and his address to the National Association of 
Evangelicals in 1983 laid the groundwork for his foreign policy narrative at Pointe du 
Hoc. After this historical background, I draw on archival materials from the Reagan 
Library to describe how White House officials saw the place of Reagan’s speech—Pointe 
du Hoc—and the bodies in that place—the U.S. Army Rangers—as an important means 
of persuasion. I then turn to my analysis of the text, paying specific attention to the ways 
in which Reagan rooted his audience in place and time while reflecting on the past and 
charting a clear course for future action. I conclude this chapter by considering how the 
media coverage and circulation of Reagan’s presidential presence at Normandy amplified 
the site’s importance and discussing the implications of this case study for studying 
presidential commemoration in place. 
 
Normandy in the National Imaginary: A Cold War Commonplace 
When Ronald Reagan commemorated the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe 
du Hoc and Omaha Beach in June 1984, he drew on the site’s symbolic resonances in 
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U.S. public memory even as he appropriated this symbolism for his present and future 
purposes. To audiences watching Reagan in the United States on June 6, 1984, the story 
of D-Day was familiar, and yet a poignant rhetorical resource for this particular moment 
in Cold War history. As a place of national and international significance, Normandy 
offered a physical and metaphorical commonplace—a location to which U.S. presidents 
(and other public officials) could return as inspiration and justification for U.S. attempts 
to defeat Soviet communism at home and abroad. Because battlefields intern “memories 
of the transformative power of war and the sacrificial heroism of the warrior,” they 
provide a space for national reflection on shared values—a commonplace.594 These sites 
also inspire language that reinforces “the primal themes of patriotic orthodoxy: war as 
holy crusade, bringing new life to the nation and the warrior as a culture hero and savior, 
often likened to Christ.”595 Beginning in 1944, U.S. presidents held up Normandy as a 
prime example of U.S. leadership, moral resolve, and virtue, arguing that the events of 
June 6, 1944, offered prophetic lessons for the present and future. Here I examine these 
presidential commemorations briefly to trace the overarching metaphors and themes that 
became bundled in Normandy as a storehouse of shared meaning for the U.S. public 
during the Cold War.596 As I demonstrate below, themes of the story of D-Day—courage, 
sacrifice, good triumphing over evil—quickly became guiding principles for the battle 
between democracy and communism. 
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The mythic description of Normandy as a moral crusade began with General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Order of the Day” delivered to all Allied troops just days 
before their invasion:597 
Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Forces: You are about to 
embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many 
months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-
loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and 
brothers-in-arms on other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the 
German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over oppressed peoples of 
Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.598 
Although Eisenhower did not name Normandy explicitly in this “Order of the Day,” these 
words became forever linked to the Allied invasion of France. This was a “Great 
Crusade,” one with worldwide implications for “liberty-loving people everywhere.” Later 
that evening in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt led the nation in prayer 
over radio, asking God to give the nation “[f]aith in our united crusade” as the Allied 
soldiers fought “not for the lust of conquest. . . . [but] to end conquest.”599 From the very 
beginning, Normandy was rhetorically constituted as a place that represented an inherent 
moral struggle and the ability of freedom-loving peoples to defeat evil. 
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These themes continued throughout later presidential commemoration of D-Day. 
In 1954, Eisenhower, who was now President of the United States, released a statement 
to mark the tenth anniversary of the Allied invasion. After reminding his audience that 
“[t]his day is the tenth anniversary of the landing of the Allied Expeditionary Force in 
Normandy,” Eisenhower noted that the heroic action displayed on June 6, 1944, “set in 
motion a chain of events which affected the history of the entire world” and noted that the 
“lessons of unity and cooperation have by no means been lost in the trying period of 
reconstruction since the fighting stopped. Rather, we see peoples, once bitter enemies, 
burying their antagonisms and joining together to meet the problems of the postwar 
world.” In an indirect reference to the Soviet Union, Eisenhower noted that even if some  
members of the Grand Alliance have not maintained in time of peace the spirit of 
that wartime union, if some of the peoples who were our comrades-in-arms have 
been kept apart from us, that is cause for profound regret, but not for despair. The 
courage, devotion and faith which brought us through the perils of war will 
inevitably bring us success in our unremitting search for peace, security and 
freedom.600 
In this statement, Eisenhower reminded his audience that the same “courage, devotion 
and faith” exhibited during World War II would also see the nation through this new 
period in U.S. history: the Cold War. In this frame, Normandy symbolized past triumphs 
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against evil and offered hope and inspiration for the nation as it continued its 
“unremitting search for peace, security and freedom.”601 
In 1964, with the nation still reeling from President Kennedy’s assassination the 
previous November, Lyndon B. Johnson sent a U.S. delegation to Normandy for the 
twentieth anniversary of D-Day. On June 3, in a ceremony in the Rose Garden at the 
White House, the president offered a poignant tribute to those who fought at Normandy 
and also interpreted these past sacrifices for the present moment. He told the delegation 
that their journey to Normandy 
must be a mission of remembrance. For your country it is a mission of resolve. 
You remember, and will never forget, the 6th of June in 1944 when America’s 
sons and those of our gallant allies helped carry freedom back to the continent 
where it was cradled. Your country remembers and will never forget, the resolve 
born on that D-Day, that, so long as we are able, and other men are willing to 
stand together, we shall not permit the light of freedom to be extinguished on any 
continent again. 
Here Johnson explicitly linked the delegation’s physical journey to Normandy—a 
geographic location—with what that place symbolized in the U.S. national imaginary 
even as he described the country’s role in “carry[ing] freedom back to the continent 
where it was cradled.” The “resolve born on that D-Day” inspired the nation’s current 
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support of freedom and democracy around the world so that the “light of freedom” would 
not “be extinguished on any continent again.” The president also called the delegation—
and the broader U.S. public—to remember and not forget the sacrifices of that day twenty 
years earlier, sacrifices that enabled the United States to continue this cause. 
“In these last 20 years,” Johnson continued, “we and the world have lived 
between the darkness of midnight for civilization and the brightness of a new dawn, for 
the rays of that dawn are piercing through the shadows.” Here the president was clear that 
since the events of D-Day, the world had engaged in a ideological struggle between “the 
darkness of midnight” and “the brightness of a new dawn”—light and dark metaphors 
frequently used to describe U.S. democracy versus Soviet communism. But the place of 
Normandy, and all that Normandy symbolized, offered hope for present and future 
generations. “The beachheads of Normandy have been opened into beachheads of hope 
for us all—hope for a world without tyranny, without war, without aggression, without 
oppression.” Johnson’s use of “beachhead” here is particularly notable, a military term 
referring to “a fortified position of troops landed on a beach.”602 Obviously, this 
definition describes the story of D-Day, but Johnson added a metaphorical connotation to 
the term. Normandy as a literal, physical beachhead was now a “beachhead of hope for us 
all,” the promise that the principles of freedom and liberty could triumph over fascism, 
totalitarianism, and Soviet communism. Reagan would use this same term in 1984, yet 
with a slightly different twist that could be interpreted as extending an olive branch to the 
Soviet Union. 
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Although it was not widely publicized like Reagan’s speech in 1984, Johnson’s 
address on the twentieth anniversary of D-Day is important because it offers a clear and 
compelling explanation for why D-Day still mattered as U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
was escalating quickly.603 In his conclusion, the president reemphasized the centrality of 
Normandy as a physical and metaphorical location symbolizing the nation’s commitment 
to defending freedom. “So let all the world know that when this Nation has stood 2,000 
years[,] we shall not have forgotten the lands where our sons lie buried, nor the cause for 
which our sons died.” The nation would never forget Normandy, for it represented the 
values and ideals for which so many men gave their lives on June 6, 1944. Just as the 
United States did not abandon its moral responsibility to defend liberty during World 
War II, Johnson pledged that “[w]here we have commitments to the cause of freedom, we 
shall honor them—today, tomorrow, and always.” Implied here was the presence of 
twenty thousand U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, a country whose “freedom” 
from North Vietnamese communist influence the United States took seriously.604 Johnson 
then extended this commitment beyond U.S. interests and to the rest of the world. 
“Freedom is not the cause of America alone, however, nor the hope of Western man 
alone,” he said. “It is the one cause and the one hope which unites in spirit all men around 
the globe, whatever their country or their color or their creed. After these last 20 years we 
can believe that freedom is the tide of history—and we of the West stand astride that 
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wave, confident of what lies ahead.”605 Here Johnson described freedom as the active 
agent in this particular scenario—the tide of history that could not be stopped. The United 
States simply stood astride that wave, although quite certainly helping it along. “On this 
anniversary,” the president concluded, “the memory of yesterday’s battles in war only 
move us all to fight more valiantly today’s battles for tomorrow’s peace.”606 It is notable 
here that Johnson described “this anniversary” as an occasion warranting reflection on the 
past and consideration of the present to ensure future security. In this description, 
Johnson used Normandy and the events of D-Day to constitute a shared community of 
fellow citizens dedicated to “fight[ing] more valiantly today’s battle’s for tomorrow’s 
peace”—whether in South Vietnam or along the Iron Curtain. 
Two days after Johnson’s remarks in the Rose Garden, CBS News aired a special 
broadcast entitled “D-Day + 20” for CBS Reports. In the ninety-minute special, news 
anchor Walter Cronkite and former supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary 
Force and former president Dwight D. Eisenhower led the nation on a tour of key sites at 
Normandy. CBS’s announcement of the broadcast described the program as one in which 
Eisenhower would give “his personal recollections of D-Day and the liberation of France, 
as well as his reflections on the meaning of the wartime events for today’s world.” 
According to the executive producer Fred W. Friendly, “‘There will be no other generals 
or politicians or statesmen on the program. It will be one soldier’s personal way of saying 
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it was all worthwhile.’”607 The program aired on Friday night, June 5, from 8:30 p.m. to 
10:00 p.m. around the country, and the New York Times reported that “West Germany 
and 18 other countries . . . purchased [access to] the show.”608 There was much press 
anticipation of the broadcast, and the news media focused on the eyewitness account 
Eisenhower would provide of June 6, 1944. The Los Angeles Times wrote that the general 
and former president would offer “personal recollections of D-Day decisions and 
experiences as well as place the day and the invasion in historical perspective.”609  
This special broadcast brought the nation—and world—to the scene of battle, 
with the general who commanded the invasion narrating events. Citizens saw images of 
Pointe du Hoc, Omaha Beach, and the bunkers where German soldiers tried to stop the 
Allied advance. The program also offered sweeping views of the French coastline and 
moving images of the thousands of white crosses at the Normandy American Cemetery. 
Although the U.S. public would have seen print images of Normandy and perhaps even 
newsreel footage of D-Day just weeks after the invasion, these televised images would 
offer a new personal connection to the events twenty years earlier. Eisenhower offered 
his own recollections of D-Day as they moved from place to place, and these reflections 
were interspersed from camera footage CBS obtained of the D-Day landings. In the final 
segment of the broadcast, with Eisenhower and Cronkite sitting on a stone wall by with 
white crosses in the background, the former president offered this interpretation of June 
6, 1944:  
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These men came here, British, and our other Allies, and Americans, to storm 
these beaches for one purpose only, not to gain anything for ourselves, not to 
fulfill any ambitions that America had for conquest, but just to preserve freedom, 
systems of self-government in the world. Many thousands men have died for 
ideals such as these. And here again, in the twentieth century for the second time, 
Americans, along with the rest of the free world, but Americans had to come 
across the ocean to defend those same values.610 
Like Johnson, Eisenhower stressed the Allies’ ultimate goal for the Normandy invasion: 
liberating Europe from Nazi Germany and ensuring that the ideals of freedom and 
democracy would triumph over tyranny. 
New York Times writer Jack Gould described the program as “90 minutes of 
quietly moving television.” He noted that “[l]ittle was added to history’s record of the 
turning point in World War II,” but he emphasized the power of listening to 
Eisenhower’s memory in place. “[S]haring first-hand the Allied commander’s illustrated 
remembrance of D-Day was an effective and novel commemoration of the occasion,” he 
wrote. “For both General Eisenhower and the individual viewer it was an experience in 
nostalgia and a reminder of D-Day’s cost, particularly in the closing scene of 9,000 
American graves at St. Laurent-on-the-sea.”611 These visual images of Pointe du Hoc, 
Omaha Beach, the German bunkers, and the U.S. military cemetery coupled with the 
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general’s first-hand account made the events of the past come alive to those watching in 
the present moment, even if they were far removed from the scene of battle. 
One year later, in 1965, President Johnson made mention of the twenty-first 
anniversary of D-Day in a commencement address at Catholic University and argued that 
Normandy offered the prime example the “moral duty” supplying the “wellsprings of 
American purpose.” 
Twenty-one years ago today, on the 6th day of June 1944, it was neither 
isolationism nor imperialism that sent our sons ashore in Normandy to intervene 
in the destiny of the continent of Europe where our culture was cradled. . . . Nor is 
it militarism now that motivates America to stand her sons by the sons of Europe 
and Asia and Latin America in keeping a vigil of peace and freedom for all 
mankind. What America has done—and what America is doing around the 
world—draws from deep and flowing springs of moral duty, and let none 
underestimate the depth of flow of those wellsprings of American purpose.612 
In this speech, Johnson equated Normandy and D-Day with current U.S. foreign policy 
abroad—including military action in South Vietnam. Just as the nation’s “sons [were 
sent] ashore in Normandy to intervene in the destiny of the continent of Europe” in 1944, 
so also would the United States send “her sons” as soldiers around the world to secure 
“peace and freedom for all mankind.” 
After three years of presidential silence on the sixth of June in 1966, 1967, and 
1968, the White House issued a presidential proclamation to commemorate the twenty-
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fifth anniversary of D-Day in 1969. “Twenty-five years ago on June 6,” it read, “Allied 
Forces under the leadership of Dwight David Eisenhower, made a successful landing on 
the beaches of Normandy.” Yet again, the president’s linkage of D-Day with its physical 
location—the “beaches of Normandy”—underscored the site’s symbolic significance in 
national memory. “What happened on that day—and in the days and months immediately 
following—is now part of the acts of valor which have been the inspiration and often the 
salvation of Western civilization. The Sixth of June was transformed on that day from a 
date on the calendar to a historical landmark in the history of freedom.” This 
proclamation articulated exactly how—and why—Normandy and June 6, 1944, had 
become potent symbols in the national imaginary. It was through human action, valor, 
courage, and commitment that a calendar date (and Normandy itself as a physical site) 
was “transformed . . . to a historical landmark in the history of freedom.” In this 
particular description, place and time were inextricably linked. Normandy achieved 
significance because of what happened there on June 6, and the sixth of June meant 
something because of the action that took place at Normandy. “Our Nation and nations of 
free men everywhere are forever grateful for the sacrifices made in Normandy,” the 
statement read. “Twenty-five years have not diminished but have, rather, enhanced the 
profound importance of that day.” In this description, time amplified the symbolic 
significance of Normandy, constituting a shared commonplace that represented 
democratic ideals not just for U.S. citizens, but “nations of free men everywhere”—
including those in the present moment during the Cold War.613 
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After Nixon’s proclamation in 1969, there was no formal presidential 
commemoration of the anniversary of D-Day until 1982.614 This absence is notable, 
particularly in light of larger political issues at home and abroad such as the Vietnam War 
and Watergate. With national morale at an all time low after Watergate and the failure of 
U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia, the lessons of D-Day seemed much murkier. In a 
May 28, 1984, Time magazine article, columnist Lance Morrow captured these 
sentiments particularly well: 
If there has sometimes been a messianic note in American foreign policy in 
postwar years, it derives in part from the Normandy configuration. America gave 
its begotten sons for the redemption of a fallen Europe, a Europe in the grip of a 
real Satan with a small mustache. . . . But when the U.S. has sought to redeem 
other lands—South Viet Nam, notably—from encroaching evil, the drama has 
proved more complex. The war in Viet Nam, in fact, had many Americans 
believing that the evil resided in themselves. So the experience of Normandy, 
bloody as it was, has a kind of moral freshness in the American imagination, a 
quality of collective heroic virtue for which the nation may be wistful. Liberation 
meant something very wonderful and literal then. It had not acquired the cynical, 
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even Orwellian overtone one hears in, say, “the liberation of Saigon.” And there 
were things that seemed worth dying for without question. Today the questions 
always seem to overshadow the commitment. The morals of sacrifice, so clear 
then, are more confusing now.615 
If, as Morrow argues, Normandy provided “a kind of moral freshness in the American 
imagination” throughout Vietnam and Watergate, it is curious that Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter did not utilize this nationalistic commonplace as a mythic antidote to a 
discouraged citizenry. In 1976, Ford made a passing reference to D-Day in a speech in 
Cleveland on June 6, but he only mentioned it to emphasize what the nation was not 
doing. “On this day, the anniversary of D-day on the beaches of Normandy, no American 
soldier is fighting on battlefield anywhere in the world.”616 Where earlier presidential 
commemorations had focused on Normandy as a shining example of U.S. values and 
ideals, here Ford emphasized the nation’s inward focus and assured a war-weary public 
that it was time of peace. 
After thirteen years of presidential silence on the anniversary of D-Day, Ronald 
Reagan delivered two speeches from Paris, France, in 1982: a videotaped message to the 
citizens of France broadcast over national TV and a radio address to the U.S. public at 
home. In the first, Reagan told his French audience that D-Day was significant because 
the Allied nations “fought shoulder to shoulder for democracy and freedom—and won.” 
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The president noted that today’s freedoms were “secured by great men and at a great 
cost” and asked his audience to “remember their courage and pray for the guidance and 
strength to do what we must so that no generation is ever asked to make so great a 
sacrifice again.”617 In this framing, the sacrifices of D-Day required a certain type of 
response; the Western world needed “guidance and strength” to take necessary steps so 
that world war would not happen again. In the radio address to the U.S. public, Reagan 
was more explicit about what D-Day meant for the present moment when he noted that 
“[o]ne lesson of D-Day is as clear now as it was 38 years ago: Only strength can deter 
tyranny and aggression. . . . it was a mighty endeavor, an endeavor of liberty, sacrifice, 
and valor. As we honor these men, I pledge to do my utmost to carry out what must have 
been their wish—that no other generation of young men would ever have to repeat their 
sacrifice in order to preserve freedom.”618 Reagan’s return to this nationalistic 
commonplace demonstrates a careful balance between holding up Normandy as an 
inspiring lesson of the past and assuring the U.S. public that he was committed to keeping 
the nation out of war. 
The purpose of this section has been to outline how previous U.S. presidents 
commemorated D-Day prior to Reagan and to demonstrate how they returned to 
Normandy as a commonplace of Western values and U.S. patriotism during the Cold 
War. But where Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Johnson celebrated Normandy as a pivotal 
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moment in U.S. history representing the nation’s steadfast commitment to protecting and 
defending democracy around the world, this interpretation waned during the late 1960s 
and 1970s. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, however, he revitalized this 
messianic narrative not just in commemorations of D-Day, but within his larger U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. To fully appreciate the president’s address at 
Pointe du Hoc, it is essential to understand how this commemorative occasion reflected 
and advanced earlier statements on his “peace through strength” philosophy. 
 
Reagan’s Cold War Diplomacy 
When Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential 
election by more than eight million votes, many saw Reagan's victory as a direct rejection 
of the president's policies at home and abroad.619 According to a New York Times/CBS 
News Poll, voters ousted Carter because of two main issues: the failing U.S. economy 
and the nation's foreign policy dealings, especially its relationship to the Soviet Union. 
The New York Times reported that two-thirds of voters “cited economic problems such as 
unemployment, taxes and inflation as a key reason for their vote.” Moreover, those polled 
said they wanted the United States “to be more forceful in dealing with the Soviet Union 
‘even if it increased the risk of war’” by a margin of almost 2 to 1.620 “When Ronald 
Reagan took office in early 1981,” writes Paul Fessler, “the United States appeared weak 
and faltering. In foreign affairs, the United States, still reeling from defeat in Vietnam, 
faced not only a Soviet Union expanding into Afghanistan but also a major hostage crisis 
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in Iran. . . . It seemed as if America’s self-image as a confident and strong international 
superpower was fading into a distant memory.”621 Reagan addressed this perception of a 
weakened America in his inaugural address, pledging that as the nation took steps to 
“renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength 
throughout the world. We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope 
for those who do not now have freedom.”622 
Early in his first administration, Reagan delivered several important foreign 
policy addresses that outlined his view on the Cold War, communism, and the Soviet 
Union. In a 1997 interview, Anthony “Tony” Dolan, one of Reagan's chief speechwriters, 
explained that Reagan's foreign policy rhetoric from 1981 to 1983 displayed the 
“evolution of a counter-strategy to the Soviets” that accomplished two things: 
First, it reject[ed] the notion that you cannot be morally candid and confront the 
Soviet Union. In other words, it establishes a sort of dual strategy—a paradoxical 
strategy—of candor and reconciliation. Tough rhetoric and at the same time an 
offer of diplomatic engagement—many offers of diplomatic engagement. But it 
did something else: It rejected containment. It said the Soviet Union is about to 
collapse and we’re gonna push it. That’s all it’s ever really needed. And we’re not 
going to stay on our side of the fifty yard line anymore.623 
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Thirty-five years later, it is difficult to fully appreciate how radical this approach was. 
But after a long history of détente, with U.S. presidents striving to appease the Soviet 
Union, Reagan took a bold—and to many, idealistic—approach. Yet Reagan’s strength, 
writes Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, “lay in his ability to see beyond 
complexity to simplicity. And what he saw was simply this: that because détente 
perpetuated—and had been meant to perpetuate—the Cold War, only killing détente 
could end the Cold War.”624 
Two speeches in particular—the 1982 Address to Members of the British 
Parliament and 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals—set forth a 
substantive view of Reagan’s foreign policy and provided a foundation for his later 
speeches in Normandy.625 On June 8, 1982, just two days after his radio address to the 
U.S. public on the thirty-eighth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan spoke in the Royal Gallery 
of Westminster to members of the British Parliament. In this speech, the president 
highlighted European nations who were seeking freedom from Soviet domination and 
predicted the “the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism 
on the ash-heap of history.”626 He evoked the idea of a special partnership between the 
United States and Great Britain, one that was cemented during World War II and fostered 
by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. As leaders on the world stage, 
Reagan declared that the United States and Great Britain had a responsibility to learn 
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from the mistakes of World War II and act as “[f]ree people, worthy of freedom and 
determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.”627 The 
Westminster Address was Reagan’s opportunity to chart a new course for U.S. foreign 
policy towards the Soviet Union and renew the United States’ partnership with Great 
Britain. Although Reagan’s willingness to relegate Soviet communism to the “ash-heap 
of history” struck many critics as reckless and naïve, his prediction proved correct over 
time.628 Less than a year later, on March 8, 1983, Reagan delivered a speech at the annual 
meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. The president 
called on his audience to resist the temptation “to ignore the facts of history and the 
aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant 
misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and 
wrong and good and evil.” Reagan also maintained that the struggle between democracy 
and communism was not ultimately a matter of military might, but a spiritual crisis, “a 
test of moral will and faith.”629 Instead of simply presenting U.S. democracy and Soviet 
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communism as two competing views of the world, Reagan pronounced one good and the 
other evil. The explicit argument was that the United States was on the side of what was 
right and good, and that the nation had a responsibility to extend democratic liberties to 
those oppressed by Soviet Communism.630 
These two speeches established an important foundation for Reagan’s rhetoric at 
Normandy in at least two ways. First, the president’s address at Westminster and remarks 
to the National Association of Evangelicals emphasized a shared democratic alliance 
between the United States and other Western democracies, most notably Great Britain. In 
1982, the president emphasized the vitality of a U.S.-British partnership throughout 
history. He reminded his British audience (and the U.S. audience at home) that the two 
nations had worked together to defeat Nazi Germany and linked the world situation in 
1941 with the current struggle against Soviet communism. Reagan argued that “[i]f 
history teaches anything it teaches that self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is 
folly” and praised Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s courageous leadership during “the 
dark days of the Second World War.” The choice of the two allies in 1982 was the same 
as it was during World War II: would the United States and Great Britain let “freedom 
wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?” At the end of his 
speech, Reagan set forth a vision for this U.S. / British partnership. “[T]ogether . . . [l]et 
us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage 
the faith and fortitude of the next generation.”631 This explicit link between the Allied 
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commitment during World War II and the present situation continued in Reagan’s D-Day 
commemoration in 1984. 
The second way these speeches provided a foundation for Reagan’s rhetoric at 
Normandy was in his portrayal of the Cold War as a moral struggle between good and 
evil. Reagan’s declaration that communism was an “evil empire” was radical in 1983; all 
previous U.S. presidents had argued for a policy of accommodation and détente towards 
the Soviet Union. When Reagan spoke at Normandy in 1984, he softened his tone but 
still hinted at the underlying spiritual ethic of fighting totalitarianism. Reagan referred to 
the Allies’ “rockhard belief that Providence would have a great hand in the events that 
would unfold here; that God was an ally in this great cause.” Naming God as an “ally,” 
the president argued that Providence was on the side of those who fought Nazi Germany. 
He stated that the Allies were “bound today by what bound us 40 years ago, the same 
loyalties, traditions, and beliefs.”632 Linking the present struggle between democracy and 
communism to World War II, Reagan implicitly stated that God was on the side of the 
Allies in 1984. 
Although Reagan’s main focus at Pointe du Hoc was to commemorate the fortieth 
anniversary of D-Day and honor the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who were present with 
him on stage, the president and his staff also saw this event as an important moment 
within the White House’s larger foreign policy agenda and in the president’s reelection 
campaign. I now turn to archival evidence and personal memoirs to recount the planning 
process for the president’s trip. These documents offer a behind-the-scenes narrative of 
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the White House’s goals for Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc. Of more importance, 
however, they show how Reagan Administration officials saw the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc 
and the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers as crucial rhetorical resources for the president 
to display through his speech. 
 
Setting the Stage for Normandy 
The president’s trip to Normandy in June 1984 was part of a ten-day European 
tour designed to strengthen U.S. ties with its Western allies, particularly Great Britain, 
France, and Ireland. “[O]ur objective,” wrote National Security Advisor Robert C. 
McFarlane to Deputy Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver, “by the time the trip is 
completed, will be to reassert U.S. interest in a stronger and viable Europe within a larger 
policy context embracing both the Atlantic and Pacific communities, while stressing 
shared democratic values.”633 The White House chose specific geographic locations that 
would highlight these themes. In an April 1984 memo, William Flynn Martin, the 
Director of International Economic Affairs for the National Security Council, noted that 
certain places would play a significant role in the president’s trip. He wrote that Reagan’s 
visits to Ireland, Normandy, and London would “provide the President with an ideal 
backdrop for his themes of peace and prosperity and the importance of Allied support and 
cooperation in the achievement of both.” At Normandy, wrote Martin, Reagan should 
Focus on Normandy as a landmark in the transatlantic relationship. Pay tribute to 
the Americans and other Allies who gave their lives in the fight for liberation and 
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link the events at Normandy forty years ago with the reconciliation of former 
adversaries and the establishment of the current period of unprecedented peace 
and prosperity of Europe, based on the continued and continuing US commitment 
to the security of Europe.634 
As both an “ideal backdrop” for the president’s foreign policy goals and “a landmark in 
the transatlantic relationship,” the physical scene and symbolic significance of Normandy 
in U.S. public memory offered powerful visual imagery. In addition, as Martin noted, this 
place would provide a tangible link between past and present; what happened at Pointe du 
Hoc forty years earlier offered an inspiration for future Allied cooperation in Europe. 
Reagan would deliver two addresses on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day—one at 
Pointe du Hoc and the other at Omaha Beach—but the White House saw Pointe du Hoc 
as especially significant.635 In the same April memo, Martin outlined the stops Reagan 
would make on June 6: 
Visit to Normandy: (Three sites: Point [sic] du Hoc, the American cemetery 
memorial and Utah Beach.) Normandy symbolizes the US commitment to 
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Europe, which led directly to the Atlantic Alliance. The President will make brief 
(10-15 minutes) remarks at the Point [sic] du Hoc ceremony to about 500 people, 
including veteran groups. This should be emotional, stirring, and personal. The 
themes include reconciliation of former adversaries, how postwar cooperation has 
kept the peace for the longest period in modern European history, Alliance 
solidarity, and the strength of the American commitment to Europe.636 
Writing that Reagan’s Pointe du Hoc address should be “emotional, stirring, and 
personal,” Martin set the tone for what would become one of the president’s most 
celebrated addresses.  
Secretary of State George P. Schultz extended the idea further in a May 1984 
memorandum to Reagan when he explained why the location of the president’s speech 
was so important:   
It was here on June 6, 1944 that the US Army Rangers scaled the cliffs under 
heavy fire and secured the area to protect the landings at Omaha and Utah 
Beaches… Here you will make your principal statement of the day -- a 15 minute 
speech stressing the bravery of the fallen and the survivors of this battle and 
emphasizing that Normandy marked the beginning of a continuous U.S. 
commitment to the security of Europe.637 
Here Secretary Schultz stressed the foreign policy goals of Reagan’s address at Pointe du 
Hoc: memorialize the dead, honor the living, and show how the events of D-Day worked 
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to strengthen U.S.-European ties in the future. A handwritten note on the top of a May 21, 
1984, speech draft summarized the speech’s overarching theme: “Pointe du Hoc a symbol 
of our selfless effort – against impossible odds men willing to do great deeds.”638 This 
notation hinted at the connection Reagan would draw between the U.S. Army Rangers’ 
heroic action in 1944 and the United States’ ongoing commitment to defending 
democracy against Soviet expansion. 
But it was not simply what happened at Pointe du Hoc that made this place 
significant; the power of the visuals associated with this place was of great importance. A 
speech draft from the National Security Council focused specifically on what one saw 
from the site: “The Cliffs which fall away to this often rough sea witnessed extraordinary 
heroism. Forty years ago -- as part of a great Allied effort -- brave American Rangers 
scaled these heights under fire. This ceremony and this place honors them.”639 A month 
later, in an article for the New York Post just a few days before the commemorative 
ceremonies, journalist Jack Schnedler noted that Pointe du Hoc offered the best “real” 
view of D-Day. “[I]t is hard to visualize that a great and fearsome battled raged only 40 
years ago” at many of the historical sites at Normandy, he wrote. “Time and 
reconstruction have erased the evidence. But Pointe du Hoc, eight miles northwest of the 
U.S. cemetery, is an exception. Atop this 100-foot cliff, which the Germans were thought 
to have fortified with massive 155-mm. guns, the terrain is still a moonscape of craters 
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and shattered bunkers from the Allied bombardment of June 6, 1944.”640 Not only did 
this place symbolize extraordinary heroism and sacrifice; it offered a glimpse into the 
past and the ideal backdrop for Reagan’s retelling of D-Day. Both the White House and 
the Reagan-Bush ’84 reelection campaign planned to use these images to connect with 
U.S. citizens at home and a larger international audience. The White House timed the 
“Pointe du Hoc” speech so it could be broadcast live on U.S. networks over the morning 
news. The “Draft Notional Schedule – Trip of the President to Europe” dated May 7, 
1984, specified that Reagan would arrive at the Pointe du Hoc landing zone at 8:20 am 
EDT (2:20 pm local time), tour the Ranger Memorial for ten minutes with two survivors 
of the Pointe du Hoc landing, and begin his “Remarks to assembled Veterans and 
unveiling of plaque commemorating Point [sic] du Hoc” at 8:40 am EDT (2:40 pm local 
time).36 
White House speechwriter Peggy Noonan was tasked with writing Reagan’s 
speech at Pointe du Hoc. In her memoir of her years at the White House, she described 
the challenge of crafting a speech that would use “big, emotional words and images so 
[the White House Office of] advance and Mike Deaver would be happy” and also retell 
the story of D-Day so anyone, young or old, would understand what the day symbolized 
for the Allies in 1944 and freedom-loving nations in 1984. “I thought that if I could get at 
what impelled the Rangers to do what they did,” she wrote, “I could use it to suggest 
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what impels us each day as we live as a nation in the world. This would remind both us 
and our allies of what it is that holds us together.”641  
Noonan wrote for two audiences: the U.S. public watching the speech on the 
morning news and Reagan’s immediate audience in France, particularly the U.S. Army 
Rangers who had climbed the cliffs on which the president would stand. She knew that 
the speech would be broadcast live in the United States and she imagined the “kids 
watching TV at home in the kitchen at breakfast.” By describing the events of D-Day, 
Noonan wanted to place “it all in time and space for myself and, by extension, for the 
audience. If we really listen to and hear the snap of the flags, the reality of that sound . . . 
will help us imagine what it sounded like on D-Day. And that would help us imagine 
what D-Day itself was like. . . . History is real.”642 By using the images of sight and smell 
and sound, Noonan said she “wanted American teenagers to stop chewing their Rice 
Krispies for a minute and hear about the greatness of those tough kids who are now their 
grandfathers. . . . Pause, sink in, bring it back to now, history is real.”643 The goal was to 
help the U.S. audience, although far removed from the scene of battle, to connect past 
history with the present. As important as the U.S. public was, Noonan structured the 
speech so the president could speak directly to the heroes of his story: the U.S. Army 
Rangers. In the midst of her preparations, the head of Reagan’s advance office told 
Noonan that the men who scaled the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc would be sitting right in front 
of Reagan as he spoke. Noonan later recalled how this information changed her approach 
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to the speech: “[T]he Rangers were going to be sitting all together in the front rows, 
sitting right there five feet from the president. . . . Well then he should refer directly to 
them. He should talk to them. He should describe what they did and then say—. . . . 
‘These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc.’”644 By talking “directly to them,” Reagan could 
celebrate their heroic actions and call on his audience to show similar resolve and bravery 
in the fight between democracy and communism. 
The bodily presence of these U.S. Army Rangers—and the thousands buried in 
the American Memorial Cemetery down the road—triggered another important symbolic 
link in the mind of at least one member of the speechwriting time. In a miscellaneous 
series of notes in the speechwriting files for this address, an unidentified author scratched 
out the following passage from Thucydides’ famed account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration: 
For her[oes] have the E[arth] for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, 
where the column w/ its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a 
record unwritten w/ no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart.645 
Below this paragraph, the author wrote: “Remind people this was written in [the] 400 b.c. 
Funeral oration of Pericles.”646 Although the date of Pericles’ oration was incorrect, the 
author of these notes obviously knew his or her history enough to recognize that 
Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc followed the ancient Athenian tradition of 
memorializing the dead through public speech. This specific quotation suggests the 
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commemorative function Reagan’s speech would fulfill. Although he would not confront 
the immediate shock of death in 1984, he would use this occasion to honor the heroes of 
D-Day who epitomized the values driving the Allied forces in 1944: freedom from 
tyranny, love of country, and moral resolve. Just as the citizens of Athens would listen to 
a revered orator deliver a eulogy over the dead, Reagan’s audience would hear the 
president retell the story of Pointe du Hoc to the very men who enacted the daring feat 
forty years earlier. 
And yet, it would be naïve to assume that the White House had no political goals 
behind Reagan’s trip to Normandy, particularly in the lead up to the 1984 presidential 
election in November. As Secretary of State George P. Schultz wrote to Reagan in May, 
“[t]he public relations highlight of your trip to Europe will undoubtedly be the 
celebrations in Normandy. . . . [t]he intense media interest provides an opportunity for 
you personally, and allied leaders as a group, to reach an unprecedented audience on both 
sides of the Atlantic.”647 In a February 1984 memorandum, the campaign stressed the 
importance of using “the pre-convention period to positively reinforce the President’s 
image as President and leader,”648 and the president’s trip to Europe was a key element of 
this strategy. As Robert McFarlane wrote in a confidential memorandum to White House 
deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver in May 1984, the “Primary Perception” the White 
House sought to advance was that of a “Strong President and the American Renewal: 
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assertive leadership is essential to world peace and prosperity.”649 Deaver planned to use 
footage of the president’s speech at Pointe du Hoc during the 1984 Republican National 
Convention, and a campaign camera crew shadowed Reagan throughout the D-Day 
festivities to secure the perfect visuals for campaign television commercials later in the 
fall.  
The White House capitalized on this widespread media coverage, even granting 
CBS anchor Walter Cronkite (the same broadcaster who interviewed General Eisenhower 
in Normandy twenty years earlier) an exclusive interview with Reagan just after the 
president’s speech at Pointe du Hoc. Five days before the event, Michael Dobbs of the 
Washington Post offered a synopsis of the White House’s adaptation for prime time:  
With its gaze firmly fixed on the presidential elections in November, the White 
House has been anxious to see that photogenic ceremonies coincide with 
breakfast-time television back home. A speech by Reagan at the Pointe du Hoc, 
scene of a heroic assault by 225 U.S. Rangers to seize a gun emplacement at the 
top of a 100-foot cliff, will be beamed back live by all major U.S. networks 
Wednesday morning. Pool arrangements between U.S., French and British 
television stations will provide live coverage by over 30 camera crews of 
ceremonies at the American cemetery above Omaha Beach and at Utah Beach. . . . 
Each network is planning to deploy its big guns, from Walter Cronkite 
broadcasting live from Pointe du Hoc for CBS to Ted Koppel hosting a one-hour 
reconstruction of the D-Day events on ABC’s Nightline. The biggest effort is 
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being mounted by NBC, which has hired its own satellite ground station and is 
fielding 12 camera crews.650 
In the days leading up to the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, numerous television 
programs, radio specials, and newspaper articles also set the stage for the president’s trip 
by interpreting the events of June 6, 1944, for the U.S. public. In May, NBC651 and 
CBS652 aired evening specials on the Allied preparations for and rehearsals of D-Day. 
The week before the anniversary, NBC Nightly News featured a five-part special offering 
a play-by-play of June 6, 1944.653 Newspapers around the country editorialized the 
meaning and significance of D-Day, with op-ed columnists often drawing comparisons 
between 1944 and the current Cold War. 
One particular article is worth mentioning here, because it accurately predicted 
key elements of Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc and an underlined copy sits in 
Noonan’s speechwriting files at the Reagan Library. Time columnist Lance Morrow 
underscored the anniversary of D-Day as a commemorative event, one that would 
encourage the U.S. public to reflect on its heroic action at Normandy and apply these 
moral lessons to the present moment.  
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Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 86-91, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, 
Box 161, Folder: President’s Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
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The ceremonies in Normandy will celebrate the victory and mourn the dead. They 
will also mourn, almost subliminally, a certain moral clarity that has been lost, a 
sense of common purpose that has all but evaporated. Never again, perhaps, 
would the Allies so handsomely collaborate. The invasion of Normandy was a 
thunderously heroic blow dealt to the evil empire. Never again, it may be, would 
war seem so unimpeachably right, so necessary and just. Never again, perhaps, 
would American power and morality so perfectly coincide.654 
In this article, explains historian Douglas Brinkley, Morrow demonstrated “how the D-
Day story had spellbinding, redemptive qualities that Reagan could sell to Cold War 
America. . . . Morrow, perhaps placing himself into the President’s mind-set or psyche, 
explained D-Day to Time readers as an American religious fable or sterling folklore 
moment.”655 Of course, Morrow’s decision to describe Nazi Germany as “the evil 
empire” was most certainly a direct reference to Reagan’s earlier characterization of the 
Soviet Union in 1983. Although the extent to which this article influenced Noonan’s 
writing is not clear, it accurately predicted how Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc would 
tap into the mythic heroism of the U.S. Army Rangers’ actions on D-Day. 
 
June 6, 1984 
When Reagan commemorated the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, 
he celebrated the heroic actions of the Allied soldiers, connected their valor and sacrifice 
to the present moment, and called for future action worthy of this sacrifice. Reflecting on 
                                                
654 Morrow, "June 6, 1944." 
655 Brinkley, The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day, and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion, 
147. 
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the speech in 2004, Washington Post reporter and Reagan biographer Lou Cannon 
described the address as “elegiac,” a term that captures the cadence or repeated rhythms 
adopted by Greek poets to recite national history and memorialize the dead.656 Where 
most fables or folklore ask the audience to imagine the story in their minds, Reagan 
physically displayed (epideixis) the heroes of his narrative in the very place where they 
enacted their daring feats forty years earlier. In what follows, I analyze how Reagan 
utilized deictic spatial and temporal indicators to situate his audience in place and time 
while also “reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the 
future.”657 I argue that the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers and Pointe du Hoc as place 
provided a tangible link between past and present, an enthymematic rhetorical resource 
that visually and physically displayed the lessons of Normandy—courage, sacrifice, 
moral resolve—to the world. And yet it was not enough to simply see the cliffs or the 
bodies withered with age. Instead, I contend that what made Reagan’s speech so powerful 
was how he ascribed meaning and value to “the boys of Pointe du Hoc” and “this place 
where the West held together.” As my analysis will show, Reagan’s references to bodies, 
place, and time offered a powerful nationalistic narrative that drew on the past for 
inspiration while casting a hopeful vision or the future. Each and every time he pointed 
his audience to the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers seated beside him, the president 
reaffirmed their status as military heroes and linked their actions to the larger Allied 
operation on June 6, 1984, forever cementing their status in the annals of U.S. history. 
                                                
656 Lou Cannon, "At 40th D-Day Tribute, Reagan Took the Occasion by Storm," Washington Post, June 7, 
2004. 
657 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 1.3.4. 
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President Reagan spoke with his back to the English Channel with the “boys of 
Pointe du Hoc” seated on both sides of him. This staging was deliberate. A miscellaneous 
note scratched on the back of a White House notepad described the set up: “RR stands in 
front of memorial dagger w/ Rangers, Mrs. Rudder & Mrs. Reagan seated in front on 
same level – In horseshoe – vets dependents[,] other veterans[,] VIP – military brass[,] 
official. RR won’t even be announced. No one else speaks.”658 This arrangement had 
several important effects. Although U.S. presidents most often speak from an elevated 
podium or platform at some distance from the audience, Reagan would situate himself on 
the “same level” as the U.S. Army Rangers. The president and the “boys of Pointe du 
Hoc” would be featured together on the elevated stage, with the larger audience 
assembled around the stage in a “horseshoe” formation. This allowed two rhetorical 
exchanges to occur simultaneously. In the first, Reagan would speak directly to an 
intimate group of sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who had fought to secure the very 
ground on which they sat. In the second, the physical display (epideixis) of the U.S. 
Army Rangers’ bodies would work rhetorically alongside Reagan. For the broader 
audience assembled around the stage—and the millions watching over live television—it 
would be impossible to look at Reagan without seeing the aged soldiers sitting on either 
side of him. The second part of the note reveals an unusual departure from protocol. The 
president would not be announced to the audience, but instead would just walk up behind 
the podium (which did not contain the typical presidential seal) and begin to speak. This 
                                                
658 Miscellaneous Note, no date, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (4),” Box 161, White House Office 
of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library. 
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decision worked as a subtle reminder that the president was not the featured headliner of 
this event. Instead, “the boys of Pointe du Hoc” were the main attraction. 
 
Reagan’s Address at Pointe du Hoc 
Reagan began his address by noting the significance of this historical occasion: 
“We’re here to mark that day in history when the Allied armies joined in battle to 
reclaim this continent to liberty.”659 In his very first sentence, the president situated his 
audience in time and place. “We”—he and the rest of the audience, both those assembled 
at Normandy and the millions watching via television—were gathered “here” at the cliffs 
of Pointe du Hoc to “mark” or commemorate an event in the past. The verb tenses in this 
first sentence signal the first temporal shift: “we’re [we are] here” in the present moment 
to look backward to “that day” in history. The president’s use of “that” directed his 
audience to the past even as he noted that the Allied actions on “that day” secured “this 
continent”—the very ground upon which his immediate audience was seated—for 
liberty. Reagan then invited the audience to imagine the historical context of June 6, 
1944: “For 4 long years, much of Europe had been under a terrible shadow. Free nations 
had fallen, Jews cried out in the camps, millions cried out for liberation. Europe was 
enslaved, and the world prayed for its rescue.” The temporal marker of “4 long years” 
reminded the audience of the duration of Hitler’s shadow across the continent. The lack 
of conjunctions underscored the relationships among these events, and Reagan’s dual use 
of “cried” emphasized the horror of Nazi occupation and the concentration camps, as if 
                                                
659 Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-
day.” All successive quotations from here unless otherwise noted. Deictic indicators have been bolded and 
italicized. 
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the suffering continued, unbound, with no end in sight. These stylistic devices created a 
distinct rhythm that set the tone—solemn, reverent, patriotic—for the rest of the speech. 
After situating his audience in the present moment while pointing them toward the 
past (“we’re here to mark that day in history”), Reagan rooted his audience in place: 
“Here in Normandy the rescue began. Here the Allies stood and fought against tyranny 
in a giant undertaking unparalleled in human history.” The successive use of “here” 
reminded audience that this place was a marker not only on the timeline of “human 
history,” but also the physical location where the Allied rescue of Europe began. “We 
stand on a lonely, windswept point on the northern shore of France,” Reagan 
continued. In this sentence, the president defined the physical scene and setting (this 
place was “lonely” and “windswept”) even as he located his audience geographically on 
the cliffs of Normandy. Although the air was now “soft,” Reagan reminded his audience 
that “40 years ago at this moment, the air was dense with smoke and the cries of men, 
and the air was filled with the crack of rifle fire and the roar of cannon.” Again, the 
president transported his audience back in time to what had happened in this place. These 
powerful metaphors of sight, sound, and smell made the realities of war viscerally 
present. Booming verbs such as “crack” and “roar” anchored the sentence, causing it to 
flow rhythmically and heavily, almost like the sharp popping of artillery. 
After positioning the audience in time and place, Reagan moved from a general 
description of the events at Normandy to a vivid description of what happened at this 
exact spot—Pointe du Hoc: 
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At dawn, on the morning of the 6th of June, 1944, 225 Rangers jumped off the 
British landing craft and ran to the bottom of these cliffs. Their mission was one 
of the most difficult and daring of the invasion: to climb these sheer and desolate 
cliffs and take out the enemy guns. The Allies had been told that some of the 
mightiest of these guns were here and they would be trained on the beaches to 
stop the Allied advance. The Rangers looked up and saw the enemy soldiers -- the 
edge of the cliffs shooting down at them with machineguns and throwing 
grenades. And the American Rangers began to climb. They shot rope ladders over 
the face of these cliffs and began to pull themselves up. When one Ranger fell, 
another would take his place. When one rope was cut, a Ranger would grab 
another and begin his climb again. They climbed, shot back, and held their 
footing. Soon, one by one, the Rangers pulled themselves over the top, and in 
seizing the firm land at the top of these cliffs, they began to seize back the 
continent of Europe. Two hundred and twenty-five came here. After 2 days of 
fighting, only 90 could still bear arms. 
In this passage, Reagan relied on what was visually evident and physically present: 
“these sheer and desolate cliffs,” the beachhead at “the bottom of these cliffs,” the 
hazardous climb to “the top of these cliffs.” These repeated references to the jagged 
boulders lining the shore of France fused Reagan’s spoken texts with its material context. 
“These cliffs” offered a powerful material testament to the courage, bravery, and sacrifice 
of the 225 U.S. Army Rangers who persevered under heavy German artillery fire to make 
it to the top of the embankment. Through deictic indicators (“these cliffs”) and vivid 
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verbal imagery, Reagan transported the audience back to the sights, sounds, and smells of 
the past, inviting them to respond kinesthetically with the Rangers who jumped and ran to 
the bottom of the cliffs upon which they were seated. 
After providing this vivid historical account of the U.S. Army Rangers’ heroic 
climb at Pointe du Hoc, Reagan made the past immediately present by introducing the 
human actors of his narrative: 
Behind me is a memorial that symbolizes the Ranger daggers that were thrust into 
the top of these cliffs. And before me are the men who put them there. These are 
the boys of Pointe du Hoc. These are the men who took the cliffs. These are the 
champions who helped free a continent. These are the heroes who helped end a 
war.  
To Reagan’s immediate audience and the millions watching via television, it would have 
been impossible to look at the president and not see the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers 
seated on either side of him. With the physical presence of these aged soldiers 
immediately before the eyes of all who were watching, Reagan amplified these visual 
images by pointing to these heroes with his words: “These are the boys of Pointe du 
Hoc.” The president used the same word, “these,” to describe the physical scene and 
heroes of the historical narrative. This word choice allowed Reagan to draw the 
audience’s attention to the jagged rocks directly behind him and the elderly men in front 
of him. In a climax construction, Reagan redefined how this struggle had changed these 
warriors. Initially, they were “the boys of Pointe du Hoc”—a poetic description of their 
relative youth on June 6, 1944. But they were more than boys. Reagan described the U.S. 
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Army Rangers’ climb as a movement of maturity; as they took the cliffs, they were 
transformed from boys to men, champions, and heroes who represented the thousands of 
men who fought at Normandy forty years earlier. In this way, Reagan’s physical display 
of the U.S. Army Rangers’ bodies offered a tangible instantiation of the sacrifices of D-
Day while also shifting the discourse from the immediate to the imaginary. 
 With the aged soldiers now front and center for his immediate and extended 
audience, Reagan linked these brave men to other Allied troops, using vignettes vivid in 
their specificity to describe other soldiers and nations who had fought beside the U.S. 
Army Rangers. Scottish soldier Bill Millin of the 51st Highlanders cheerfully played his 
bagpipes as he led a group of reinforcements to rescue British soldiers trapped near a 
bridge, and Lord Lovat of Scotland apologized for being “a few minutes late” coming 
from “the bloody fighting on Sword Beach, which he and his men had just taken.” There 
were others, too. Reagan praised the “impossible valor of the Poles who threw 
themselves between the enemy and the rest of Europe as the invasion took hold, and the 
unsurpassed courage of the Canadians who had already seen the horrors of war on this 
coast. They knew what awaited them there, but they would not be deterred.” Reagan 
enumerated “a rollcall of honor”: the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Poland’s 24th Lancers, the 
Royal Scots Fusiliers, the Screaming Eagles, the Yeomen of England’s armored 
divisions, the forces of Free France, and the Coast Guard’s “Matchbox Fleet.” By 
specifically naming these groups, the president made their sacrifices present to the 
assembled audience and emphasized that the U.S. Rangers had not won the battle alone. 
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This listing also underscored the need for Allied cooperation in the present-day struggle 
against Soviet communism. 
After recognizing the other nations who fought to free Europe in this historical 
narrative, Reagan returned to the present moment and spoke directly to the heroes of his 
story. “Forty summers have passed since the battle that you fought here.” In this first 
sentence, the president emphasized the passing of time while also emphasizing the 
inextricable link between this place and the events that unfolded on June 6, 1984. 
Although “forty summers [had] passed,” the physical presence of the elderly veterans 
“here” at Pointe du Hoc reinforced the importance of this place and this commemorative 
occasion. Reagan then contrasted the U.S. Army Rangers’ physical appearance in the 
present moment with their youth in 1944: 
You were young the day you took these cliffs; some of you were hardly more than 
boys, with the deepest joys of life before you. Yet, you risked everything here. 
Why? Why did you do it? What impelled you to put aside the instinct for self-
preservation and risk your lives to take these cliffs? What inspired all the men of 
the armies that met here? We look at you, and somehow we know the answer. It 
was faith and belief. It was loyalty and love. 
As Reagan translated the heroic actions of the men sitting before him, their physical 
bodies displayed the lessons of Normandy that so many U.S. presidents had referenced 
earlier. The enthymematic argument Reagan started developing was this: if these men 
had been willing to risk their lives and give up the “deepest joys of life” to free other 
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nations and defend their own country from Nazi tyranny, the United States had a moral 
obligation to follow their example forty years later.  
The president continued his interpretation of the soldiers’ bravery, extending the 
U.S. Army Rangers’ action at Pointe du Hoc to the broader Allied alliance in 1944—and 
1984. 
The men of Normandy had faith that what they were doing was right, faith that 
they fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant them mercy on this 
beachhead or on the next. It was the deep knowledge -- and pray God we have 
not lost it -- that there is a profound, moral difference between the use of force for 
liberation and the use of force for conquest. 
Again, the president’s verbal pointing to the U.S Army Rangers—and, by extension, all 
those who fought on D-Day—made their faith, courage, and sacrifice physically present. 
Reagan emphasized that the “men of Normandy” fought a battle “for all humanity,” and 
explained that it was this enduring belief in the justice of their cause that motivated the 
Allied forces forty years earlier. This reflection on the past quickly shifted to the 
immediate present when the president expressed his hope that the Allies had not forgotten 
the “profound, moral difference” between liberation and conquest. The president then 
interpreted the U.S. Army Rangers’ action in light of this moral lesson: “You were here 
to liberate, not to conquer, and so you and those others did not doubt your cause. And 
you were right not to doubt.” Although Reagan did not mention U.S. military action after 
World War II explicitly, his language implied that any involvement by the United States 
overseas designed to “liberate, not to conquer” should receive similar support from the 
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citizenry and government officials—such as military campaigns more recent in the U.S. 
public’s memory, such as Vietnam and Grenada.660 “You all knew that some things are 
worth dying for,” Reagan continued. “One’s country is worth dying for, and democracy is 
worth dying for, because it’s the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised 
by man. All of you loved liberty. All of you were willing to fight tyranny, and you knew 
the people of your countries were behind you.” This bold claim positioned democratic 
freedom above all other governmental structures, in particular the “tyranny” the men of 
Normandy came to fight.  
Reagan continued the narrative by linking the U.S. Army Rangers seated in front 
of him with concrete examples of civic patriotism on the home front and faith-filled 
soldiers at Normandy forty years earlier:  
The Americans who fought here that morning knew word of the invasion was 
spreading through the darkness back home. They . . . felt in their hearts, though 
they couldn’t know in fact, that in Georgia they were filling the churches at 4 
a.m., in Kansas they were kneeling on their porches and praying, and in 
Philadelphia they were ringing the Liberty Bell. 
Reagan’s use of “they” applied not just to the U.S. soldiers fighting at Normandy, but the 
U.S. public in their specific locales—Georgia, Kansas, and Philadelphia. This inclusive 
pronoun worked to unify the Allied soldiers with their family members, neighbors, and 
friends and emphasized that the events of D-Day encompassed the patriotic citizenry 
                                                
660 A miscellaneous note in the speechwriting files suggested that the president should tie the U.S. Army 
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back home. But there was “[s]omething else [that] helped the men of D-day,” Reagan 
explained: “their rockhard belief that Providence would have a great hand in the events 
that would unfold here; that God was an ally in this great cause.” In language quite 
similar to Eisenhower and Roosevelt forty years earlier, Reagan described D-Day as a 
“great cause” that went far beyond one soldier, commander, or Allied nation. Instead, the 
president argued that God was behind “the events that would unfold here” at Normandy 
on June 6, 1944. Again, sharply drawn examples made that point intensely. He told of Lt. 
Col. Robert Lee Wolverton, commander of the 101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army, 
who, when he asked his parachute troops to kneel with him in prayer, said: “Do not bow 
your heads, but look up so you can see God and ask His blessing in what we’re about to 
do.” He told of General Matthew Ridgway, who relied for strength on the Bible, 
“listening in the darkness for the promise God made to Joshua: ‘I will not fail thee nor 
forsake thee.’” Reagan recreated the battle, the fears and hopes of those who fought there, 
and in so doing recreated intense patriotic and religious feelings about the rightness of the 
cause for which the U.S. and Allied forces fought and died. 
Reagan then signaled a subtle shift in his narrative by summarizing: “These are 
the things that impelled them; these are the things that shaped the unity of the Allies.” 
Trusting in the moral uprightness of their cause, the support of their fellow citizens back 
at home, and the providence of God, the Allied soldiers (and the nations they represented) 
unified around a common goal: freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny and ensuring that other 
nations would remain free. After focusing the first half of his speech on the events of 
June 6, 1944, the president continued the historical narrative up to the present moment—
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all while still relying on the place of Normandy and the U.S. Army Rangers’ bodies as 
tangible evidence. “When the war was over, there were lives to be rebuilt and 
governments to be returned to the people. There were nations to be reborn. Above all, 
there was a new peace to be assured. These were huge and daunting tasks. But the Allies 
summoned strength from the faith, belief, loyalty, and love of those who fell here.” 
Despite the difficulties of the post-war years in Europe and the rest of the world, Reagan 
argued that the Allies found inspiration because of the courage and sacrifice of those who 
died at Normandy. Again, the bodily presence of the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers seated 
on stage offered a vivid reminder of the thousands who fought to free France. Here men 
fell and died while holding true to their faith, belief, loyalty, and love; thus, it was here, at 
Normandy, that strength and resolve could be found for the future. 
From this inspiration, Reagan explained, the Allies “rebuilt a new Europe 
together.” The United States “did its part, creating the Marshall plan to help rebuild our 
allies and our former enemies. The Marshall plan led to the Atlantic alliance -- a great 
alliance that serves to this day as our shield for freedom, for prosperity, and for peace.” 
This emphasis on unity and cooperation was also fraught with spatial metaphors. What 
had been decimated by war, famine, and poverty was rebuilt through reconciliation and 
joint resolve. Those who were once enemies—most notably, the German people—were 
now friends and allies, and this friendship provided “our shield” for freedom (and against 
the spread of communism). Despite these shared efforts, “not all that followed the end of 
the war was happy or planned. Some liberated countries were lost. The great sadness of 
this loss echoes down to our own time in the streets of Warsaw, Prague, and East 
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Berlin.” The “loss” of nations to Soviet communism was a bitter blow still evident in 
specific foreign locations. Warsaw, Prague, and East Berlin offered tangible examples of 
the Soviet march across Europe: 
Soviet troops that came to the center of this continent did not leave when peace 
came. They’re still there, uninvited, unwanted, unyielding, almost 40 years after 
the war. Because of this, allied forces still stand on this continent. Today, as 40 
years ago, our armies are here for only one purpose -- to protect and defend 
democracy. The only territories we hold are memorials like this one and 
graveyards where our heroes rest.  
Here Reagan used spatial and temporal indicators to emphasize the problems of the 
present moment. Unlike the Allied troops who came to Normandy “to liberate, and not to 
conquer,” Russian troops came and never left. It was because of their continued presence 
in places like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany that the United States (and 
other Western nations) had stayed. Their one purpose, argued Reagan, was “to protect 
and defend democracy”—a mission that, according to his earlier historical narrative, was 
good and right. In this interpretation, the present-day Soviet presence in Europe was a 
continuation of the Second World War. How could the Allies not continue to defend the 
principles for which so many fought and died on June 6, 1944? 
In the final minutes of the speech, Reagan offered the moral to this story, what 
was to be learned from these events: 
We in America have learned bitter lessons from two World Wars: It is better to be 
here ready to protect the peace, than to take blind shelter across the sea, rushing 
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to respond only after freedom is lost. We’ve learned that isolationism never was 
and never will be an acceptable response to tyrannical governments with an 
expansionist intent. 
It was more important to be “here”—here in Normandy and here in Europe—than living 
in willful ignorance on the other side of the world, Reagan argued. This was the lesson of 
the nation’s isolationist impulse prior to U.S. entry into World War II. The underlying 
implication was that earlier U.S. action against Nazi Germany would have saved 
thousands of lives—including those who died here at Pointe du Hoc. Yet learning was 
not enough; specific actions were necessary. “[W]e try always to be prepared for peace; 
prepared to deter aggression; prepared to negotiate the reduction of arms; and yes, 
prepared to reach out again in the spirit of reconciliation.” The rhythm underscored the 
importance of preparation to respond to possibilities and risks. Reagan stated that the 
United States welcomed reconciliation with the Soviet Union so that both countries could 
“lessen the risks of war, now and forever.” The shift was subtle and somewhat 
unexpected, the language reflecting a desire to reunite in an effort that echoed their past 
alliance. 
This spirit of reconciliation was underscored by Reagan’s public recognition of 
Russian casualties during World War II. “It’s fitting to remember here the great losses 
also suffered by the Russian people during World War II: 20 million perished, a terrible 
price that testifies to all the world the necessity of ending war.” This mention was a last 
minute addition by the National Security Council and State Department. Officials pushed 
the speechwriting staff to include this line, noting that “an addition of a short paragraph 
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alluding to Soviet losses . . . will assist us in maintaining the moral high ground we have 
secured in our public diplomacy struggle with the Soviets.”661 This mention also served 
as an indirect refutation to Soviet press reports charging that the president was attempting 
to “falsify the historic events of 40 years ago” and discount the Soviet’s role in defeating 
Hitler.662 This acknowledgement of the millions of Russian citizens who perished during 
World War II humanized the Soviets. They, too, had lost men, women, and children—
including the more than 4 million that died during the siege of Leningrad.663 Reagan’s 
statement also worked as a metaphorical olive branch to the Russians. “I tell you from my 
heart that we in the United States do not want war. We want to wipe from the face of the 
Earth the terrible weapons that man now has in his hands.” Although the president’s use 
of “you” could have referred to his immediate audience, it also could be interpreted as 
referring to Soviet leaders. He most certainly was aware that the Russians were listening 
to his speech, and Reagan’s personal admission “from [his] heart” made the point 
intensely personal. However, Reagan placed responsibility on the Soviet Union, stating 
that the Russians needed to demonstrate a willingness to work together with the United 
States and other Western allies. “We look for some sign from the Soviet Union that they 
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are willing to move forward, that they share our desire and love for peace, and that they 
will give up the ways of conquest. There must be a changing there that will allow us to 
turn our hope into action.” 
After describing his vision for a post-Cold War world, Reagan shifted his 
audience back to the present moment, immediate scene, and the bodies of the U.S. Army 
Rangers on stage. In these final sentences of his address, Reagan spoke as national priest, 
evoking themes of civic patriotism and religious ritual. “We will pray forever that some 
day that changing will come,” he said. This language recalled the prayers of the faithful 
who watched and prayed for some event to be realized in the future. “But for now, 
particularly today,” Reagan continued, “it is good and fitting to renew our commitment 
to each other, to our freedom, and to the alliance that protects it.” The president’s 
temporal references to “now” and “today” reminded his audience of their present 
obligation as witnesses (theōros) to what happened at Normandy forty years earlier. 
Today, on this commemorative occasion, how should they respond? Today, admonished 
the president, “it [was] good and fitting to renew our commitment to each other,” the 
principles of democracy, and the Western alliance that kept those ideals safe. Reagan’s 
choice of “good and fitting” mirrored Lincoln’s statement that “[i]t [was] altogether 
fitting and proper” that he and the rest of the audience would dedicate the fields at 
Gettysburg.664 Both of these phrases reflected a much earlier religious ritual: the prayer 
that immediately precedes the Eucharist in which the priest leads the congregation in a 
call and response. After the priest says, “Let us give thanks unto our Lord God,” the 
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congregants respond: “It is right and meet to do so.” More contemporary versions list the 
congregation’s response as: “It is right to give him thanks and praise.”665 Although few in 
Reagan’s immediate and extended audience would have made the connection between 
Reagan’s language and these canonical texts of U.S. civil religion and Christianity, the 
cadence was strikingly similar, encouraging those in attendance and watching around the 
world that now was the time for communal reflection, dedication, and a renewed 
commitment to the ideals and values of U.S. democracy. 
The president’s concluding words continued this religious ritual as he reaffirmed 
the United States’ commitment to its Western allies. “We are bound today by what bound 
us 40 years ago, the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs. We’re bound by reality. The 
strength of America’s allies is vital to the United States, and the American security 
guarantee is essential to the continued freedom of Europe’s democracies.” Reagan’s use 
of “bound” implied a covenanting; here, in this place where Allied troops fought and died 
together for freedom, he was renewing the United States’ commitment to defending 
liberty against Soviet communism.666 Moreover, the temporal shift between “today” and 
“40 years ago” reaffirmed the enduring covenant that neither time nor distance could 
sever. The president continued: 
                                                
665 See Samuel Leuenberger, Archbishop Cranmer's Immortal Bequest: The Book of Common Prayer of the 
Church of England: An Evangelistic Liturgy, trans. Samuel Leuenberger and Lewis J. Gorin (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1990), 306. 
666 For more on Ronald Reagan’s covenanting rhetoric, see Margaret H. Kunde, “Ronald Reagan and the 
Resurgence of the Puritan Covenantal Tradition: The ‘City on a Hill’ and a Reorientation of the People of 
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We were with you then; we are with you now. Your hopes are our hopes, and 
your destiny is our destiny. Here, in this place where the West held together, let 
us make a vow to our dead. Let us show them by our actions that we understand 
what they died for. Let our actions say to them the words for which Matthew 
Ridgway listened: “I will not fail thee nor forsake thee.” Strengthened by their 
courage and heartened by their value [valor], and borne by their memory, let us 
continue to stand for the ideals for which they lived and died. 
In this moving conclusion, Reagan employed deictic pronouns to shift between 
describing the United States (“we”; “our”) and their Allied partners (“you”; “your”) in 
the present moment (“now”) to those who fought at Normandy forty years earlier (“our 
dead”). It was “[h]ere, in this place where the West held together,” that the president 
called on the United States and other Western democracies to make a solemn vow—a 
vow not just to each other, but “to our dead.” Again, the bodily presence of the sixty-two 
U.S. Army Rangers who climbed the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc offered a tangible display 
(epideixis) of those men who had lived and died to liberate Europe. How could all 
freedom-loving nations not vow to honor their sacrifice and the thousands who perished 
on these very beaches forty years earlier? Just as the Allies had found strength in the 
“faith, belief, loyalty, and love” of the Allied soldiers during the post-war reconstruction 
of Europe, Reagan argued that the United States and the rest of the world had a moral 
responsibility to continue that mission in the present and future. Here, on this “lonely, 
windswept point on the northern shore of France,” Reagan rededicated this “place where 
the West held together” and constituted his immediate and extended audiences as 
  326 
witnesses (theōros). Although many in the immediate audience were not present at Pointe 
du Hoc in 1944, the president invited them to become fellow soldiers for the cause of 
democratic freedom and demonstrate their moral resolve to “stand for the ideals for 
which [the Allied soldiers in 1944] lived and died.” This commemoration in place was 
particularly powerful because Reagan featured sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers to amplify 
his argument visually. These veterans—the real eyewitnesses to June 6, 1944—provided 
a living, breathing link between the past and the present. 
In this analysis, I have shown how Reagan employed references to bodies, place, 
and time to fuse his spoken text with its immediate context. This close textual reading 
reveals how the president relied on what was physically present as a material means of 
persuasion. However, the majority of Reagan’s audience was not at Normandy. Instead, 
they were watching via live network news. Thus, to fully appreciate the extended appeal 
of Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc, I turn to a discussion of the news network coverage 
of Reagan’s commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of D-Day to show how the 
president’s rhetoric in place was mediated and circulated in the United States and 
throughout Western Europe. 
 
The Mediation and Circulation of Reagan’s Rhetoric in Place 
The White House timed the Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc so it would be 
broadcast live on U.S. networks over the morning news.667 According to the White House 
                                                
667 The "Draft Notional Schedule – Trip of the President to Europe" dated May 7, 1984, specified that 
Reagan would arrive at the Pointe du Hoc landing zone at 8:20 am EDT (2:20 pm local time), tour the 
Ranger Memorial for ten minutes with two survivors of the Pointe du Hoc landing, and begin his "Remarks 
to assembled Veterans and unveiling of plaque commemorating Point [sic] du Hoc" at 8:40 am EDT (2:40 
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Daily Diary, President and Mrs. Reagan arrived at Pointe du Hoc via Marine One at 8:02 
am Eastern Daylight Time (2:02 pm France Daylight Time) and departed for Omaha 
Beach exactly one hour and one minute later.668 This hour slot perfectly coincided with 
television news network morning broadcasts, ensuring that Reagan’s speech would 
receive full coverage. Sweeping panorama shots of Pointe du Hoc (what CNN anchor 
Bernard Shaw described as “the point of reverence”) transported viewers to the beaches 
of Normandy, and camera crews followed the President and Mrs. Reagan as they 
inspected the concrete German Bunkers and walked along the edge of the cliffs. To the 
millions watching in the United States and throughout Western Europe, this live coverage 
offered a unique front row seat to Reagan’s commemoration in place. Viewers heard the 
waves crashing against the rocky shore below and saw gusts of wind blow Reagan’s hair 
out of place. A lone seagull flew out over the English Channel as Reagan spoke. 
Although it was impossible to fully appreciate the multisensory dimensions of Pointe du 
Hoc without being there in person, the dramatic visuals and live media coverage of 
Reagan’s presidential presence in place further amplified the president’s moving 
narrative. 
News network correspondents on the ground editorialized the president’s hour-
long stop at Pointe du Hoc, offering poignant insights into how this place moved them 
personally. ABC correspondent Pierre Salinger described the effect: “You relive the day 
of D-Day, you see these enormous German bunkers . . . it still has the look of war around 
                                                                                                                                            
pm local time. See Draft Notional Schedule, Trip of the President to Europe," May 7, 1984, folder 
"President's Trip to Normandy (2)," Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 
1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library. 
668 Brinkley, The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day, and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion, 
258. 
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it.”669 As the camera crew panned to the hundred-foot cliffs, Peter Jennings asked his 
viewers to look carefully and consider what it must have been like to scale the heights 
under enemy fire. “Look at how high above the water [Reagan] is, forty years ago today, 
imagine people trying to climb up there.”670 CNN anchor Bernard Shaw narrated the 
scene for those watching at home. “You can see how rocky the terrain is,” he said, 
explaining that Pointe du Hoc offered the most realistic picture of what D-Day actually 
looked like forty years earlier. As Reagan listened to two of the Rangers recount their 
climb just prior to his speech, reporter Richard Blystone encapsulated what everyone else 
had attempted to articulate: “These are men to stand in awe of when you stand at the 
place where they did what they did.”671 
During the president’s address, the network cameras focused their attention on 
Reagan and the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers assembled on the platform, with images of 
the jagged cliffs and rocky coastline sprinkled throughout. When Reagan reminded his 
audience of Bill Millin, ABC showed a picture of the British soldier playing the bagpipes. 
Several minutes later, as Reagan recounted the scene of battle, the network played 
historical footage taken of the Allied invasion. These black and white images depicted 
crowded boats motoring toward shore, dead bodies floating in the water, and smoke 
billowing in the distance. After this brief return to the past, ABC returned to the 
                                                
669 “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication 
Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, 
France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
670 “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication 
Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, 
France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
671 “D-Day + 40,” CNN, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication Agency 
videotape collection, “R2005 06/06/1984 President Reagan visit to Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France with 
speech (CNN, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.  
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immediate scene and zoomed in on the U.S. Army Rangers as Reagan asked what 
motivated these men to sacrifice so much for their country. These images—both past and 
present—offered a physical display, an epideixis, of the courage, honor, and sacrifice of 
those who fought on D-Day. “You really do hope that a lot of the very young are 
watching,” Peter Jennings remarked just after the president’s speech, “because . . . there’s 
been this sense of urgency and almost sense of wistfulness” that the current generation 
“don’t have a real sense of what men and women went through to regain their 
freedom.”672 
These live images from Reagan’s commemoration in place also transported the 
U.S. public to the beaches of Normandy, much like Eisenhower’s televised interview 
twenty years earlier. As Kathleen Hall Jamieson observes, “[t]elevision enabled Reagan 
to transport the national audience to the stage he had set in Normandy. . . . The 
dramatization was compelling, the staging unsurpassable, the visual argument politically 
potent.”673 Later in the day, the evening news broadcasts featured similar imagery and 
reporters commented on the persuasive impact this place and the U.S. Army Rangers had 
on those who attended the ceremonies at Pointe du Hoc. ABC reporter Sam Donaldson 
noted that the president relied on the sixty-two veterans “to set the tone for the American 
remembrance.”674 The CBS Evening News highlighted how these men offered a living 
link between past and present:  
                                                
672 “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication 
Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, 
France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.  
673 Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking, 162-163. 
674 “D-Day Anniversary,” World News Tonight, ABC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from 
the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
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[T]he president of the United States came to the beaches of Normandy to touch 
history. The wind and waves were almost calm, unlike 1944, and the sun, not seen 
then, sparkled today over the legions of the dead. At Pointe du Hoc, a sheer 
granite knife-edge 100 feet above the sea, Mr. Reagan heard from men of the 
second ranger battalion how they scaled the cliff under a hail of machine gun fire, 
losing more than half their number before they took the summit, only to be 
trapped there for several days.675 
As one CBS reporter explained, “This solemn occasion was the kind of opportunity that 
comes only to a president to demonstrate statesmanship to the world at large, as well as to 
those back home.”676 
But the press also commented on Reagan’s larger goals for his commemoration at 
Normandy on June 6, 1984. “The White House saw Mr. Reagan’s participation today as 
the perfect moment to reassure Europe that the alliance is strong and to argue 
dramatically that he wants no war,” noted a CBS commentator.677 Tom Brokaw noted 
that the president “used this occasion to reach out to the Soviet Union, an American ally 
forty years ago.”678 But perhaps it was NBC reporter Chris Wallace’s assessment that so 
perfectly described the symbolic significance of this occasion and the White House’s 
goals for the president’s presence at Pointe du Hoc: 
                                                
675 “D-Day Anniversary,” Evening News, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
676 “D-Day Anniversary,” Evening News, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
677 “D-Day Anniversary,” Evening News, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
678 “D-Day Anniversary,” Nightly News, NBC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
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For Ronald Reagan, this was a day to honor the past, and use it to shape the 
future. He began at Pointe du Hoc, a one hundred foot high spike of rock that U.S. 
Rangers scaled with heavy casualties against a German barrage. Thirty [sic] of the 
225 Rangers who fought here returned today [sic]. Mr. Reagan said they saved 
democracy. As he would all day, [he] compared the alliance against the Nazis 
then, to the alliance to the Soviets now. . . . The White House saw this as a big 
event for the President, and used it. He spoke here before meeting French 
president Mitterrand to get on U.S. morning television. Every move had been 
carefully choreographed. White House advance men rushed in children in to wave 
goodbye to the Reagans and then tried to rush their teacher out of the picture. . . . 
The president drew parallels between D-Day and now. But the real pull of that 
June day may that it seems so far off. The U.S. was fighting for right, and it won. 
After Vietnam and Lebanon, the world no longer seems so uncomplicated.679 
For the millions of U.S. citizens watching at home, Reagan’s rhetoric at Pointe du Hoc—
and the bodies he displayed as evidence—presented a moral narrative of the past that also 
supported his present Cold War foreign policy. 
The newspaper coverage of Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc also stressed the 
linkages between 1944 and 1984. In a special report for the New York Times, military 
correspondent Drew Middleton noted that Reagan’s speeches on the fortieth anniversary 
of D-Day “touched common themes, including the bravery of the German enemy and 
                                                
679 “D-Day Anniversary,” Nightly News, NBC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
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sacrifices made by the Soviet Union during World War II.”680 The Los Angeles Times 
described how Reagan “issued a call to ‘wipe from the face of the earth the terrible 
weapons man now has in his hands,’” and made special mention of the president’s 
emphasis on “the 20 million Soviet citizens who lost their lives in the war.”681 According 
to Benjamin Taylor, a writer for the Boston Globe, “[t]he now peaceful beaches of 
Normandy served as a dramatic backdrop yesterday for a ceremony commemorating the 
40th anniversary of D-Day. . . . In remarks laced with emotion and patriotism, Reagan 
castigated the Soviet Union for its military domination of Eastern Europe even as he 
continued to extend the olive branch of reconciliation if ‘they will give up their ways of 
conquest.’”682 These reports highlighted the clear dual message of Reagan’s speeches at 
Normandy: commemorate the past Allied triumph over Nazi tyranny and rededicate the 
Western alliance to defending—and spreading—democracy during the Cold War. 
The circulation of Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc continued into the 1984 
presidential election cycle, most notably in the Reagan-Bush ’84 campaign video entitled 
“A New Beginning.” On the final evening of the Republican National Convention in 
Dallas, Texas, the campaign aired an eighteen-minute video highlighting iconic moments 
and key initiatives of Reagan’s first term in office.683 The film featured snippets of 
                                                
680 Drew Middleton, "Reagan Honors D-Day; Calls for Spirit of Peace," New York Times, June 7, 1984. 
681 "D-Day Remembered: Allied Leaders Honor Heroes of Normandy," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1984. 
682 Benjamin Taylor, "Reagan Lauds Men Who Died on D-Day," Boston Globe, June 7, 1984. 
683 In a strategy memo dated June 19, 1984, the producers of the convention documentary detailed their 
plan for the film, noting that there would be no interviewer or narrator—only the voice of the President. 
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on film.” Memorandum, Sig Rogich to Michael K. Deaver, June 19, 1984, folder "Convention 
Documentary (2)" Box 6, Richard G. Darman Files, Ronald Reagan Library. For a full record of how the 
campaign video worked within the sequence of events that final day of the campaign, see “August 23, 
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Reagan’s speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Beach, including sweeping panoramic 
shots of the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, endless rows of white crosses and Stars of David in 
the Normandy American Cemetery, and the large audience assembled for the joint 
ceremony at Omaha Beach. The most poignant aspect of this section was how the 
campaign interspersed Reagan’s speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha beach with actual 
footage of men storming the beaches on June 6, 1944. In addition, the video also 
contained close up shots of the sixty-two “boys of Pointe du Hoc” and Private Peter 
Zanatta’s daughter, sons, and widow. As the audience listened to Reagan’s narrative of 
the Allied landings at Normandy, they watched black and white footage of soldiers 
swimming to shore. When Reagan recounted the courageous climb of the U.S. Army 
Rangers forty years earlier, the camera zoomed in on the faces of the aged veterans. And 
as the president read aloud from Lisa Zanatta Henn’s letter at Omaha Beach, the audience 
witnessed Zanatta Henn crying in the front row. This juxtaposition of text and image 
provided a striking tribute not just to the men who fought at Normandy, but it also 
reinforced Reagan’s image as a focused, patriotic head of state dedicated to protecting 
U.S. democracy at home and preventing the spread of communism abroad. 
The mediation and circulation of Reagan’s commemoration in place reaffirms 
how Normandy—and, specifically, Pointe du Hoc—functioned as an important means of 
invention and enthymematic proof. The live television coverage of the president’s visit 
transported the U.S. public to the physical scene and setting of Normandy, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
1984, Republican National Convention, Day 4,” C-SPAN, accessed October 21, 2015, http://www.c-
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images of President and Mrs. Reagan strolling through the American Military Cemetery, 
greeting U.S. veterans, and peering out of German bunkers made the past viscerally 
present. As the cable news networks, newspaper reports, and the 1984 Reagan-Bush 
campaign film circulated these images long after the president’s trip to Europe, these 
visuals became inextricably linked to Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc. 
 
Conclusion 
Ronald Reagan’s speech on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc 
stands as an exemplar of presidential commemoration. Thirty years later, this address 
continues to receive critical acclaim. Indeed, Reagan is to Normandy as Kennedy is to 
Berlin; all successive presidential addresses at Normandy are judged by Reagan’s 
speeches in 1984.684 In his speech at Pointe du Hoc, Reagan situated the daring acts of 
sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers within a broader historical context of World War II and the 
Cold War. These men, who had sacrificed so much to liberate Europe from Nazi tyranny 
in 1944, were the living, enduring link between the past and present. They had risked and 
even given their lives; how could the Allied coalition not honor their sacrifice? Here, in 
this sacred place, Reagan called on the Allies to consecrate themselves to the task set 
before them. By directing the audience’s attention to Normandy’s place-as-rhetoric and 
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the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers who secured it forty years earlier, Reagan used 
these symbolic elements of his speech setting to motivate present and future action. 
Indeed, although Reagan’s address was epideictic in form and content, the 
president used this occasion to advance his broader Cold War foreign policy. In a 2013 
interview, Reagan White House speechwriter Peggy Noonan commented on this larger 
goal: 
The text of the speech—the ostensible thing that was being said—was, “Look, 
civilized nations of the West, look what you did forty years ago when you held 
together, joined together, you defeated a terrible tyranny called Hitler’s 
Germany.” So that’s what the speech is. Underneath that, Reagan was really 
saying to all the gathered leaders of the West who were there that day, “Guys, 
look what your parents and grandparents did. If we hold together as they did, we 
are going to defeat together the tyranny of our time—and that is Soviet 
communism.” So, by lauding the World War II generation, Reagan was also 
trying to inspire those who now still had to hold together—the Berlin Wall had 
not fallen—to push that wall over. So, he very consciously . . . used that speech to 
say, “Look what we did last time. We can still do it!”685 
Noonan’s reflection offers insight into why this speech had such resonance in 1984, and 
why it continues to be ranked as one of Reagan’s most celebrated addresses. 
After Reagan’s commemoration in place in 1984, three additional presidents—
William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—have traveled to Normandy to 
                                                
685 Peggy Noonan, “Peggy Noonan on Reagan’s D-Day Speech,” The Kelly File, December 4, 2013, 
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commemorate the anniversary of D-Day and reaffirm the United States’ commitment to 
maintaining freedom around the world. In 1994, Clinton promised the D-Day veterans 
assembled at Normandy, “We commit ourselves, as you did, to keep [freedom’s] lamp 
burning for those who will follow. You completed you mission here. But the mission of 
freedom goes on; the battle continues.”686 Ten years later, on the sixtieth anniversary of 
D-Day, George W. Bush told the surviving veterans, “[Y]ou will be honored ever and 
always by the country you served and by the nations you freed.”687 In 2009, President 
Barack Obama commented on the historical significance of June 6, 1944, noting, “D-Day 
was a time and a place where the bravery and selflessness of a few was able to change the 
course of an entire century.”688 And in 2014, on the seventieth anniversary of the 
Normandy invasion, Obama not only honored those who fought at Normandy, but he also 
acknowledged several U.S. service members who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan 
since 9/11. After introducing several of these individuals to the audience, he told the 
World War II veterans: “[Y]our legacy is in good hands. . . . this 9/11 generation of 
service members—they, too, felt something. They answered some call; they said ‘I will 
go.’ They, too, chose to serve a cause that's greater than self, many even after they knew 
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they'd be sent into harm's way.”689 In his remarks, Obama drew a parallel between the 
“Greatest Generation” and present-day military heroes fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
As Reagan had done before him, Obama used the story of D-Day to inspire patriotic 
sentiment and humble appreciation for these “generations of men and women who proved 
once again that the United States of America is and will remain the greatest force for 
freedom the world has ever known.”690 
These examples of U.S. presidential commemorations of D-Day after 1984 
demonstrate how Reagan’s speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Beach inaugurated an 
important commemorative tradition in U.S. political culture. As “interpreters-in-chief” of 
our shared history, U.S. presidents remind us of our national identity and shared values, 
and one of the primary ways they do this is through public speech.691 At Normandy, 
Reagan used the physical display (epideixis) and visual imagery of the U.S. Army 
Rangers and the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc to link past and present in the “place where the 
West held together.” As a sacred battlefield of war, Reagan’s narrative reaffirmed the 
site’s symbolic significance in the United States’ national imaginary even as it 
(re)constituted it as a place of return in the most literal sense. By traveling to Normandy 
to mark the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan called his audience to pause, to reflect, 
to remember, and to rededicate themselves to the ideals and values for which so many 
Allied soldiers died. Narrating the events of June 6, 1984, to the nation and the world via 
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live television, Reagan translated the story of D-Day—in all its hardship and struggle and 
triumph—into the contemporary moment. To a nation recovering from economic 
inflation and a lost sense of self, the heroic actions of "the boys of Pointe du Hoc" and 
Private Peter Zanatta provided a moral lesson that was just as applicable in 1984 as it was 
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Chapter Six: The U.S. Presidency, Place, and the Cold War 
 
 
The purpose of this study has been to argue for the significance of place in U.S. 
presidential public address. Put simply, place matters. In the preceding pages, I have 
suggested that when U.S. presidents speak in place, they do one or more of the following: 
(1) invest the location with symbolic meaning through speech; (2) harness the political and 
cultural symbols always already present to build conceptual and literal commonplaces 
(topoi) for the ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning 
embedded in that place; (3) constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the 
United States’ role in it; and (4) reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. In my 
introductory chapter, I outlined six guiding assumptions motivating this project. To 
conclude, I return to these assumptions to summarize the key implications of this study and 
to suggest areas for future research.  
 
Place 
Presidential invocations of place build on prior symbolic resonances even as they 
(re)appropriate such resonances for present and future purposes. Analyzing the 
significance of place in relation to public address requires that the critic write a rhetorical 
history of the place itself. Doing rhetorical history offers us, in the words of Kathleen J. 
Turner, “the opportunity to see rhetoric as a perpetual and dynamic process of social 
construction, maintenance, and change rather than as an isolated, static product.”693 As 
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such, doing a rhetorical history of place reveals how places condition rhetorical acts and, 
conversely, rhetoric’s potential to make and remake place. 
For Truman, speaking at the Lincoln Memorial simultaneously challenged 
previous presidential rhetoric in place (namely, President Warren G. Harding’s dedication 
speech in 1922) even as it supported the NAACP’s strategic adaption of the Memorial 
through Marian Anderson’s 1939 concert. After Truman’s address, numerous speakers 
connected with the Civil Rights movement spoke or performed at the Lincoln Memorial. Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s address in 1963 is the most notable, of course, but other political 
leaders, including several U.S. presidents, followed the precedent set by Truman and 
delivered civil rights addresses at the Lincoln Memorial. Kennedy’s invocation of Berlin as 
evidence of the failures of communism built on the city’s symbolic status during the Cold 
War, particularly its prominence during the 1948 Berlin Airlift and the 1961 Berlin Crisis. 
Since Kennedy’s speech in 1963, six other U.S. presidents have traveled to Berlin to deliver 
significant foreign policy speeches. After D-Day, Normandy became a physical symbol of 
U.S. moral resolve and commitment to defending democracy abroad, one that early Cold 
War U.S. presidents invoked to support military operations overseas. When Reagan spoke at 
the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, he became the first U.S. president to attend a ceremony 
commemorating the occasion and used the story of D-Day—and Normandy’s place-as-
rhetoric—as physical evidence for his Cold War foreign policy. Since his visit in 1984, 
Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have traveled to Normandy to honor the 
memory of those who died and apply the lessons of D-Day to the contemporary moment. 
These three case studies reveal why writing a rhetorical history of place is so important, for 
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it allows the critic to understand the symbolic resonances Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan 
activated through speech and how their rhetoric in place invited—and still invites—future 
presidential rhetoric in situ.  
 
The U.S. Presidency 
Presidential presence and oratorical performance in place amplifies the rhetorical 
dimensions of that location even as the physical speech setting contributes to the 
president’s own authority and ethos. As U.S. presidents amplify a site’s importance in the 
public imaginary by making place present, they also bolster their own rhetorical authority 
and ethos because that place matters to the U.S. public. As such, presidential presence in 
place reveals a co-constitutive relationship between presidential authority and rhetoric in 
place, a back and forth exchange between presidential authority as a function of ethos and 
the symbolism embodied in the history and memory of a place itself. My analyses of 
Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan reveal how presidential rhetoric in situ helps chief executives 
strengthen their rhetorical ethos even as they designate certain places as politically 
significant.  
As the first president to address the NAACP in person, Truman used the place of his 
address to link his recent civil rights initiatives to Abraham Lincoln’s legacy and Marian 
Anderson’s 1939 Easter Sunday concert at the Lincoln Memorial. By speaking to the 
NAACP at the Lincoln Memorial, Truman marked himself as a staunch supporter of civil 
rights and reaffirmed the monument as a prominent site of racial struggle. For Kennedy, 
traveling to West Berlin was an attempt to bolster his foreign policy credentials and 
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leadership on the world stage. Kennedy’s physical presence—“the vigorous, young 
American giving off hope and enthusiasm,” wrote a Washington Post columnist—at the 
Berlin Wall made U.S. commitment to West Berlin tangible and personal, particularly when 
Kennedy introduced himself as a fellow citizen of Berlin.694 When Reagan spoke at Pointe 
du Hoc, he connected his Cold War foreign policy to the events at Normandy forty years 
earlier and underscored the United States’ commitment to defending democracy in the 
present moment. For Reagan, the “boys of Pointe du Hoc” provided a living link between 
past triumphs and present realities, and the place symbolized the specific geopolitical 
policies the president sought to advance.695 In all three case studies, the presence of the 
president communicated that the place—and all that place symbolized—mattered on a 
national and global scale. 
 
Materializing the Topoi 
When U.S. presidents travel to and speak from place, they constitute civic 
commonplaces that are physically real, using their presidential authority to transform 
what was once a symbolic conceptual resource into a literal storehouse of shared values, 
ideologies, and ways of being in the world. Presidential rhetoric in place activates the 
conceptual “storehouses of social energy” publics find persuasive and adds a material 
dimension to them.696 My analyses of Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan demonstrate how 
                                                
694 Marquis Childs, "President to See a Sunny Germany," Washington Post, June 17, 1963. 
695 Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-
day.” 
696 Citrón, "Democracy and Its Limitations," 100. 
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all three presidents (and their staff) saw the location of the president’s address as a 
physical instantiation of their larger Cold War argument. 
For Truman, the Lincoln Memorial offered a space for communal rededication 
and renewal. Speaking in the shadow of Abraham Lincoln and reaffirming the sixteenth 
president’s status as the Great Emancipator, Truman called the nation to return to the 
ideals Lincoln represented and extend his Emancipation Proclamation to the nation and 
the world. Kennedy’s decision to visit West Berlin in 1963 was directly related to the 
city’s symbolic status at the height of the Cold War. As the first U.S. president to visit 
West Berlin since 1945, Kennedy made the place physically present to the U.S. public by 
being there himself and telling his immediate and extended audience that the city offered 
the most tangible evidence of the failures of communism “for all the world to see.”697 
Likewise, Ronald Reagan used the memories embedded in Normandy to advance his 
larger Cold War argument. To a nation still recovering from the failures of Vietnam and 
the Watergate scandal, Pointe du Hoc offered a hopeful commonplace that represented 
U.S. patriotism and moral resolve. 
 
Mediation and Circulation 
The mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric in place—be it through 
photographs, newspaper coverage, radio, television, and/or the Internet—reveals how in 
situ rhetorical performances fuse spoken discourse with the visual and spatial elements of 
the rhetorical act and how these verbal/visual texts circulate in, around, and through place 
                                                
697 Kennedy, “Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin.” 
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over time. My three case studies also demonstrate how the mediation of presidential 
rhetoric in place conditions how audiences perceive and experience this phenomenon.  
Walter White and the NAACP made specific plans to circulate Truman’s address 
via radio within the United States and around the world via a State Department broadcast. 
The NAACP also arranged for newsreel footage to be taken of the event, and audiences 
around the country listened to the president declare that “all Americans” should enjoy 
“these rights” from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.698 Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin 
was televised throughout both West and East Germany, and footage of the event was 
promptly flown back to the United States for the U.S. public. Moreover, the United States 
Department of Defense produced a thirty-five minute documentary of Kennedy’s visit to 
Berlin and the United States Information Agency created another film that chronicled 
Kennedy’s trip for audiences abroad.699 The Reagan White House specifically timed the 
president’s speech at Pointe du Hoc to coincide with the morning news cycle in the 
United States, and news networks frequently interspersed their live coverage with images 
of D-Day forty years earlier. The mediation and circulation of presidential presence in 
place extends beyond the moment of utterance, pushing critics to consider, in the words 
of Ronald Walter Greene, “the need to redefine the object of public address as a spatial 
encounter at differential speeds of circulation and durations of attention.”700 Because 
presidential rhetoric in place continues to circulate even after delivery, scholars of public 
                                                
698 Truman, “Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.” 
699 See “Five Cities of June, 1963,” United States Government Agencies Collection, John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 2016, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/USG-01-15.aspx and “One Day in Berlin,” United States Government Agencies 
Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 2016, 
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address must account for the ways in which these verbal/visual texts extend over time and 
in/through place, often (re)making place for future rhetoric in situ. 
 
Rhetoric In Situ 
Rhetoric in situ provides a conceptual storehouse—a commonplace—for 
organizing these separate but interrelated themes of place, presence, and the mediation 
and circulation of texts. Throughout this project, I have used the phrase in situ to describe 
rhetoric that has been designed for and delivered in place, rhetoric that is intentionally 
located within a geographic region and yet often circulates beyond a particular point on a 
map. As discussed in chapter two, classical orators used in situ performances to direct 
their audiences to monuments, statues, and temples that symbolized specific civic virtues 
and political ideologies as a material means of persuasion. More recent work on in situ 
rhetoric emphasizes the material or lived dimensions of rhetoric in place, whether it be 
the physical site of classical oratorical performance701 or scholarly participation in “‘live’ 
rhetorics.”702 This project adds another dimension to rhetoric in situ by suggesting that 
critics should attend more carefully to how speakers use language to activate, define, 
constitute, and even transform the persuasive elements of their speech setting. This 
perspective emphasizes the persuasive potential of rhetoric in place. It considers how 
speech deliberately located in place takes on another dimension as it harnesses the 
symbolic power of language and the persuasive power of the place itself. More 
specifically, this in situ orientation pushes scholars of presidential rhetoric to consider the 
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702 Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres, "Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and 
Tensions," 391. 
  346 
spatial, temporal, visual, and sensory dimensions of presidential speech. My analyses of 
Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan reveal how all three administrations saw the persuasive 
dimensions of the president’s rhetorical act as directly linked to its physical placement. 
The presence of the president in place—and the mediation and circulation of his physical 
situatedness in that location—became a material means of persuasion. 
 
A Rhetorical Theory of Deixis 
An analysis of rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place requires a 
theoretical and methodological intervention that accounts for the variety of ways speakers 
use language to activate the material realities of the rhetorical situation and link text with 
context. To fully appreciate how orators activate the material elements of a speech setting 
as a means of persuasion, I have argued that a rhetorical theory of deixis orients the critic 
to the bodies, places, and temporalities implied in and displayed through speech. Because 
every rhetorical act is unique, a deictic approach to close textual criticism will operate 
differently in every instance. In this specific project, deixis reveals the persuasive power 
of presidential rhetoric in place. More broadly, however, this theoretical and 
methodological orientation offers some important insights into the principles of close 
textual analysis, the relationship between text and context, the practice of archival 
recovery, and the role of the critic. 
First, it offers a program of close textual criticism motivated by a critical 
sensitivity to bodies, places, and moments in time. This perspective takes Bühler’s 
“I/here/now” triad as a starting point, yet pushes beyond a simple identification of a 
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speaker’s references to speaker, location, and temporality. It understands rhetoric as an 
embodied practice that is situated in place, located within a particular temporal moment, 
with political ideologies, material effects, socio-economic relationships, and bodily 
sensations interwoven throughout. Second, it pays particular attention to how texts 
activate their contexts and, at the same time, how contexts produce texts. This approach 
extends the bounds of context beyond simply providing the historical background to a 
particular speech act, inviting the critic to understand the rhetorical situation as materially 
real, as a living, breathing “multi-celled organism.”703 Third, it obliges the critic to 
answer recent critical questions posed by in situ criticism, rhetorical fieldwork, and 
ethnography by recourse to archives so as to recover the sights, sounds, and embodied 
experiences the audience experienced firsthand. As many scholars have noted and any 
person who has done archival research knows well, the archive is itself a rhetorical 
phenomenon, a space that often protects privilege and conceals what might be the most 
important pieces of context.704 But what it offers far outweighs these challenges. Through 
speechwriting drafts, internal memos, audio recordings, fuzzy photographs, and yellowed 
newspaper clippings stapled together, the critic is ushered into another time and place, a 
moment that cannot be reproduced and yet is reflected in “the materiality of the trace, the 
immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image.”705 Fourth, and finally, a 
rhetorical theory of deixis affirms the critic’s role in reconstructing the material 
dimensions of the rhetorical situation. Deixis offers the critic a way to identify where and 
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how a speaker uses language to assemble a “foreground upon a background” of the 
speech setting—a metaphorical and literal display of the bodies, locations, objects, and 
temporalities the rhetor chooses to amplify through speech.706 Although it is impossible 
to reconstruct a historical speech event fully, a deictic approach to close textual criticism 
provides a theoretical and methodological approach to uncovering how texts speak in and 
through their contexts. For scholars interested in (re)discovering all the material means of 
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